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Abstract
This thesis consists of three papers in the broad field of Applied Economics. I
focus on three “soft factors”, namely, face-to-face communication, brief social inter-
actions and information updates. I study on how they affect individual and organ-
isational outcomes using different natural experiments. The first chapter provides
causal evidence on how the ability to communicate face-to-face (in addition to elec-
tronic communication) can increase organisational performance. The study exploits
a natural experiment within a large organisation where workers must communicate
electronically with their teammates. A computerized system allocates the tasks to
workers creating exogenous variation in the co-location of teammates. Workers who
share the same room, can also communicate in person. The main findings are that
face-to-face communication increases productivity and that this effect significantly
varies across tasks, team characteristics and working environments. In the second
chapter I construct a novel dataset of immigrants and ships arrived to the US in
the early 20th century to study the effects of brief social interactions and their per-
sistence over time. The chapter shows that individuals travelling (during few days)
with shipmates that have better connections in the US, have higher quality jobs.
Several findings are consistent with the mechanism whereby individuals get informa-
tion or access to job opportunities from their shipmates. The study highlights the
importance of social interactions with unknown individuals during critical life junc-
tures. It also suggests that they are more relevant for individuals with poor access to
information or weak social networks. The third chapter shows that executions cause
a local and temporary reduction in serious violent crime. The interpretation of this
result follows from a theoretical framework connecting information updates with the
increasing ’awareness’ of individuals about the consequences of crime. Consistently
with the predictions of the model, the study finds that effects are stronger when
media attention is high and lower in places with high propensity to apply the death
penalty.
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Chapter 1
Face-to-Face Communication in
Organisations
1.1 Introduction
Workers in teams typically need to communicate effectively with each other, espe-
cially when dealing with tasks that are urgent and complex. While a lot of atten-
tion has been devoted to understanding the effects of team incentives (Burgess et
al. 2010, Bandiera et al. 2013, Friebel et al. 2017) or team composition (Hamil-
ton et al. 2003, Hjort 2014, Lindquist et al. 2017) on performance, the central
issue of team communication has been empirically neglected. A necessary step in
this direction consists of understanding the causal relation between (access to more)
communication and team productivity inside organisations. Unfortunately, even
this first step has been impeded by measurement and endogeneity concerns. There
are well-known difficulties in gaining access to data on the internal operations of
organisations, especially when these are sophisticated enterprises. Yet, without un-
usually rich data it is not possible to measure communication between teammates.
Secondly, the organisational communication infrastructure is typically the result of
an efficiency-maximizing decision process, prompting often insurmountable endo-
geneity concerns.
This paper overcomes these issues by taking advantage of an extremely rich
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dataset and a unique natural experiment in a large and complex public sector organ-
isation. In our setting, individuals working in teams are always able to communicate
electronically. Some teams, exogenously chosen by a computerised system allocat-
ing tasks to workers, can also communicate in person. Therefore, our experiment is
best interpreted as identifying the value of communicating face-to-face, in addition
to electronically.
Our paper has three objectives. Firstly, we provide the first evidence on a causal
link between the ability to communicate face-to-face and team productivity inside
organisations. Secondly, we document substantial heterogeneity in the size of this
relation. In particular, the ability to communicate face-to-face is more valuable to
teams that are demographically homogenous, have experience of working together,
face high pressure, and deal with urgent and information-intensive tasks. In contexts
where encouraging face-to-face communication is costly, this finding suggests that
managers should condition such investments on the nature of the tasks, workers
and production environments. Thirdly, we seek to understand and measure the
operational costs of communication. In our context, these costs arise from workers
being slower to undertake new tasks when they spend time communicating face-to-
face on existing tasks. By contrast, we find no displacement of attention away from
other tasks that workers are contemporaneously handling.
This Study The setting is the branch in charge of answering 999 calls (the equiv-
alent of the US 911) and allocating officers to incidents in the Greater Manchester
Police. An incoming call is answered by a call handler, who describes the incident
in the internal computer system. When the handler officially creates the incident,
its details become available to the radio operator responsible for the neighbourhood
where the incident occurred. The radio operator then allocates a police officer on the
basis of incident characteristics and officer availability. The main metric of perfor-
mance is the time that it takes for the operator to allocate an officer.1 Often, delays
result from the radio operator’s need to gather additional information, which she
can do through a variety of channels including communicating with the call handler
1We describe this measure in detail in Section 1.2. There, we also list its advantages and
potential limitations and explain why the organisation assigned high importance to this measure
during our sample period.
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in person.
To identify the importance of face-to-face communication we exploit both a natu-
ral experiment and highly detailed information throughout the production process.
In the Greater Manchester Police, handlers and operators are spread across four
rooms, each in a separate part of Manchester. Each room contains the radio op-
erators responsible for the surrounding neighbourhoods as well as a subset of the
call handlers, who can take calls from anywhere in Manchester. This arrangement
implies that, for some incidents, an operator reads the information inputted in the
system by a handler located in the same room. For other incidents, the information
will instead have been entered by a handler based in another location. A direct con-
sequence of co-location is that it allows the two teammates, handler and operator,
to communicate face-to-face if they wish to do so.2
We first exploit the fact that the computerised queuing system matching incom-
ing calls to newly available handlers creates exogenous variation in the co-location
of handler and operator. Our baseline finding here is that allocation time is 2%
faster when handler and operator work in the same room.3 This improvement is
not at the expense of observable dimensions of the quality of the allocation, such
as the seniority of the officer sent. We also show that proximity within the room
is important - the effect of co-location is twice as high when handler and operator
are sitting close together. In fact, allocation time is lower even when the same pair
of workers are located inside the room closer together. This last finding rules out
unobservable characteristics in the match between handler and operator (correlated
with co-location) as the explanation for the baseline findings. We provide addi-
tional evidence in this respect with a placebo test that exploits an organisational
restructure that altered the regular workplaces of handlers and operators.
Having identified the causal effect of co-location on productivity, we proceed to
2The alternative to face-to-face communication is further electronic communication. See Sec-
tion 1.2 for details.
3Although not large, this effect compares well with typical annual productivity increases in
the public sector (Simpson, 2009). Another comparison is with the effect of introducing team
performance pay in the field experiment of Friebel et al. (2017), which they find to be 3%. The
effect in our study is twice as large for urgent and information-intensive tasks, among others. At the
police force level the baseline effect adds up to approximately 900 hours per month, a substantial
magnitude.
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establish face-to-face communication as the primary explanatory mechanism. Un-
surprisingly, our organisation did not record any information transmitted through
informal in-person interactions between co-workers, and therefore we are not able to
use these informal messages here. Instead, we provide a set of complementary tests.
Firstly, we use several proxies to show that the quality of the handler’s electronic
communication is not higher when a co-located operator will be reading the inci-
dent’s description. Secondly, we show that operators do not assign higher priority
to co-located incidents, at the expense of other contemporaneous incidents. These
two findings are counter to the most natural channels (alternative to face-to-face
communication) through which co-located teammates could increase productivity.
In addition to results inconsistent with other channels, we also find evidence
in favour of the face-to-face communication channel. We do this by examining
the behaviour of the handler after officially creating the incident. Under the face-
to-face communication mechanism, the handler then spends time talking to the
operator, which temporarily prevents her from being available to take new calls.
Alternative mechanisms, such as better electronic communication by the handler or
higher operator effort, do not naturally have that prediction. We show that handlers
spend more time ’unavailable’ to take new calls following the creation of co-located
incidents, and we interpret this as strong evidence that they are communicating
with their operators in these incidents.
The second objective of the paper is to uncover conditions under which face-
to-face communication is particularly important. We find first that co-location in-
creases productivity more for incidents that are more information-intensive. This is
reassuring, in that it is consistent with the notion that having access to an additional
communication channel is valuable particularly when more information needs to be
transmitted. The effect of co-location is also higher for more intrinsically urgent
incidents, as well as during periods when operators face a higher incident workload.
These last two findings are consistent with each other, in that they both suggest
that operators facing higher time pressure benefit most from being able to gather
information through an additional quick, informal channel. Lastly, we investigate
the characteristics of the teams associated with a higher effect of co-location on
productivity. We provide three separate but mutually consistent results: teams of
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the same gender, similar age, and with a longer history of working together benefit
more from co-location. Together, the three findings indicate that the ability to com-
municate face-to-face benefits more teams that are more cohesive, because of either
demographic traits or a common, shared, experience.
The third objective of the paper is to identify and highlight the operational
costs of face-to-face communication. As mentioned earlier, we do not find that
operators distort their attention towards co-located incidents and at the expense of
other contemporaneous incidents. Negative spillovers of this type do not therefore
seem to be present in our setting. However, we do find that handlers spend more
time unavailable to take new calls after creating co-located incidents. This clearly
imposes a delay on incoming calls whenever the queue of incoming calls is not empty.
In other words, communicating face-to-face has an opportunity cost whenever the
organisation has no slack. We provide a simple theoretical framework and a set of
tests to quantify this cost in our organisation. Empirically, we find that the cost is
very small, relative to the benefits of face-to-face communication. As expected, the
cost is however higher when the number of on-duty handlers is low relative to the
number of incoming calls (i.e. when there is less organisational slack).
Contribution This paper provides, we believe, the first causal evidence on the
relation between (face-to-face) communication and team productivity inside organ-
isations. As is common in organisational economics, the study involves a particular
setting and production technology.4 As such, the implications are stronger for high
pressure environments such as the healthcare professionals assessing and treating
patients in emergency rooms, or the frontline staff and their supervisors in air traffic
control, the military, and other time-critical settings.
More generally, the results on the contingent value of face-to-face communica-
tion have broader applicability. For instance, the results regarding the urgency
and information-intensity of tasks indicate the type of production environments
where investments encouraging communication are likely to be particularly valu-
able. Equally significant is the finding that homogeneous teams benefit more from
4Other recent papers using data from a single organisation include Bandiera et al. (2010),
Bloom et al. (2015) and Chan (2016).
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being able to talk to each other. We briefly mention in the conclusion a number of
policy prescriptions based on this finding.
Lastly, the insights on the operational (opportunity) costs of communication are
of general validity. Of course, increasing communication in the workplace is likely to
be associated in many contexts with fixed costs (such as capital, estate or traveling
costs) that we do not have the information to analyse here. The costs that we focus
on are operational and arise from the fact that every second spent communicating
cannot be devoted to other activities. This is a general trade-off, as is the idea that
this opportunity cost depends on the alternative use of workers’ time and therefore
on the amount of slack in the organisation. While our setting is not unusual in
the existence of this trade-off, it is unusual in that the highly structured nature of
the production process and the granularity of the dataset allow us to estimate it
empirically.
Related Literature Despite its importance, field evidence on communication in
organisations is scant. Gant et al. (2002) argue that the adoption of innovative
HRM practices induces more communication among co-workers. Palacios-Huerta
and Prat (2012) use email exchanges to generate a measure of the relative importance
of individual managers. Bloom et al. (2014) investigate whether firms adopting
technologies such as data intranets altered their spans of control and autonomy
levels. None of these papers explore effects on productivity, as we do.
By contrast, a large body of work investigates whether communication affects
team performance in laboratory experiments. Early research, typically by psychol-
ogists, focused on the shape of the communication networks (Bavelas and Barrett
1951, Leavitt 1951, Guetzkow and Simon 1955). Later on, Weber and Camerer
(2003) study how productivity-enhancing languages emerge and are disrupted dur-
ing mergers. Cooper et al. (1992) and Blume and Ortmann (2007) show that
pre-play communication about strategies increases efficiency in weak-link coordi-
nation games. An advantage of laboratory experiments is that informal messages
between subjects can be observed, something that is much more difficult in real
organisations.5 It is of course unclear how results from the laboratory extrapolate
5In our study, we can (partially) observe the electronic messages between teammates, but not
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to the field.
The experimental variation in this paper relates to the co-location of teammates.
This suggests a link with Catalini (2016), who uses the relocation of departments
in a French university to analyse how search costs and monitoring costs vary with
physical proximity between academics.6. Another related paper is Bloom et al.
(2015), who find that working from home increased productivity in a Chinese call
centre. The contrast with our finding that co-location increases productivity is likely
the result of the many differences between the two settings. A very important one
is the complexity of the production process. While the simple individual production
of Bloom et al. (2015) can be easily monitored and co-ordinated remotely, we show
that, in organisations requiring tight co-ordination between colleagues, working in
the same place may have significant advantages, especially when tasks are relatively
information-intensive.
Plan We describe the institutional setting in Section 1.2. We introduce the data
and the empirical strategy in Section 1.3. We present the main results of the paper
in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, we provide evidence in support of the face-to-face com-
munication mechanism. Section 1.6 explores the heterogeneity of the main results.
In Section 1.7, we provide a cost-benefit analysis of the face-to-face communication
effect. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Setting
We exploit a natural experiment in the Operational Communications Branch (OCB)
of the Greater Manchester Police (GMP). The OCB is the unit in charge of answering
999 calls from members of the public and managing the allocation of officers to the
corresponding incidents. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 provide a simplified visualisation of
the face-to-face messages.
6A large body of work examines the relation between geographical proximity, assumed to
facilitate face-to-face interactions, and the diffusion and generation of knowledge (Jaffe et al. 1993,
Thompson and Fox-Kean 2005) A challenge here is to disentangle geographical distance from other
factors, such as knowledge or social distance, correlated with it. In addition, the typical bird’s-eye
view of these papers does not allow for the isolation of mechanisms explaining why geographical
proximity matters.
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this production process.
Call Handler Emergency calls requesting the police are allocated to call handlers
using a standard computerised queuing system. A result of the system is that any
handler can respond to calls from any Manchester location.
The handler questions the caller, assigns an opening code and a grade level, and
records any information deemed relevant. The grade level can range from one to
three and, very coarsely, determines the official urgency of an incident. The opening
code describes, horizontally and at a fairly detailed level, the type of issue that
the incident relates to (neighbour dispute, disturbance in licensed premises, etc.).
The description of the incident will include information on the individuals involved,
their states of mind, the existence of prior history between these individuals and the
likelihood of further incidents in the near future.7
All the information above is recorded in GMPICS, a specialised IT package used
throughout the GMP to create, record and manage incidents.8 The handler ticks
a box in GMPICS to officially create the incident, and then indicates her status as
’not ready’ (which allows the handler, among other things, to step away from his
desk), or instead ’ready to receive new calls’. Under the ’ready’ status, a call can
arrive at any point and must immediately be answered by the handler. Once an
incident has been created, the handler cannot keep adding details to it.
Radio Operator When an incident is created, it immediately appears on the
computer screen of the radio operator overseeing the Manchester subdivision where
the incident occurred. The allocation of incidents to radio operators is deterministic,
since at any point in time there is only a single operator in charge of a specific
subdivision (a corollary of this is that handlers do not decide to which operator
7The language used in these descriptions is highly efficient, as it includes a large number of
official and unofficial abbreviations for features of incidents that appear repeatedly. For instance,
official abbreviations include A/ABAN (apparently abandoned) and NFA (no fixed abode). Unoffi-
cial but widely used abbreviations include XXX (very drunk). Despite this, the written descriptions
inevitably fail to perfectly communicate the full richness of the information gathered by the call
handler.
8Our personal conversations with multiple handlers, radio operators and their supervisors indi-
cate that GMPICS is widely regarded as an efficient system. GMPICS was developed in-house and
incrementally over more than two decades. OCB staff receive extensive training and accumulate
considerable expertise in its use.
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they assign an incident). Radio operators are in charge of processing the information
inputted by the handler and allocating police officers to incidents, on the basis of
incident characteristics and officer availability.
Lacking a direct link with the caller, the radio operator has to rely on the in-
formation recorded by the handler in GMPICS. It is, however, often the case that
additional information is needed before an officer can be allocated. For instance,
written descriptions of incidents are regarded by radio operators as lacking sufficient
emotional content, which makes it harder to understand the state of mind of the vic-
tim and the impact that the incident has had on it. Similarly, a full characterisation
of the physical surroundings where the incident occurred, or of the complex rela-
tionships between the people involved are often difficult to communicate in writing.
A complete picture of the incident is often necessary to efficiently match incidents
with officers, advise the attending officer of important details that she may find at
the scene, or even understand the level of priority that the incident merits.9
The additional information can be acquired by conducting targeted searches on
specific individuals or addresses in the GMP databases, asking the call handler or
contacting the initial caller directly. Typically, the allocation of an officer will be
delayed until the radio operator can gather this information.
Teamwork In this paper our definition of a team comprises the combination of the
call handler and the radio operator. While officially equal in rank, the positions of
call handler and radio operator are associated with different status within the OCB.
This stems from the fact that the job of radio operator is both more complex and
more stressful, as it involves carrying out a variety of tasks in parallel and bearing the
ultimate responsibility for the outcomes of incidents. The decision-making authority
of radio operators is also wider. For instance, they can overrule the code and grade
allocated by the handler (although this is in practice rare). Accordingly, radio
9Regarding the optimal matching between incidents and officers, note for instance that some
incidents can be responded alternatively by sworn police officers or by PCSOs (police community
support officers) and the likelihood that the more extensive legal powers and expertise of police
officers may be needed is decision-relevant information. Similarly, incidents involving vulnerable
individuals require officers with specialist training, which makes it critical to understand the con-
dition of the caller and other individuals affected. More generally, certain officers are particularly
well-suited to dealing with specific types of incidents or individuals.
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operators earn a higher salary and have on average more experience in the OCB.
Many in fact transferred into radio operations from the call handling desk, a move
widely seen in the organisation as a promotion.
Face-to-Face Communication When a radio operator regards the electronic
description of an incident insufficient, an efficient and fast way to gather this infor-
mation is to ask the handler in person. Alternatively, it is often the handlers who
decide to complement the written description with additional information delivered
face-to-face. When handler and operator are communicating in person, the handler
will need to be in ’not ready’ status, as she may otherwise be forced to abruptly end
the conversation when a new call arrives.
Our conversations with members of the OCB suggest that they attach several
advantages to face-to-face communication: firstly, it is a highly efficient channel, in
that it allows for rapid, short exchanges that provide immediate feedback to both
teammates. Secondly, non-verbal cues can help to communicate fuzzy concepts that
in writing would require lengthy descriptions. Thirdly, it is a more natural vehicle
for the use of colloquialisms that can succinctly and effectively communicate charac-
teristics of an incident including the physical or mental condition of the individuals
involved. For a variety of reasons (including both the potential for misunderstand-
ing and the possibility of future audits of the official GMPICS descriptions) these
colloquialisms are less likely to be used in written communication.
Note that face-to-face communication has two features that electronic commu-
nication lacks. Firstly, it is oral. Secondly, handler and operator are able to observe
each others’ faces. Because communication by phone is not a realistic alternative
in our setting, we are unable to precisely disentangle which of the two features is
responsible for the increase in productivity.10
10Sending an electronic message to the handler is possible in the GMPICS system, although of
course the operator then has to wait for the handler’s electronic response. This response may not
be immediate in the same way that emails are often not immediately answered in standard office
environments. Unfortunately, our very rich data does not include information on these potential
electronic exchanges. Communicating on the phone is theoretically possible but in practice unlikely,
as a handler in status ’ready to take new calls’ cannot be contacted on the phone without first
alerting the handler’s supervisor. On the other hand, a handler can easily switch status from
’ready’ to ’not ready’ if an operator approaches in person with the need to clarify some doubt.
22
Co-Location In the period between November 2009 and January 2012, OCB staff
were spread across four buildings or ’rooms’, each in a different part of Manchester:
Claytonbrook, Leigh, Tameside and Trafford. Every room accommodated the ra-
dio operators overseeing the surrounding subdivisions (Figure 1.3 displays the areas
overseen from each of the four locations). As discussed earlier, call handlers were
not geographically specialised. However, for historical reasons they were also dis-
persed across the four locations. This assignment meant that radio operators would
sometimes be reading the descriptions of incidents created by same room handlers,
while on other occasions the handlers were based in a different part of Manchester.
In January 2012, a major reorganisation of the OCB reassigned all handlers to a
single location (Trafford), while radio operators were divided between Claytonbrook
and Tameside. This put an end to the natural experiment that we study here.
Measures of Performance As is the case with other public sector organisations
(Dewatripont et al., 1999), objectives in the GMP are multifaceted and often vague.
The prevention of harm or damage to property, the satisfaction and reassurance of
the public, and the application of sufficient but proportionate force are all important
objectives that escape precise measurement. Capturing every one of these objectives
with explicit measures of performance is therefore an impossible task. Our first
measure of performance is the allocation time of an incident: the time elapsed
between its creation by the call handler and the allocation of an officer by the radio
operator. We also study the effect of distance on response time: the time between
creation and the officer reaching an incident’s scene.11
The two measures that we use are undoubtedly partial. They do not capture,
for instance, any notion of whether the ’right’ officer was allocated to an incident,
or whether the attending officer was in possession of all the relevant information
prior to arrival. They also do not indicate whether or not excessive or insufficient
11Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for these and other variables. Note that these two
measures are strongly correlated, since response time is equal to allocation time plus the officer’s
travel time. It is worth noting that better information on the part of the radio operator could
affect travel time also. Imagine, for instance, a radio operator deciding whether to allocate the
closest officer, or an officer who is further away but has a specialised skill. Better information could
reveal that the incident does not require the specialised skill, and that the officer with the shorter
travel time can be safely allocated.
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resources were allocated to resolve an incident.
The two measures are nevertheless very important for the organisation that we
study, for two main reasons. The first reason is that the GMP is partly evaluated on
the basis of these variables. Specifically, nation-wide numerical targets for maximum
allocation and response times were introduced by the UK Home Office in 2008.12
The second reason is that these measures are regarded as important determinants
of the public’s satisfaction. UK-wide survey evidence suggests that response time is
one of the most important variables predicting citizens’ satisfaction with the police
forces (Dodd and Simmons, 2002/03).
Table 1.1 provides direct evidence of this in our setting. In the GMP, a subset
of callers is regularly questioned about their satisfaction with the treatment they
received, after their incident has been closed. We obtained these surveys and linked
the response time in our dataset with the answers to the two most important ques-
tions (our dataset is described in detail in the next section). Table 1.1 shows that
there are very strong correlations between these variables. For instance, in incidents
where police response time was below the maximum target prescribed by the Home
Office, satisfaction was .14 standard deviations higher. Callers were also more likely
to report that their opinion of the police had improved. The effects of response
time on satisfaction are not linear, but instead concentrated at the top end of the
response time distribution (Figure 1.4).13
Overall, there is substantial evidence that the leadership of the GMP internalised
the need for minimising allocation and response times. One example can be found
in the GMP Incident Response Policy manual April 2011. Allocation and response
times are the only tactical performance measures mentioned in the manual. In
12For Grade 1 crimes, for instance, these targets were for a maximum of two minutes and fifteen
minutes for allocation time and response time, respectively. The equivalent targets for Grade 2
(respectively Grade 3) were 20 and 60 minutes (respectively 120 and 240 minutes). While these
targets were nominally scrapped in June 2010, police forces continued to regard them as objectives
and to believe that they were being informally evaluated on this basis (Curtis, 2015). Information
on response times was also frequently discussed in the reports produced by the HMIC (the central
body that in the UK regulates and monitors police forces). For an example, see HMIC (2012).
13While we do not claim that these coefficients can be interpreted as causal effects, they suggest
at the very least the type of evidence on which the GMP based their decisions. Unfortunately, we
are unable to use the victim satisfaction variables as dependent variables in the main analysis of
the paper. The number of survey responses is relatively low and it mostly falls outside our baseline
sample period.
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particular, this indicates that:14
The OCB will produce daily reports regarding graded response perfor-
mance. This will include the % of incidents resourced within target and
the % attended within target for each division. This will enable ongoing
analysis of the accuracy of the resource management of that BCU.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section we present and discuss the dataset and main variables of the paper.
We also first explain the empirical strategy to estimate the effect of co-location on
performance, and then justify it with a set of balancing tests. Establishing such a
causal effect is not an easy task. In addition to exploiting the idiosyncratic allocation
of incidents to handlers, which we outline in this section, we will need to consider the
possibility that co-location represents a proxy for unobserved characteristics of the
handler, or handler/operator pair. We postpone the discussion of these confounding
effects, together with the tests that we use to evaluate them empirically, to Section
1.4.
Dataset Our baseline dataset contains every incident reported through the phone
to the GMP between November 2009 and December 2011. We restrict our atten-
tion to incidents where the handler allocated the call a grade below or equal to
three, therefore transferring responsibility to a radio operator rather than to a di-
visional commander. For every incident we observe, among others, the allocation
and response time, the location of the incident, the grade and (horizontal) opening
code, the identity of the call handler and radio operator, and the desk position from
which the handler took the call. The dataset was made available to us under a strict
confidentiality agreement.
14Additional examples include the following. The launching in April 2010 of a website where
the public could access up-to-date statistics on response times, separately for each of the twelve
divisions (Pilling, 2010). Secondly, the fact that throughout our sample period every report by the
GMP to the Manchester City Council Citizenship and Inclusion Overview and Scrutiny Committee
provided detailed statistics on response times and, if these were deemed unsatisfactory, a list of
reasons for the failure.
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Table 1.2 provides basic summary statistics for the main variables in our study.
Note first that our sample size is very large, as it includes close to one million
incidents. In around one in four observations the handler and operator are in the
same room. The performance variables are highly right-skewed. For response, for
instance, the median time is 19 minutes, while the average time is more than four
times larger.15
We find that there is considerable gender and age variation among handlers
and operators. Consistently with our earlier discussion of the differences in status,
operators are significantly older than handlers. They are also more likely to be
female, likely the result of females being more likely to regard the OCB as a long-
term career choice.
Intuition of Empirical Strategy The computerised queuing system allocating
calls to handlers works as follows. As calls come in, they join the back of a call
queue. The system matches the call at the front of the queue with the next handler
that becomes available. If the call queue is empty and several handlers start to
become available, they form their own queue. The system then matches the handler
at the front of the handler queue with the next incoming call. The system creates
exogenous variation in the co-location of the handler and operator involved in an
incident. We visualise this notion in Figures 1.5A and 1.5B where, for simplicity,
we assume that there are only two locations (Trafford and Leigh), rather than four.
Assume that, within a relatively narrow time horizon, two calls (one from Traf-
ford, one from Leigh) reach the queuing system, and that two handlers (one based in
Trafford, the other in Leigh) become available. The exact timing at which handlers
become available is the result of a large number of factors, including the length of
their previous calls, the time at which the calls started, the existence and length
of ’not ready’ periods etc. Similarly, the exact order at which the calls arrive is
the result of many factors, including the times at which the incidents occurred, the
delay in dialling 999 and the further delay in opting for a police service and being
15The maximum value is more than 15 days, likely the result of some error in the classification
of the incident. The fact that the left hand side variables in our regressions are in logarithmic
form should dampen the effect of outlying observations. Nevertheless, in Appendix Table 1.A10
we show that our baseline estimates are robust to the exclusion of these outliers.
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transferred to the GMP. These factors are arguably orthogonal to the factors deter-
mining the order at which handlers become available. It follows that two handlers
that are on duty during the same time period should be equally likely to be the
one assigned to an incoming call. If, as in Figure 1.5A, the handlers are assigned
calls from a subdivision that their room oversees, they will be co-located with the
radio operators with whom they have to communicate electronically. For arguably
exogenous reasons, they may instead be assigned a call (and have to communicate
with an operator) from a different area of Manchester. We capture this variation
with the dummy variable SameRoom, which is the main independent variable in
our study.
We have just argued that, conditional on the exact time period at which a
call arrives, on duty handlers should be equally likely to be assigned that call. In
practice, some rooms (for instance Trafford) are bigger than others (e.g. Leigh)
and therefore contain a larger number of handlers. This implies that the likelihood
of SameRoom = 1 will be mechanically higher if the call originates in a Trafford
neighbourhood, relative to a Leigh neighborhood. Calls originating from Trafford
and Leigh may also have different characteristics, which could independently affect
their average allocation and response times. Therefore, our claim regarding the
exogeneity of the variable SameRoom is only conditional on hour (i.e. year X
month X day X hour of day) and (handler and operator) room fixed effects.16
Estimating Equation Our baseline estimating equation is:
yi = βSameRoomj(i)k(i) + θt(i) + λj(i) + µk(i) + pig(i) + γh(i) + Xi + i (1.1)
where yi is a measure of OCB performance for incident i. Throughout our paper, al-
location and response times are measured in log form, both for ease of interpretation
of the coefficients and in the presence of right-skewness to minimise the effect of out-
lying observations. Consistently with our earlier discussion, we control for θt(i) (the
fixed effect for the hour t at which the incident arrived) and λj(i) and µk(i) (the fixed
16In most regressions, we use hour fixed effects to condition on the exact time period at which
a call arrives. Our findings are qualitative unchanged if we instead control for the half-hour or
quarter-hour period (see, for instance, Appendix Table 1.A7).
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effects for the rooms j and k from which the incident was handled and dispatched).
Our main independent variable of interest is the dummy SameRoomj(i)k(i), which
takes value 1 when rooms j and k coincide.
We also control in our baseline specification for pig(i) and γh(i) (the fixed effects
for the individual handler g and operator h assigned to the incident) and by other
incident characteristics (such as the assigned grade) included in the vector Xi. These
latter controls are not essential for identification, but should contribute to the re-
duction of the standard errors. We cluster these standard errors at the operator
room and year/month level. In Appendix Tables A1 and A2 we show that the base-
line findings are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of additional controls and to
alternative clustering choices.
Balancing Tests Our first set of tests examines the balance of incident (grade,
location of the incident scene), worker (gender, age, location of the desk, current
workload) and room time-varying (measures of current average workload) variables
across the co-location of handler and operator. To perform these tests, we separately
regress each variable on SameRoom, after controlling for hour and room fixed effects:
xsi = βSameRoomj(i)k(i) + θt(i) + λj(i) + µk(i) + i (1.2)
where the variable xsi is a characteristic s of incident i, and the other variables
are defined as above. To ease interpretation, non-binary dependent variables are
standardised.
The results in Figure 1.6, where we label each row in the left axis by the re-
gression dependent variable, plot the estimated confidence intervals of SameRoom.
To illustrate the need for our empirical strategy, we report for every variable the
estimates of two regressions: with and without the hour and room controls. We
find first that SameRoom is (unconditionally) strongly correlated with incident
characteristics: the estimates are large and most are statistically significant. The
introduction of the hour and room controls, however, greatly decreases both the
standard errors and the estimates, which then become extremely small in magni-
tude. For instance, among the non-binary variables all the estimated coefficients
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imply an effect of SameRoom lower than .005 standard deviations of the dependent
variable.17 We also find that, after including the hour and room controls, almost all
the incident characteristics are balanced with respect to the variable SameRoom.18
The variables in Figure 1.6 do not include the incident opening code, an important
determinant of allocation and response times. The opening code is captured em-
pirically by a large set of dummy variables that are mechanically correlated with
each other, which creates a mechanical correlation on the results of balance regres-
sions based on equation (3.3). We therefore switch the dependent and independent
variables, and estimate:
SameRoomj(i)k(i) = αi + θt(i) + λj(i) + µk(i) + i (1.3)
where αi are the fixed effects for the incident opening code. We find that the F-
statistic of joint significance of these effects is 1.15 (P-value = .30), suggesting that
SameRoom and the opening code dummies are conditionally uncorrelated. Overall,
we interpret the results of estimating (1.3) and the regressions of Figure 1.6 as
consistent with our assumption that co-location between the handler and operator
of an incident is conditionally orthogonal to incident, handler, operator and room
time-varying characteristics.
1.4 Baseline Results
In this section we present and interpret the baseline results of the paper. We then
use a number of tests to confirm that these estimates can indeed be interpreted as
17We report the values of the coefficients and standard errors in Appendix Table 1.A13. Ap-
pendix Figure 1.A1 shows that it is the room controls that are critical to the empirical strategy.
Failing to control for the hour of the incident does not lead to a stronger correlation between
SameRoom and the incident characteristics.
18Admittedly, two characteristics are not balanced at the 5% level. Note however that even for
these characteristics the differences are extremely small in magnitude. The significant coefficient
associated with the Grade 1 regression is both small in magnitude and negative, suggesting that
same room incidents are slightly more likely to be allocated a low priority by the handler, and
should therefore have higher allocation and response times. Furthermore, we find in estimating
equation (1.3) that the type of incident (horizontally defined) is uncorrelated with SameRoom. We
also find that all normalized differences of predetermined variables across co-location status (after
partialling out hour and room fixed effects) are lower than .01. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)
highlight that unlike t-statistics, normalized differences do not depend mechanically on sample
size. They suggest that values below 0.25 indicate good balance.
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the causal effect of co-location on performance, rather than the result of co-location
being a proxy for unobserved determinants of allocation and response time. We also
explore whether the quality of the response is different for co-located incidents. The
section concludes with an investigation of potential spillovers onto other (contem-
poraneous) incidents assigned to the radio operator.
Baseline Estimates Our baseline regressions are variations of equation (3.3). In
the first two columns of Table 1.3 we find that allocation and response time are
approximately 2% faster on average when handler and operator are located in the
same room. At the mean (respectively, median) of the independent variable, this
2% translates into 76 seconds (respectively, 5.4 seconds) saved in terms of allocation
time. For response time these savings are of 104 and 20 seconds, evaluated at the
mean and median respectively (see Appendix Table 1.A14 for the results when the
dependent variables are in levels (minutes)). Aggregated over all the incidents in a
month, the savings amount to approximately 900 hours.
We also investigate whether these times are ’on target’. Throughout our sample
period, it was an explicit objective of the UK Home Office that allocation and
response times should typically be below certain levels.19 As a result, the GMP
recorded information on whether the target maximum time was exceeded for an
incident. We use these dummies as dependent variables and find in Columns 3
and 4 that the likelihood of being on target is higher when SameRoom = 1. For
instance, the coefficient in Column 3 indicates that the likelihood of missing the
allocation target decreases by .4 percentage points (around 2% of the mean of .25),
when handler and operator are co-located.
Lastly, we find in Column 5 no evidence of co-location affecting the likelihood
that incidents classified as crimes are cleared by the GMP.20
19See Section 1.2 for details about these targets. The fact that the ’on target’ dummies are
affected by co-location confirms that the results are not disproportionately due to extreme values
of the allocation and response time distributions. In terms of understanding whether the reduction
in allocation and response times is uniform throughout their distribution, Section 1.6 and Table
1.8 show that it is more urgent incidents (i.e. incidents with shorter expected allocation times)
that are more affected.
20The absence of a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of clearing the crime may
be due to the fact that our sample size is much smaller in this regression, since only around 16%
of incidents are crimes. Nevertheless, it is surprising given the findings of Blanes i Vidal and
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Estimates by Distance Inside the Room Table 1.3 has established that co-
location of handler and operator is associated with higher performance, relative
to them working in rooms in separate areas of Manchester. We now investigate
whether performance improves as distance decreases even when handler and operator
are already working in the same room. In addition to providing richer evidence on
the functional form of the relation between proximity and teamwork performance,
within-room variation allows the introduction of handler/operator pair fixed effects
in the regression. We argue in the next subsection that the introduction of these
controls strengthens the credibility of our claim regarding the causal interpretation
of the estimates.
The assignment of desks to workers was as follows. Inside a room, a fixed desk
would be earmarked for the radio operator overseeing a specific subdivision. Han-
dlers, on the other hand, were free to work from any remaining and available desk.
To measure the within-room distance between desks, we use yearly-updated floor-
plans of the four OCB rooms (see Figure 1.7 for an example).21 We set distance to
zero if handler and operator are not in the same room, and add the interaction of
distance and the same room variable to our baseline specification.
We provide two types of evidence. In Table 1.4 distance is measured paramet-
rically, in logs. In Figure 1.8 we instead split distance into four categories of ap-
proximately equal sample size, and plot the interactions of SameRoom with these
dummies. The estimates from both specifications indicate that teammates that sit
closer together are more productive. In the parametric estimation, a 10% decrease in
within-room distance is associated with a 2.6% increase in the effect of SameRoom
on allocation time. The non-parametric evidence is perhaps more informative. We
Kirchmaier (2017) that a faster response time increases the likelihood of clearing the crime. In
that paper, the identification strategy exploits discontinuities in distance across locations next to
each other but on different sides of division boundaries. In the current paper, co-location between
handler and operator would likely not be a valid instrument for response time. The exclusion
restriction is unlikely to be satisfied because co-location could affect clearance likelihood through
many channels in addition to faster response times.
21The floorplans are unfortunately not to scale, which prevents us from measuring distance in
metric units and is likely to introduce measurement error in the within-room distance variable.
Instead, desks are depicted in the floorplans in a matrix (x, y) format. Our measure is therefore
the euclidean distance between desks inside this matrix. D =
√
[(yRO − yH)2 + (xRO − xH)2],
where yRO is the position of the radio operator along the row dimension and the other coordinates
are defined accordingly. As an example, two adjacent desks in the same row or column are at a
distance of one, while the distance between two diagonally-adjacent desks is
√
2 = 1.4.
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find that incidents assigned to workers separated by a distance lower than 2 (e.g. di-
agonally adjacent desks at most) are on average allocated and responded 4% faster.
The effect decreases monotonically with distance and becomes zero when handler
and operator are separated by a distance higher than 4.22
The findings in Figure 1.8 indicate that productivity decays very rapidly with
within-room distance: being on the other side of the room is equivalent to being
on the other side of Manchester. We cannot provide a definitive answer as to why
this is the case. Our conversations with GMP staff have however pointed to the
fact that some handlers ’ supervisors (labelled to us as ’old-school’) discourage the
communication between handlers and operators. This is because these supervisors
feel mostly responsible for managing the flow of incoming calls and therefore view
conversations that occupy the handlers’ time (even if they benefit the rapid alloca-
tion of officers) as hindering that objective. These attitudes often make handlers
unwilling to attract attention by stepping far away from their desks.
Establishing a Causal Interpretation Our preferred interpretation of the find-
ings in Table 1.3 is that: (a) being physically closer allows teammates to commu-
nicate face-to-face, and (b) in settings where information is complex and must be
processed relatively quickly, this additional communication channel is performance-
improving. An alternative interpretation is that call handlers may be better in-
formed or motivated to deal with incidents originating in the geographical area that
surrounds their workplace. To understand this potential confounding effect, note
in Figures 1.3 and 1.5A that SameRoom = 1 when a handler based in a location
is allocated an incident from the geographical area surrounding that location. If
handlers are more effective at dealing with cases that occur closeby, the findings
in Table 1.3 may reflect proximity to the incident scene, rather than to co-location
with the co-worker.
A second alternative interpretation is that co-location may be a proxy for some
unobserved dimension of similarity between teammates. In an extreme example,
imagine that workers communicate through room-specific language, which makes
22To interpret this, note that two desks that are three positions apart along both the row and
the column dimension are separated by an euclidean distance of 4.2. Two desks separated by three
positions along one dimension and two positions along the other are at a distance of 3.6.
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electronic communication with individuals outside one’s room less efficient. This
would be the case if, for instance, there are strong local dialects and the workers
in a room are drawn from the neighbourhoods surrounding that room. In that
case, co-location would represent a proxy for the ease of electronic communication
between teammates, as opposed to providing a performance-improving additional
communication channel.
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.4 we find evidence that is inconsistent with the
two alternative interpretations above. We add a set of handler/operator pair fixed
effects to the baseline regressions, and estimate the effect of distance within the room
on performance. Because handlers and operators do not typically change workplace,
the introduction of pair fixed effects effectively absorbs the same room variable.
We find that the same pair of workers operating from the same room are more
productive when their desks are closer together. The estimated coefficients are in
fact almost identical to those in Columns 1 and 2, without the pair fixed effects.
These effects absorb any time-invariant characteristics of the match between handler
and operator (including the match between the handler and the location of the
incident). The robustness to their inclusion therefore confirms that it is the location
of the handler relative to the operator that causes the estimated Table 1.3 decreases
in allocation and response times.23
A second strategy to evaluate the above is to perform a placebo test using the
post-2012 information. As we mentioned in Section 1.2, the 2012 reorganisation of
the OCB relocated all the call handlers to Trafford, while the radio operators were
split between Claytonbrook and Tameside. Therefore, handlers and operators never
shared a room after 2012. Using the information on the workplaces of handlers
23A potential caveat here is of course that handlers choose daily the desks where they sit,
conditional on these desks being unoccupied. Therefore, within-room distance between handler
and operator cannot be considered random. This would be problematic to the extent that it is
correlated with time-varying characteristics of their match. For instance, it may be that handlers
choose to sit next to operators with whom they have worked on more incidents in the past (if these
seats are available). While this is a theoretical possibility, we note two things. Firstly, handlers and
operators who have worked together on more incidents in the past are empirically not more likely
to sit closer to each other (Appendix Table 1.A11). Secondly, the effect of within-room distance
on allocation time is robust even after controlling for the interaction of the handler/operator pair
and the year/semester pair (Appendix Table 1.A12). In fact the estimates are very similar, if
anything larger. Of course, the introduction of such a large number of fixed effects implies that
this regression is highly demanding, as most of the variation in within-room distance is absorbed.
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and operators just before the reorganisation, we can construct ’placebo same room’
variables taking value one when an incident is allocated to a pair of teammates
that used to be co-located.24 In the estimation of (3.3) we now interact the same
room variable with dummies for each of the five semesters comprising our baseline
period (the last semester of 2009 includes only two months, since the data starts in
November). We then use the post-2012 data to estimate (3.3) again, interacting the
placebo same room variable with semester dummies. The coefficients are displayed
in Figure 1.9.
We find that the same room variable is essentially zero for every semester of
the post-2012 period, while it is negative for most of the baseline period. Note in
particular the large difference in the estimates between late 2011 and early 2012.
This difference suggests that the same pairs of workers that were able to deliver
higher performance when jointly assigned to an incident ceased to do so when they
stopped being co-located. The evidence in Figure 1.9 reinforces the conclusion that
it is indeed distance between co-workers, rather than unobservables correlated with
distance, that improves allocation and response times.25
Effects on the Type of Officer Sent We now study whether the faster allocation
and response times associated with co-located incidents are at the expense of other
dimensions of the quality of the response. As we argued in Section 1.2, these are
typically difficult to measure empirically. One aspect that we can observe in our
dataset is the rank and experience of the officer that was sent to the incident. Officers
with the rank of ’response officer’ are trained (and accumulate on-the-job experience)
specifically to deal with incidents that the police is alerted to. Neighbourhood
officers are instead in charge of patrolling but can be called to attend certain types
24Following the reorganisation radio operators remained in their previous roles in terms of the
subdivisions for which they dispatched officers. Therefore, a post-2012 handler-operator match
continues to capture accurately whether the handler is assigned a case from the geographical area
around her pre-2012 workplace.
25Interestingly, Figure 1.9 also suggests that the effect of co-location on productivity may have
been increasing over time. In November 2009 a major reorganisation had taken place that created
a Manchester-wide handling system and split the roles of handler and operator. Workers may have
taken time to adapt to their new roles, and to fully exploit the sources of higher productivity in
the new setting. In particular, the coefficients of Figure 1.9 are consistent with workers learning
about the performance-improving potential of co-location over time. We return to this issue in
Section 1.6, where we investigate whether individuals that have worked together on more incidents
in the past benefit more from co-location.
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of incidents, for instance if response officers are temporarily unavailable. If the
likelihood of sending an officer with the rank of ’response officer’ is lower for co-
located incidents, a faster response time might be interpreted as being at the expense
of lower ’quality’.
In Column 1 of Table 1.5 we find, however, that this is not the case. In Column
2, we regress the officer’s number of years in the force on the same room dummy,
and again find no correlation. We conclude that, to the extent that we can measure
quality, there is no evidence that co-location is associated with both a faster response
and a worse response.
Spillovers to Other (Contemporaneous) Incidents We now investigate the
existence of potential spillovers from same room incidents into other contemporane-
ous incidents. Radio operators typically have open (i.e. yet to be allocated) several
incidents at the same time. Theoretically same room incidents can generate both
positive and negative spillovers. Positive spillovers will occur, for instance, when the
time and effort that the operator saves on a same room incident (as a result of being
able to gather information more efficiently) is redistributed to other contempora-
neous incidents. Negative spillovers are equally plausible. One potential channel
would be operators assigning higher priority to incidents that have been created by
co-located handlers. If that was the case, the improvement in performance for same
room incidents that we document in Tables 3 and 4 would be, at least partially, at
the expense of other contemporaneous incidents, as attention is diverted away from
them.
To study whether spillovers are in fact present in our setting we first replicate our
baseline specification and use as independent variable of interest the percentage of
incidents assigned to the operator that, in the period surrounding the index incident,
are same room incidents. Positive spillovers should lead to a negative coefficient for
this variable because, if same room incidents are easier to deal with, a higher share
of those will allow for more time and effort being available for the index incident.
Negative spillovers would instead imply that valuable attention or resources are
diverted away from the index incident when other incidents are handled in the same
room, leading to higher allocation and response times, and a positive coefficient in
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this regression.26
We find in Table 1.6 no evidence of either positive or negative spillovers. Given
the uncertainty about the time horizon on which spillovers might occur, we calculate
the independent variable at the 60, 30, and 15 minutes time horizon. We find in
every case that a higher share of same room incidents does not translate into different
performance for other contemporaneous incidents.
We perform a second exercise by ordering the incidents assigned to each operator
according to the time at which they were created. We then create leads and lags for
the four incidents that, for a given operator, immediately precede and follow a same
room incident.27 The estimated coefficients in Figure 1.10 are inconsistent with
the existence of negative spillovers, since none of the lag and lead coefficients are
positive and statistically different from zero. One of the eight coefficients is negative,
providing at most weak evidence of some positive spillovers. Overall, we interpret
Figure 1.10 as suggesting, consistently with Table 1.6, that the improvement in
performance of same room incidents is neither at the expense nor to the benefit of
other contemporaneous incidents.
1.5 Mechanism
The findings above have established the existence of a causal relation between co-
location and performance. Our preferred explanation is that co-location permits
face-to-face interactions which communicate relevant details about incidents. In
this section we first discuss alternative mechanisms, and then provide evidence that
is consistent with the face-to-face communication mechanism but inconsistent with
these alternative mechanisms.
Discussion of the Alternative Mechanisms In addition to the possibility of
communication face-to-face, co-location may change other dimensions of the inter-
26We use the baseline sample for this exercise, since in principle spillovers could occur both to
same room and to non-same room incidents. In Appendix Table 1.A6 we restrict the sample to
including only non-same room incidents and find very similar effects.
27Because incidents are not dispatched immediately, a same room incident could create spillovers
to other incidents that were assigned to the same operator earlier in time.
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action between handler and operator. For instance, under co-location handler and
operator may be more likely to learn each others’ identity. Note importantly that
there are only three alternative channels through which these dimensions can affect
productivity in our setting. The first alternative channel consists of the handler
exerting more effort in the transmission of the GMPICS electronic information un-
der co-location. The second alternative channel is similar: the operator might exert
more effort in the interpretation of this information, and the subsequent allocation of
an officer, for co-located incidents. A third potential channel would be the preferen-
tial allocation of scarce resources, such as police officers, to co-located incidents and
in detriment of other incidents. We do not consider this third channel here because
the evidence in Section 1.4 showing the lack of negative spillovers is inconsistent
with it.28
We can think of two plausible reasons why workers may exert more effort under
co-location, even in the absence of face-to-face communication.29 The first reason
would be some type of silent psychological effect leading to higher priority assigned
to incidents that will be read, or were written, by a same room co-worker. The
second potential reason would be handler and operator exerting silent visual peer
pressure on each other, similarly to the visual pressure among supermarket cashiers
identified by Mas and Moretti (2009).
We regard this second reason as unlikely, in particular with regards to the han-
dler exerting peer pressure on the operator, as several features of the institutional
setting are inconsistent with it. Firstly, while handler and operator are ’teammates’,
they are not actually ’peers’. As discussed in Section 1.2, operators are both more
senior and uniquely responsible for the allocation of the incident, which makes it
improbable that they may feel a lot of pressure from handlers. There is in fact
little scope for handlers to even be aware of the allocation and response times of the
28We anticipate at this point that these three channels are unable to explain the evidence in
Table 1.7, which we discuss below.
29Note that face-to-face communication could lead to the higher motivation of its receiver (in
this case, the radio operator). Storper and Venables (2004) argue persuasively that face-to-face
communication can serve as a signal about the importance of a task, thereby stimulating a ’psycho-
logical rush’ that leads to greater and better efforts. In our context, it is possible that discussing
an incident in person may induce the operator to devote more time and effort to it, and this chan-
nel is not incompatible with the higher ability to deal with the incident resulting from a richer
information set. Similarly, to the extent that the act of communicating face-to-face itself requires
effort by the handler, it is by construction correlated with it.
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incidents that they created, unless they actively search for them in the GMPICS
system. Furthermore, the cognitive and desk-bound activities of the operator are
difficult to monitor visually, especially relatively to manual tasks like supermarket
item checking. For instance, an operator may appear busy by virtue of looking at
her computer screen, while in fact paying little attention to her work. In addition,
there are significant physical barriers (computer monitors, desk screens...) between
the workers in the rooms of our setting. These barriers make it impossible to observe
the behaviour of all but the closest co-workers, unless a handler actively stands up
from her desk. While it is possible in theory for a handler to stand up and watch
over the operator’s shoulder in silence, we think that is an unlikely possibility.
Evidence Inconsistent with the Handler’s Effort Mechanism The first al-
ternative mechanism consists of the handler communicating better electronically.
We now test whether there is any evidence of the handler being more precise and
thorough in the electronic communication of co-located incidents. We have three
good measures of this communication. The first one is the handler’s creation time:
the time elapsed between the handler answering the call and the creation of the in-
cident in the GMPICS system. Remember that this creation time takes place before
the radio operator is informed of the incident’s existence (see Figure 1.2). We ex-
pect that a more thorough and precise electronic communication will require more
time devoted to writing the description of the incident, and probably also to the
elicitation of the information from the caller. In Column 1 of Table 1.7 we however
replicate our baseline specification using creation time as dependent variable, and
find that it is unaffected by co-location.
As complementary measures of the quality of the electronic communication, we
use the number of characters and number of words in the first line of the description
of the incident.30 Unsurprisingly, these two variables are very correlated with each
other, even after conditioning on the baseline set of controls (Appendix Table 1.A8).
30Unfortunately, due to a combination of technical challenges and the extreme confidentiality of
this information, we were not able to obtain the full content of these descriptions. The first line of
the incident description consists of a maximum of 210 characters, and serves as a quick summary
of the nature of the incident. When operators have more than one incident open at one time, they
typically only see the first line of this description, which then plays a role similar to the subject of
an email in an inbox.
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They are also strongly correlated with the creation time, suggesting that, despite
their coarseness, there is valuable information in them. In Columns 2 and 3 of Table
1.7 we find that these variables are not different for co-located incidents.
To conclude, we find no evidence that the electronic information inputted by han-
dlers is better or worse for co-located incidents, relative to other incidents. Therefore,
higher effort on the handler’s part and the resulting better electronic communication
does not appear to be an important mechanism in our setting.31
Evidence in favour of the Face-to-Face Communication Mechanism The
mechanisms outlined above entail different predictions about the behaviour of the
handler after the incident has been created, in particular with respect to the likeli-
hood that the handler is ’not ready’ to take a new call. Consider first the alternative
mechanism whereby the operator exerts more effort for co-located incidents. Han-
dlers are continually monitored by their supervisors, and are expected to remain at
their desks unless there is a reason to leave them. Therefore, any handler exerting
visual pressure on an operator would typically be doing so from her desk, an activity
that is perfectly compatible with being available to take a new call. Similarly, the
notion that operators are psychologically prone to exert more effort for co-located
incidents does not require any change in behaviour on the handler’s part. In partic-
ular, it does not require handlers being more or less willing to take new calls after
creating co-located incidents.
Face-to-face communication, on the other hand, is an activity that typically
requires the handler’s full attention. Being in ’ready’ status while talking to an
operator risks having to either ignore an incoming call (an offence so serious that it is
likely to trigger disciplinary action) or abruptly cut short the discussion of important
details. Therefore, a prediction of the face-to-face communication channel is that,
following the creation of co-located incidents, handlers will be more likely to be in
’not ready’ status. This prediction is not shared by alternative plausible channels.
31Table 1.7 also suggests that co-located handlers do not devote less time and effort to the
electronic communication, in the expectation of complementing the information face-to-face. One
explanation of this lack of substitution may be the fact that an electronic ’paper trail’ needs to be
established by the handler, so that other staff members can access that information in the future
and the handling of the incident is not criticised during later audits.
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In Column 4 of Table 1.7 we replicate the baseline specification using the length
of the ’Not Ready’ interval following an incident as the dependent variable. The
SameRoom coefficient is 2.5% and statistically significant, suggesting that handlers
step away from their desks (or remain on their desks while being unavailable) for
longer periods following co-located incidents. In Column 5 of Table 1.7, we repeat
this exercise using as dependent variable a dummy for whether the handler signals
her immediate availability to take new calls or instead takes some ’not ready’ time
at all. Again, we find that the likelihood of not being immediately available is higher
for co-located incidents. Of course, the organisation did not record informal com-
munication exchanges between co-workers, and therefore we cannot directly observe
these exchanges here. In the absence of such direct evidence, we interpret the esti-
mates in Table 1.7 as strong evidence in favour of face-to-face communication being
the main mechanism through which co-location improves performance.32
1.6 Heterogeneity
In this section we identify characteristics of incidents, teammates and the working
environment that are associated with a higher effect of co-location on performance.
We regard this exercise as one of the main contributions of the paper. As discussed in
the introduction, a better understanding of the specific circumstances in which face-
to-face communication has the highest impact can help guide the communication-
enhancing investments by managers.33
32A potential explanation for the effect of co-location on performance that we have not men-
tioned up to this point is as follows. When the two teammates are within close proximity of each
other as the call handler takes a call, the radio operator overhears the exchange with the caller
and starts preparing her reaction even before the handler has officially created the incident. This
would still represent in-person communication, although of a different kind than the one that we
have been discussing throughout. We have however strong reasons to discard this explanation.
Firstly, the effects are present even when the two teammates sit relatively far apart, such as at
two positions away along the row dimension and three along the column dimension. Secondly, the
noise levels in these rooms are incompatible with the ability to overhear or signal across more than
the very shortest distances. Thirdly and most importantly, this potential alternative mechanism
is unable to explain the evidence in this subsection, whereby the call handler takes longer to be
available for the next call following a co-located incident.
33We add at this point the standard note of caution that the characteristics of incidents and
teams are not randomly allocated, as they may be related to other unobserved characteristics of
the same incidents and teams. For instance, it may be that workers of the same gender tend to
socialise together during breaks and that it is the unobserved variable ’Socialising during Breaks’
that underlies the same gender/same room significant interaction in Table 1.10. This caveat is
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Characteristics of Incidents We first examine whether the effects from Table
1.3 are stronger for some types of incidents, relative to others. We focus on two par-
ticularly relevant characteristics of incidents: their urgency and the complexity of
the information required to understand and describe them. The main hypothesis is
that if co-location improves performance because it enables face-to-face communica-
tion, we should find a stronger effect for complex incidents where a lot of information
must be transmitted. In addition to being intuitive, this hypothesis is consistent
with the vast literature arguing that human production is at a lower risk of being
substituted by technology for (cognitive) non-routine tasks, relative to routine tasks
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).
We also study empirically the relation between the urgency of an incident and
the effect of co-location on performance. In principle, it is unclear what the sign of
this relation should be. On the one hand, the ability to communicate information
quickly might be more valuable and therefore used more often when an allocation
decision needs to be done faster. On the other hand, in very urgent incidents (e.g.
a serious crime in progress) the operator may not want to wait for many nuanced
details and will instead allocate an officer as quickly as possible. If that is the
case, more urgent incidents will be associated with a lower effect of co-location on
allocation time.
Both theoretical concepts, ’urgency’ and ’information intensity’, have elusive
empirical counterparts. The information intensity of incidents is difficult to measure
because we unfortunately lack access to complete characterisations of the features of
every incident in our dataset. We also lack the full GMIPCS descriptions recorded
by handlers, although of course any classification of an incident reliant on the actions
taken by its call handler would risk confusing the diligence or ability of the handler
with the intrinsic features of the incident.
To overcome the measurement challenges above we use information based on
generic incident types to create an indirect measure of information intensity, as
follows. We first classify each incident according to its opening code/grade com-
of course present in every study on differential effects by gender and, more generally, in every
heterogeneity analysis such as the one here. Our objective here is not to claim causal effects
(on the interactions), but instead to understand the type of sub-populations where the effect of
co-location is stronger.
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bination. We then compute the average creation time (the time elapsed between
the handler answering the call and the creation of the incident) for every one of
the resulting 144 combinations. The average creation time of an incident’s type
constitutes our measure of (predicted) information intensity, as it captures how long
on average it takes for handlers to extract information from the caller and record it
in GMPICS, for that incident type. Although the measure is undoubtedly coarse,
our interpretation is that incident types with high average creation time should be
those where the amount and complexity of information is typically the largest. We
construct our measure of (predicted) urgency in an equivalent way, this time calcu-
lating the average allocation time of every incident type (naturally, lower average
allocation time is interpreted as higher urgency).
We interact our measures of information intensity and urgency with the same
room dummy in the baseline regression. For ease of interpretation, these measures
are entered as above-median dummies. The estimates are displayed in Table 1.8.
We find first that incident types of high average information intensity are associated
with a higher effect of co-location on performance.34 We also find (weaker) evidence
on the urgency of incidents exacerbating the effect of co-location. In particular, the
estimate for the interaction with urgency is negative, although statistically signifi-
cant only in the allocation time regression.35
We interpret the estimates from Table 1.8 as indicating that co-location does not
increase performance for non-urgent, non-complex incidents. It, however, decreases
allocation time (respectively, response time) by 4% (respectively, 2.7%) for incidents
that are above-median both in their urgency and their information intensity. The es-
timate on the interaction with information intensity is, in particular, consistent with
the notion that co-location enables an additional communication channel, leading
to higher performance for incidents when a lot of communication is necessary.
34This finding is robust to measuring information intensity with quintiles (Appendix Figure
1.A2) and in parametric (log) format (Appendix Table 1.A4). It is also robust to building the
information intensity prediction exclusively with out-of-sample (i.e. pre-November 2009 and post-
January 2012) observations (Appendix Table 1.A3).
35Both effects become statistically stronger if information intensity is measured parametrically
(Appendix Table 1.A4). However, we find that the effect of co-location does not vary when we
use a simpler and coarser measure of the urgency of an incident: its grade. Although the effect is
stronger for Grade 1 incidents, relative to Grade 2 and Grade 3, the differences are not statistically
significant (see Appendix Table 1.A9).
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Characteristics of the Working Environment In our second heterogeneity
exercise, we study whether co-location improves performance more when workers
have to deal with more incidents. Our main interest is in the workload of the
operator, because it is for operators that a high number of incoming incidents in
their subdivision can start to accumulate, exerting competing demands on their
attention. Our hypothesis is that, if co-location allows operators to quickly resolve
any doubt through face-to-face communication, it should be more valuable when the
time and effort of the operator are scarce, that is, in periods of higher workload.36
Our measure of the operator’s workload is the number of incidents created in
the subdivision that the operator is overseeing during the hour of the index incident
(note that there is a single operator responsible, at any one time, for a subdivision).
For ease of interpretation, we enter this measure in the baseline regression as an
above-median dummy, both by itself and interacted with the same room variable.
The results are displayed in Table 1.9. We first find that allocation and response
times are slower when the operator is busier, as expected. Our main interest is in the
estimate of the interaction between the same room variable and the high operator
workload dummy, which we find to be negative and statistically significant. The
estimated coefficients indicate that co-location reduces allocation time (respectively,
response time) by 1.1% (respectively, .8%) during periods of low operator workload,
but 2.9% (respectively, 2%) during periods of high workload. This finding lends
support to our hypothesis that the benefit of communicating personally with the
handler is higher when the operator is more pressured for time and needs to gather
information more quickly.37
36By contrast, our understanding of the institutional environment is that the notion of being
’pressured for time’ is less meaningful for handlers. Handlers deal with incidents sequentially and
share the responsibility of responding to incoming calls with a large number of colleagues (since
every handler can handle incidents from every Manchester area). Together with the fact that
handlers are not responsible for the allocation of officers to incidents, this implies that we do not
have a strong hypothesis about the relation between our measure below of handler workload and
the effect of co-location on performance
37Our measure of the handler workload is very coarse, mostly because as discussed earlier, the
notion that handlers are busier in some periods relative to others is not clear-cut. We use the
(above-median dummy of the) number of incoming calls during the index hour, divided by the
number of available handlers. Because this variable is defined at the Manchester-wide level, it
is absorbed in the baseline regression by the hour fixed effect. We find in Table 1.9 that the
coefficient on the interaction with the same room variable is smaller in magnitude and only weakly
statistically significant.
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Characteristics of the Workers We now examine whether the effect of co-
location on performance is stronger when the teammates share the same age and
gender, and have worked together more often in the past. This may be the case for
two reasons. Firstly, workers of a similar background (or more familiar with each
other) may be more likely to initiate the face-to-face communication exchanges that
transmit information regarding an incident. This is because they may be more likely
to sit close to each other, or, conditional on the within-room distance, they may be
more likely to leave their desk and talk to each other. Secondly, in-person commu-
nication may also be more efficient among these types of workers.38 Alternatively,
homogenous teams may be so efficient at communicating electronically that addi-
tional in-person communication is more valuable when the team is not homogenous.
In Table 1.10 we display estimates of our baseline specification, where we add a
same gender dummy, the (log of the) difference in age, and the (log of the) num-
ber of past incidents in which handler and operator worked together. We further
interact these variables with the same room variable. To isolate the effect of the
handler/operator pair experience, the specification controls for the individual expe-
riences of handler and operator and their interactions with the same room variable.
Our main finding is that the estimates for the three interactions of interest are
statistically significant and of the expected sign. For instance, the effect of co-
location is 1.6% higher when handler and operator share the same gender. A 10%
increase in the age difference (respectively, number of past interactions) between
handler and operator decreases the effect of co-location on performance by 2.5%
(respectively, it increases it by 2.1%). These findings are consistent with the notion
that face-to-face communication, and therefore co-location, leads to higher perfor-
mance among co-workers that know and understand each other better.39 On the
38Storper and Venables (2004) discuss how the transmission of uncodifiable information (at
which face-to-face communication excels) depends on a ’communication infrastructure’ that is spe-
cific to a sender-receiver pair. This infrastructure is likely improved through learning by doing,
leading to more efficient face-to-face communication as the teammates accumulate experience with
each other. It is also likely more efficient among demographically proximate teammates. Alter-
natively, we could interpret demographic proximity as a proxy for the existence of friendship ties
between two co-workers (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2010). If workers are more willing to
and effective at communicating face-to-face with their friends, a similar prediction for the relation
between demographic proximity and the effect of co-location on performance would arise.
39We find qualitatively similar results when age and past interactions are measured as above-
median dummies (see Appendix Table 1.A5). While not the focus of this paper it is interesting
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other hand, the non-significant interactions with individual experience suggest that,
unless it is specific to the teammate in this particular incident, individual experi-
ence does not by itself allow workers to exploit better the potential advantages of
co-location.
1.7 The Operational Cost of Face-To-Face Com-
munication
In this section we provide a measure of the operational costs of communication.40
In Section 1.4 we found no evidence of negative spillovers to other incidents being
handled contemporaneously by the operator. On the other hand, Section 1.5 has
shown that handlers spend 2.5% more time unavailable to take new calls following
the creation of co-located incidents. This unavailability imposes a cost on the or-
ganisation, as it contributes to incoming calls being answered with a longer delay.
We now provide a framework to measure the opportunity cost of the time spent in
face-to-face communication, so that it can be compared to its benefit.41 We then
compute this cost in our organisation.
Theoretical Framework We formalise the process by which calls to the police
arise, join the call queue and are answered. Assume a population of individuals (of
normalised size 1) who can potentially call the police. Every individual can be in one
out of three states: dormant (waiting for an incident to happen), in the call queue,
or on the phone with the handler. xi, i = 1, 2, 3 denotes the share of individuals in
each state. H < 1 handlers are on duty to answer calls.
Transitions between states are as follows. Dormant callers join the queue at an
to note that, even when teammates are not co-located, a similar age and a longer experience with
each other are still associated with higher performance (although this is not the case for the same
gender variable). A potential explanation of these estimates is that, given the complexity of the
information that must often be transmitted, even electronic communication is more efficient among
these types of teammates.
40Building communication channels between workers may entail fixed investments, and we do
not have the information to measure the cost of these investments here.
41Note that, to the extent that communication takes time and that time cannot be devoted
to other activities, the type of cost that we measure here is present in every organisation where
communication takes place.
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exogenous rate a per unit of time. All callers must spend at least one unit of time
there before being assigned a handler. When a call is being answered, it terminates
(and the caller re-joins the dormant pool) at a constant rate υ (with 1/υ being the
average duration of calls). The number of handlers that become available to take
new calls per unit of time is therefore υx3. The total number of calls answered per
unit of time is then min{υx3, x2}, since it is limited both by the number of newly
available handlers and by the size of the call queue.
Using this simple framework we can show that the size of the call queue evolves
over time depending on the difference between the inflow (the number of dormant
individuals who encounter an incident) and the outflow (the number of queued calls
answered by handlers):
∆x2
∆t
= a (1− x2 − x3)−min{υx3, x2} (1.4)
Similarly,
∆x3
∆t
= min{υx3, x2} − υx3 (1.5)
If υx3 < x2, then it must be that all handlers are busy and x3 = H. Combining
equations (1.4) and (1.5) and assuming a steady state, we compute the time in the
queue for incoming calls, q∗, as:
q∗ =

(1−H)
υH
− 1
a
if H < a
a+υ+aυ
1 if H ≥ a
a+υ+aυ
(1.6)
This simple framework generates the following predictions. First, incoming calls
are answered immediately when there are many handlers (H high), few dormant
calls become actual calls (a low) and calls are brief (υ high). Secondly, ∂q
∗
∂(1/υ)
> 0 so
an increase in average call length leads to longer queuing times. Lastly, this effect
is lower when the number of handlers is higher, ∂
2q∗
∂(1/υ)∂H
< 0. We can interpret an
increase in H as the increase in organisational slack, as the same amount of incoming
work is divided over a higher number of workers. Therefore, this model predicts that
an increase in slack both decreases queuing times and reduces the effect of higher
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average call duration.
Computing the Opportunity Cost of Face-To-Face Communication Sec-
tion 1.5 provided evidence of an increase in ’not ready’ time following the creation
of co-located incidents. This is equivalent in our framework to an increase in the
duration of the call, as it mechanically prevents handlers from relieving the pressure
in the call queue. We now use information on all calls (not just the ones that led to
the creation of incidents) to relate call duration, the number of calls and the number
of on-duty handlers to the average time spent in the call queue. The resulting co-
efficients allow us to understand the opportunity cost of an additional second spent
dealing with a previous call. We estimate:
qi = α + γni(τ) + δhi(τ) + βdi(τ) + i (1.7)
where qi is the (log of the) queuing time of incoming call i, ni and hi are the (log
of) number of calls and on-duty handlers in a time window before i, and di is the
(log of) average duration of answered calls in the same time window.
Table 1.11 Panel A shows that the estimated elasticity of average call duration
on queuing time ranges from .58 to .96. We can compute the effect that an increase
in the duration of a single call j has on the queuing time of future calls as follows.
First, note that such an increase has an effect on the queuing time of a single future
call i that can be computed as βˆ exp(qi)
TDi
, where exp(qi) is the queuing time of i and
TDi is the total duration of the calls preceding i (which include j). Aggregating
over the K calls that follow j, we can write the overall effect of an increase in j’s
duration as βˆ
∑j+K
i=j+1
exp(qi)
TDi
.
The statistic βˆ
∑j+K
i=j+1
exp(qi)
TDi
can be interpreted as the opportunity cost (in terms
of additional queuing time of future calls i = j + 1 . . . K) of increasing the duration
of call j by one second. This statistic can be computed directly from our dataset,
using the elasticity estimated in Table 1.11 and information on the queuing time
of every call, together with the duration of the calls preceding it. Using a time
window of 60 minutes to define the calls affected by the increase in the duration
of a preceding call, we calculate it as 0.13 seconds. In Table 1.7 we estimated that
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co-located incidents increase ’not ready’ time by 2.5%. Evaluated at the mean of
’not ready’ time (66 seconds), co-located incidents are therefore associated with a
cost of 0.13 × 2.5% × 66 = 0.21 seconds.42 In our organisation, this is arguably a
small cost, when compared with the decreases in allocation and response times of
76 and 104 seconds respectively that we estimated in Section 1.4.43
Motivated by our theoretical framework, we expect the opportunity cost of face-
to-face communication to be lower when organisational slack, as captured by the
relation between on duty handlers and incoming calls, is higher. In Panels B and
C we repeat the exercise in Panel A for the subsamples of calls with high and
low organizational slack. Consistently with the prediction that increasing a call’s
duration is less costly when the relative number of handlers is higher, we find a higher
elasticity in Panel C (high slack) and a lower in Panel B (low slack). Replicating the
analysis above, we calculate costs associated with co-location of 0.15 (respectively
0.31) seconds, for periods of low (respectively high) slack.
Overall, our analysis highlights the importance of measuring the opportunity
cost of the time engaged in face-to-face communication, as well as the dependence
of this cost on the slack characterising the organisation. In our setting, we find this
cost to be much lower than the benefit.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper has provided evidence of a causal relation between co-location and per-
formance, in a teamwork setting characterised by the communication of complex
information. A series of additional tests point towards face-to-face communication
as the most important mechanism. We have also provided additional evidence on
the heterogeneity of the main result and highlighted that face-to-face communica-
tion has opportunity costs, as well as benefits. We are not aware of any existing
42We repeat this exercise for time windows of 15, 30 and 120 minutes and we estimate the cost
in 0.20, 0.18 and 0.22 seconds respectively.
43The benefits and costs associated with co-location affect different types of calls. The costs are
for the average call, including those which do not lead to incidents and those leading to incidents
that are not deemed to merit a response within four hours of the incident creation. The benefits
are instead concentrated on the calls that are deemed important enough to be assigned to a radio
operator.
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study studying these questions, especially one that is comparable in terms of the
detail of analysis and the credibility of the estimated effects.
One immediate policy prescription for the specific organisation that we study is in
terms of supervisors’ awareness of the benefits of communication between co-workers.
Discussions between handler and operator following the creation of incidents were
not encouraged and were even frowned upon by some supervisors. Because the cost
of communication is orders of magnitude smaller than the benefit, one implication is
that, in our specific context, there may be too little communication among co-located
workers rather than too much. This indicates that a change of norms and culture
to encourage more communication could be efficiency-enhancing. More generally,
however, the fact that the cost of communication is not zero indicates that the
limitations on the information sets of decision-makers highlighted by Hayek (1945)
and Arrow (1974) are unlikely to be fully overcome.
Our findings provide direct guidance to managers organising the geographical
distribution of activities. Most directly, the evidence casts doubt on the appro-
priateness of telecommuting policies in settings where workers must communicate
complex information to each other. Our results further suggest that telecommuting
may be particularly unsuitable (and co-location of teammates particularly valuable)
when activities are informationally demanding, workers are homogenous and likely
to be busy, and teams are likely to be stable.
There may be additional implications for recruitment policy. A large litera-
ture in organisational behaviour is concerned with the advantages and challenges
of diversity in the workplace (Shore et al., 2009). In economics, a parallel body of
work has studied the differences in productivity between homogeneous and hetero-
geneous teams (Hamilton et al. 2012, Hjort 2014, Lyons 2016), a question of clear
recruitment policy implications. Our results indicate that the relative benefits of
homogeneity depend on the geographical configuration of activities. In particular,
a more homogeneous organisation is most valuable when workers are likely to be
based in the same physical space.
Our results also identify a distinct driver of firm-specific human capital accumu-
lation (Topel, 1991), with implications for staff turnover and team-rotation policies.
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Consistently with Hayes et al. (2006) and Jaravel et al. (2016), we find in Section
1.6 that workers accumulate human capital that is specific to a particular co-worker.
Importantly, our finding is however that this capital is most valuable (or more rapidly
accumulated) among co-located workers. It follows that managers should be wary
of the team disruption induced by turnover particularly when the team members
work in close proximity.
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1.9 Figures of the Chapter
Figure 1.1: Operational Communication Branch
Figure 1.2: Timeline of Actions
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Figure 1.3: Location and Radio Operations Coverage of OCB Rooms
Figure 1.4: Correlation between Response Time and Victim Satisfaction
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Figure 1.5: Natural Experiment
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Figure 1.6: Balance of Incident, Worker and Room Characteristics on Same Room
Each row in the figure displays the results of two regressions, where the row variable is the dependent variable and
Same Room is the independent variable. The first regression includes no controls and the second regression
controls for Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room and Call Handler Room. The displayed
95% confidence intervals are for the coefficient of the Same Room variable. Non-binary dependent variables are
standardised. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level. Grade 1, Grade
2, Handler Female and Operator Female are the only dummy variables. Handler’s Desk Dist. Centre is the
euclidean distance between the handler’s desk and the centre of the room. Hourly Incidents per Handler in Room
is the number of incidents created during the hour of the index incident, divided by the number of handlers
working during that hour. A similar definition applies to Hourly Incidents per Operator in Room. Hourly
Incidents of Handler is the number of incidents created by the handler in charge of the index incident, during the
hour of creation. Hourly Incidents of Operator is the number of incidents allocated by the operator in charge of
the index incident, during the hour of the creation of the incident.
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Figure 1.7: Example of OCB Room Floorplan
Figure 1.8: Heterogeneity of the Effect of Same Room By Distance Inside Room
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Figure 1.9: Heterogeneity of the Effect of Same Room By Semester, Including
Placebo Period
Figure 1.10: Investigating Spillovers from Same Room Incients to Other Incidents
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1.10 Tables of the Chapter
Table 1.1: Correlations Between Allocation/Response Time and Victim Satisfaction
Measures
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Victim Victim
Satisfaction Change in
Score Opinion of Police
Log Allocation Time -.038*** -.023***
(.006) (.004)
Log Response Time -.055*** -.035***
(.009) (.006)
On Target Allocation .095*** .051***
(.019) (.012)
On Target Response .14*** .082***
(.028) (.016)
Observations 9617 7827
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of measures of caller satisfaction on allocation and
response time. Every coefficient is a different regression. The variables in the columns are the
dependent variables and the variables in the rows are the independent variables. Victim satisfaction
score is the answer by the caller to a survey ranking how satisfied she is with the police dealing
with the incident. The score takes values between 1 (Very Dissatisfied) and 8 (Very Satisfied), but
has been standardised. Victim change in opinion of police can take values -1, 0 or 1, depending
on whether the opinion has worsened, remained the same or improved. All regressions also include
indicators for Call Source, Year X Month X Day, Hour of Day, Division, Grade and Opening Code.
Standard errors are clustered at the Division X Year level.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Mean Median SD Min Max
Allocation Time (min.) 64.124 4.583 276.568 0 21331.78
On Target Allocation .748 1 .434 0 1
Response Time (min.) 87.484 19.933 311.166 .05 21391.92
On Target Response .877 1 .328 0 1
Creation Time (min.) 3.889 2.85 4.946 0 219.533
Grade 1 .197 0 .398 0 1
Grade 2 .432 0 .495 0 1
Same Room .229 0 .42 0 1
Distance inside Room 4.34 4.243 1.782 .5 11.885
Handler Female .27 0 .444 0 1
Operator Female .498 0 .5 0 1
Handler’s Age 38.406 38 11.471 19 64
Operator’s Age 45.15 46 8.243 19 66
This Table reports summary statistics for the baseline sample (N=957137). An observation is an incident.
Allocation time is the time between the creation of the incident by the call handler and the allocation of
a police officer by the radio operator. Response time is the time between creation of the incident and the
police officer arriving at the scene. On target allocation (respectively, response) is a dummy taking value one
if the allocation time falls wihin the UK Home Office targets, which are 2, 20 and 120 minutes (respectively
15, 60 and 240 minutes) for Grades 1, 2 and 3. Creation Time is the time between the handler answering
the call and the creation of the incident in GMPICS. Grade 1 and Grade 2 are dummies for the grade of
the incident. Same Room is a dummy when handler and operator are located in the same room. Distance
inside the room is the euclidean distance between the handler and the radio operator desks. This variable is
defined in this table only when same room is equal to one (N=219184). Handler female and operator female
are dummy variables.
Table 1.3: Baseline Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Log Alloc. Log Response On Target On Target Cleared
Variable Time Time Alloc. Response
Same Room -.02*** -.017*** .004*** .002*** -.001
(.004) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.003)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of five different performance measures on whether the call handler
and the radio operator are located in the same room. The sample includes all incidents received by the GMP between
November 2009 and December 2011 (N=957137). In Column (1) the performance variable is the log of the allocation
time (i.e. the time between the creation of the incident by the call handler and the allocation of a police officer by the
radio operator). In Column (2) the performance variable is the log of the response time (i.e. the time between the
creation of the incident and the police officer arriving at the scene). In Columns (3) and (4) the dependent variables are
dummy variables taking value one if allocation and response times fall within the UK Home Office targets, respectively.
The target response times for Grades 1, 2 and 3 are 15, 60 and 240 minutes, respectively. The target allocation times are
2, 20 and 120 minutes. In Column (5) the dependent variable is a dummy taking value one if the crime was cleared. In
Column (5) the sample includes only incidents that the police classified as crimes (N=156550). All regressions include
indicators for Grade, Call Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room, Call Handler Room,
Radio Operator and Call Handler. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
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Table 1.4: Heterogeneity of Same Room by Distance Inside Room
Individual F.E. Pair F.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Log Alloc. Log Response Log Alloc. Log Response
Time Time Time Time
Same Room -.049*** -.035*** - -
(.012) (.01) - -
Same Room .026*** .018*** .027*** .017**
X Log Distance (.009) (.007) (.01) (.008)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation time and response time on whether the call handler
and the radio operator are located in the same room, interacted with the distance between their desks when they
are in the same room. The sample includes all incidents received by the GMP between 2009 and 2012 (N=957137).
The distance between their desks is calculated as the euclidean distance in the floorplans provided by the GMP.
All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator
Room X Year and Call Handler Room X Year. Columns (1) and (2) also include Radio Operator and Call Handler
Identifiers. Columns (3) and (4) include Radio Operator/Call Handler Pair Identifiers. Standard errors are clustered
at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
Table 1.5: Investigating Effects on Type of Officer Sent
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Response Log Officer
Rank Experience
Same Room -.001 .002
(.001) (.002)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of measures of the type of officer sent on
the Same Room dummy. In Column (1) the dependent variable is a dummy for whether
the officer sent has the rank of response officer. In Column (2) the dependent variable
is the officer’s number of years in the GMP. All regressions also include indicators for
Call Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room, Call Handler
Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X
Month X Radio Operator Room level.
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Table 1.6: Investigating Spillovers to Other Incidents, by Same Room Incidents
Spillovers by Same Room Incidents during
Period:
60 min. 30 min. 15 min.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Dependent Alloc. Resp. Alloc. Resp. Alloc. Resp.
Variable Time Time Time Time Time Time
% Same Room .005 .004 .006 .007 .009 .007
Incidents Received (.005) (.004) (.006) (.004) (.007) (.005)
by Operator
This table investigates potential spillovers from Same Room incidents into other contemporaneous incidents. The
dependent variables in the OLS regressions are log of allocation time and log of response time. The independent
variable is the percentage of incidents during the index incident time period for which the call handler and the
radio operator were located in the same room, excluding the index incident. In Columns (1) and (2) the period
comprises of 60 minutes (respectively, 30 minutes for columns (3) and (4) and 15 minutes for columns (5) and (6)).
All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator
Room, Call Handler Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler. The regressions also include indicators for whether
there were no calls received by the Radio Operator during the time period. Standard errors are clustered at the
Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
Table 1.7: Investigating Effects on Other Actions by the Handler
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep.Var. Log Log Log Log
Creation Number of Number of Not Not
Time Characters Words Ready Ready>0
Same Room .00446 -.0004 -.00028 .02513*** .00443**
(.00326) (.00138) (.0015) (.00928) (.00201)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of three actions by the handler prior to creating the incident, on
whether the call handler and the radio operator are located in the same room. The sample includes all incidents
received by the GMP between November 2009 and December 2011. In Column (1) the dependent variable is the
log of the creation time (i.e. the time between the handler answering the call and the creation of the incident). In
Column (2) the dependent variable is the number of characters in the first line of the description of the incident
(maximum number of characters = 210). In Column (3) the dependent variable is the number of words in the
first line of the description of the incident. In Column (4) the dependent variable is the log of the not ready time
following the creation of the incident. In Column (5) the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the not ready
time takes value bigger than zero. All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Year X Month X Day
X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room, Call Handler Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler. Standard errors are
clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneity of Same Room by Incident Characteristics
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Alloc. Log Response
Time Time
Same Room .001 -.001
(.008) (.006)
Same Room X Urgent -.019*** -.007
(.008) (.006)
Same Room X Information Intensive -.021*** -.02***
(.008) (.006)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation and response time on the Same Room dummy,
interacted in measures of the urgency and information intensity of an incident. To compute the information
intensity variable we use the sample from 2008 to 2014 and calculate the average creation time (i.e. the
time between the handler answering the call and the creation of the incident) of every opening code/grade
combinations. We then assign to every opening code/grade incident type its average creation time, and label
an incident type as being information intensive if its average creation time is above the median. To compute
the urgency variable, we do a similar exercise using allocation time instead of creation time. All regressions
also include indicators for Call Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room, Call
Handler Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler, and opening code/grade indicators. Standard errors are
clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
61
Table 1.9: Heterogeneity of Same Room by Worker Workload
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Alloc. Log Response
Time Time
Same Room -.011* -.008*
(.006) (.004)
Same Room X High Operator Workload -.018** -.012*
(.008) (.006)
Same Room X High Handler Workload -.006 -.01*
(.008) (.006)
High Operator Workload .128*** .046***
(.005) (.004)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation and response time on the Same Room dummy,
interacted with measures of the workload of the operator and handler. To compute the operator workload
measure, we use the number of incidents created in the operator’s subdivion during the index hour. To
compute the handler workload measure, we use the number of Manchester-wide incidents during the index
hour, divided by the number of handlers on duty during that hour. The variables in the regression are
dummies taking value one when the workload is above the sample median. We report the uninteracted
operator workload measure. The uninteracted handler workload measure is absorbed by the Year X Month
X Day X Hour of Day fixed effects. All regressions also include indicators for Call Source, Year X Month
X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room, Call Handler Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler.
Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
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Table 1.10: Heterogeneity of Same Room by Handler-Operator Demographic Dis-
tance and by Number of Past Interactions
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Alloc. Log Response
Time Time
Same Room -.021 -.031*
(.023) (.018)
Same Room X Same Gender -.016** -.019***
(.008) (.006)
Same Room X Log Difference in Age .025*** .024***
(.005) (.004)
Same Room X Log N Past Interactions -.021*** -.019***
(.005) (.004)
Same Room X Log Handler Experience -.004 -.003
(.004) (.003)
Same Room X Log Operator Experience .005 .009*
(.006) (.005)
Same Gender -.002 -.003
(.004) (.003)
Log Difference in Age .013*** .01***
(.003) (.002)
Log Number Past Interactions -.073*** -.061***
(.005) (.004)
Log Handler Experience .058*** .045***
(.009) (.007)
Log Operator Experience -.057 -.026
(.049) (.036)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation and response time on the Same Room dummy, interacted
with whether the Radio Operator and the Handler are of the same gender, with the log of their difference in age,
and with the number of previous incidents in which they have worked together. All regressions include indicators for
Grade, Call Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room X Year, Call Handler Room X Year,
Radio Operator and Handler. All regressions also control for Handler Experience and Operator Experience and their
interactions with Same Room. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
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Table 1.11: Opportunity Cost of Higher Call Duration
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. = 15 min. 30 min. 60 min.
Log Queuing Time Window Window Window
Panel A: All
Log Calls .843*** .832*** .734***
(.005) (.006) (.006)
Log Handlers -.881*** -.872*** -.773***
(.007) (.007) (.008)
Log Avg Call Duration .582*** .819*** .959***
(.008) (.01) (.011)
Panel B: Low Organisational Slack
Log Calls .301*** .35*** .379***
(.008) (.009) (.01)
Log Handlers -.308*** -.368*** -.418***
(.01) (.011) (.012)
Log Avg Call Duration .402*** .603*** .776***
(.009) (.011) (.014)
Panel C: High Organisational Slack
Log Calls 1.827*** 1.664*** 1.48***
(.018) (.02) (.021)
Log Handlers -1.653*** -1.514*** -1.326***
(.018) (.02) (.02)
Log Avg Call Duration .941*** 1.184*** 1.272***
(.013) (.016) (.018)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of queuing time on measures of organisational slack
and average call duration in the period preceding the start of the call. We estimate the effects
separately at 15, 30 and 60 minutes periods before the call. High organisational slack is defined as
periods during which the number of calls per handler was below the median. The sample includes all
calls received by the GMP during the second semester of 2011. N=909256 for panel A, N=455023 for
panel B and N=454233 for panel C. All regressions include an indicator for whether the call reached
the GMP through an emergency line.
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1.11 Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables
of the Chapter
Figure 1.A1: Balance of Incident, Worker and Room Characteristics on Same Room
Incidents
Each row in the figure displays the results of two regressions, where the row variable is the dependent variable and
Same Room is the independent variable. The first regression includes only Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day
controls and the second regression includes only controls for Radio Operator Room and Call Handler Room. The
displayed 95% confidence intervals are for the coefficient of the Same Room variable. Non-binary dependent
variables are standardised. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
Grade 1, Grade 2, Handler Female and Operator Female are the only dummy variables. Handler’s Desk Dist.
Centre is the euclidean distance between the handler’s desk and the centre of the room. Hourly Incidents per
Handler in Room is the number of incidents created during the hour of the index incident, divided by the number
of handlers working during that hour. A similar definition applies to Hourly Incidents per Operator in Room.
Hourly Incidents of Handler is the number of incidents created by the handler in charge of the index incident,
during the hour of creation. Hourly Incidents of Operator is the number of incidents allocated by the operator in
charge of the index incident, during the hour of the creation of the incident.
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Figure 1.A2: Heterogeneity of the Effect of Same Room By Information Intensity
of Incident
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Table 1.A1: Robustness to Controls
(1) (Baseline) (3) (4) (5)
Log Allocation Time -.023*** -.02*** -.018*** -.019*** -.02***
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Log Response Time -.02*** -.017*** -.016*** -.016*** -.017***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Hour F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade/Call Source F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Room F.E. Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual F.E. No Yes No Yes Yes
Room/Date F.E. No No Yes No No
Individual/Month F.E. No No Yes No No
Opening Code/Grade F.E. No No No Yes No
Handler Position F.E. No No No No Yes
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation time and response time on whether the call handler and
the radio operator re located in the same room. The sample is the basleine sample. Every coefficient is from a different
regression. Standard errors clustered at the Year X Month X Operator Room level.
Table 1.A2: Alternative Clustering
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Alloc. Log Response
Time Time
Panel A: Baseline
Same Room -.0201*** -.0172***
(.004) (.003)
Panel B: By Handler/Operator Pair
Same Room -.0201*** -.0172***
(.0041) (.0032)
Panel C: By Subdivision
Same Room -.0201*** -.0172***
(.0039) (.003)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation and response time on the Same
Room dummy. All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Year X Month X Day
X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room, Call Handler Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler.
Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
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Table 1.A3: Heterogeneity of Same Room by Incident Characteristics. Prediction
with Out of Sample Data
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Alloc. Log Response
Time Time
Same Room -.001 -.002
(.009) (.006)
Same Room X Urgent -.015 -.006
(.009) (.007)
Same Room X Information Intensive -.024*** -.026***
(.01) (.007)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation and response time on the Same Room
dummy, interacted in measures of the urgency and information intensity of an incident. To compute the
information intensity variable we use the post-2012 and calculate the average creation time (i.e. the time
between the handler answering the call and the creation of the incident) of every opening code/grade
combinations. We then assign to every opening code/grade incident type its average time to creation,
and label an incident type as being information intensive if its average time to creation is above the
median. To compute the urgency variable, we do a similar exercise using the allocation time instead of
the handler’s time to creation. All regressions also include indicators for Call Source, Year X Month X
Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room, Call Handler Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler, and
opening code/grade indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator
Room level.
Table 1.A4: Heterogeneity of Same Room by Incident Characteristics. Interaction
with Variables in Logs
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Alloc. Log Response
Time Time
Same Room .081*** .066***
(.027) (.02)
Same Room X Non-Urgent .01*** .006***
(in Logs) (.003) (.002)
Same Room X Information Intensive -.079*** -.064***
(in Logs) (.021) (.016)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation and response time on the Same Room
dummy, interacted in measures of the urgency and information intensity of an incident. To compute the
information intensity variable we use the sample from 2008 to 2014 and calculate the average creation
time (i.e. the time between the handler answering the call and the creation of the incident) of every
opening code/grade combinations. We then assign to every opening code/grade incident type its average
time to creation, and use the variable in logs. To compute the urgency variable, we do a similar exercise
using the log of the allocation time instead of the log of the handler’s time to creation. All regressions
also include indicators for Call Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room,
Call Handler Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler, and opening code/grade indicators. Standard
errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
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Table 1.A5: Heterogeneity of Same Room by Demographic Distance (median) by
Number of Past Interactions (median)
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Alloc. Log Response
Time Time
Same Room -.0107 -.0093
(.0093) (.0071)
Same Room X Same Gender -.0191*** -.0215***
(.008) (.0061)
Same Room X Difference in Age High .0129 .0125**
(.0079) (.006)
Same Room X Number Past Interactions High -.0005* -.0001
(.0003) (.0002)
Same Gender -.0027 -.0033
(.0041) (.003)
Difference in Age High .0166*** .0077
(.0063) (.0048)
Number Past Interactions High -.0338*** -.0274***
(.0049) (.0038)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation and response time on the Same Room dummy, interacted
with whether the Radio Operator and the Handler are of the same gender, with their difference in age (measured as
an above median dummy), and with the number of previous incidents in which they have worked together (measured
as an above median dummy). All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour
of Day, Radio Operator Room X Year, Call Handler Room X Year, Radio Operator and Handler. All regressions also
control for Handler Experience and Operator Experience. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio
Operator Room level.
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Table 1.A6: Investigating Spillovers on Non-Same Room Incidents, by Same Room
Incidents
Spillovers by Same Room Incidents during Period:
60 min. 30 min. 15 min.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Dep. Var Alloc Resp Alloc Resp Alloc Resp
Time Time Time Time Time Time
% Same Room .001 .001 -.001 .002 -.004 -.003
Incidents Rece (.006) (.005) (.007) (.005) (.008) (.006)
by Operator
This table investigates potential spillovers from Same Room incidents into non-Same Room incidents. The
sample includes only incidents where Handler and Operator were in different rooms (N=734767). The dependent
variables in the OLS regressions are log of the allocation time and log of the response time. The independent
variable is the percentage of incidents during the index incident time period for which the call handler and the
radio operator were located in the same room, excluding the index incident. In Columns (1) and (2) the period
comprises of 60 minutes (respectively, 30 minutes for columns (3) and (4) and 15 minutes for columns (5) and
(6)). All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio
Operator Room, Call Handler Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler. The regressions also include indicators
for whether there were no calls received by the Radio Operator during the time period. Standard errors are
clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
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Table 1.A7: Robustness to Controlling for the Time Period More Precisely
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Alloc. Log Response
Time Time
Panel A: Baseline (60 minutes)
Same Room -.0201*** -.0172***
(.004) (.003)
Panel B: 30 minutes
Same Room -.0207*** -.0177***
(.004) (.003)
Panel C: 15 minutes
Same Room -.0198*** -.0179***
(.0041) (.0031)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation and response time on the Same Room dummy. All
regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Radio Operator Room, Call Handler Room, Radio Operator
and Call Handler. In Panel A we also include Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day. Panel B substitutes the Hour
of Day by the half hour period. Panel C substitutes by the 15 minute period. Standard errors are clustered at the
Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
Table 1.A8: Correlation Between Measures of Other Actions by the Handler
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Log Number Log Number Log Number
of Words of Characters of Characters
Log Time to Creation .076*** .076***
(.005) (.005)
Log Number of Words .906***
(0)
Pairwise Correlation .12 .14 .97
This table displays estimates of the conditional correlation among three actions by the handler during the creation
of the incident. The sample includes all incidents received by the GMP between 2008 and 2013 where the dependent
and independent variables are available (N=956440). The log of the handler’s time to creation is the time between
the handler answering the call and the creation of the incident. The number of characters is measured in the first line
of the description of the incident (maximum number of characters = 210). The number of words is also measured
in the first line of the description of the incident. All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Year
X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room, Call Handler Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler.
Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level. The unconditional correlation
coefficients are also reported.
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Table 1.A9: Heterogeneity of Same Room by Incident Grade
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Alloc. Log Response
Time Time
Same Room X Grade 1 -.023*** -.013***
(.005) (.004)
Same Room X Grade 2 -.016*** -.016***
(.006) (.004)
Same Room X Grade 3 -.014 -.013*
(.009) (.007)
P-Value G1 6= G2 .336 .552
P-Value G1 6= G3 .412 .955
P-Value G2 6= G3 .885 .722
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation and response time on the Same
Room dummy, interacted in the Grade of an incident. All regressions also include indicators for
Grade, Call Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room, Call Handler
Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X
Radio Operator Room level.
Table 1.A10: Robustness to Exclusion of Outlying Observations
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Alloc. Log Response
Time Time
Panel A: Excluding .5%
Same Room -.0193*** -.0171***
(.0039) (.0029)
Panel B: Excluding 1%
Same Room -.0196*** -.0164***
(.0038) (.0028)
Panel C: Excluding 5%
Same Room -.0174*** -.0136***
(.0036) (.0026)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation and response time on the Same Room
dummy. All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Radio Operator Room, Call
Handler Room, Radio Operator and Call Handler. In Panel A Column (1) (respectively, Column
(2)) we drop from the baseline sample the observations with the .5% highest values of allocation
time (respectively, response time). In Panels B and C we do the same for the 1% and 5% highest
values. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
72
Table 1.A11: Distance Inside Room and Past Interactions Handler/Operator
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Distance Log Distance
Log Number Past Interactions .002 .005
(.003) (.005)
Pair Fixed Effects No Yes
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of distance inside room on the number of past
incidents on which the handler and the operator worked together. The sample includes all incidents
received by the GMP between 2009 and 2012 for which handler and operator were based in the
same room (N=209180. The distance between their desks is calculated as the euclidean distance in
the floorplans provided by the GMP. All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Year
X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room X Year and Call Handler Room X Year.
Column (1) also includes Radio Operator and Call Handler Identifiers. Column (2) also includes
Radio Operator/Call Handlers Pair Identifiers. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month
X Radio Operator Room level.
Table 1.A12: Heterogeneity of Same Room by Distance Inside Room Controlling for
Pair X Semester
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Log Allocation Log Response
Time Time
Same Room X Log Distance .032*** .019**
(.011) (.009)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation time and response time on whether
the call handler and the radio operator are located in the same room, interacted with the distance
between their desks when they are in the same room. The sample includes all incidents received by
the GMP between 2009 and 2012. The distance between their desks is calculated as the euclidean
distance in the floorplans provided by the GMP. All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call
Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room X Year and Call Handler Room
X Year, and Radio Operator/Call Handler/Year/Semester Identifiers. Standard errors are clustered
at the Year X Month X Radio Operator Room level.
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Table 1.A13: Balance of Incident, Worker and Room Characteristics on Same
Room
(1) (2)
Controls None Hour/Room
Grade 1 -.011*** -.004***
(.001) (.001)
Grade 2 .001 .001
(.001) (.001)
Incident Latitude -.05*** 0
(.01) (.004)
Incident Longitude .036*** -.002
(.011) (.002)
Handler Female -.029*** .001
(.004) (.002)
Operator Female 0 -.003***
(.002) (.001)
Handler’s Age .077*** .004
(.007) (.004)
Operator’s Age -.025*** -.003
(.003) (.003)
Handler’s Desk Dist. Centre -.003 -.001
(.013) (.002)
Operator’s Desk Dist. Centre .195*** .001
(.009) (.002)
Hourly Created Incidents in Room .161*** -.005
(.012) (.003)
Hourly Created Incidents in Subdivision -.042*** -.003
(.004) (.003)
Hourly Incidents per Handler in Room -.049*** -.001
(.004) (.003)
Hourly Incidents per Operator in Room -.063*** -.003
(.004) (.002)
Hourly Incidents of Handler -.013*** -.005*
(.003) (.003)
Hourly Incidents of Operator -.038*** -.003
(.003) (.002)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation and response time on the Same Room
dummy, interacted with whether the Radio Operator and the Handler are of the same gender, with
the log of their difference in age, and with the number of previous incidents in which they have
worked together. All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Year X Month X Day
X Hour of Day, Radio Operator Room X Year, Call Handler Room X Year, Radio Operator and
Handler. All regressions also control for Handler Experience and Operator Experience and their
interactions with Same Room. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio Operator
Room level.
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Table 1.A14: Baseline Estimates Dependent Variables in Levels
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Allocation Response
Time (Minutes) Time (Minutes)
Same Room -1.275* -1.921**
(.685) (.747)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of allocation time and response time on whether
the call handler and the radio operator are located in the same room. The regressions are equivalent
to those of Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3, with the exception that the dependent variable are
in levels. All regressions include indicators for Grade, Call Source, Year X Month X Day X Hour
of Day, Radio Operator Room X Year and Call Handler Room X Year, and Radio Operator/Call
Handler/Year/Semester Identifiers. Standard errors are clustered at the Year X Month X Radio
Operator Room level.
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Chapter 2
The Persistent Effects of Brief
Interactions: Evidence from
Immigrant Ships.
2.1 Introduction
It has long been shown that social connections play an important role in shaping
economic outcomes. (Jackson, 2011; Topa, 2011; Beaman, 2016; Breza, 2016). Evi-
dence to date has focused on connections established over lengthy periods, or among
individuals strongly related in their demographic characteristics. However, many so-
cial interactions are circumstantial, brief and with previously unknown individuals.
These interactions could also have measurable effects, especially for individuals fac-
ing critical moments in their lives. For instance, Bandura (1982) argues that “Some
fortuitous encounters touch only lightly, others leave more lasting effects, and still
others lead people into new life trajectories.”. Chance encounters are also at the
heart of theories such as those explaining agglomeration economies (Jacobs, 1969;
Glaeser, 1999; Sato & Zenou, 2015). The potential value of brief fortuitous inter-
actions has also been recognized by many organisations, which have implemented
reforms to encourage these interactions.1 Despite their potential, brief interactions
1The following quote by Scott Birnbaum, Vice President of Samsumg Semiconductors is instruc-
tive: “... our data suggest that creating collisions - chance encounters and unplanned interactions
between knowledge workers, both inside and outside the organization-, improves performance.”
(Waber, et al., 2014).
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have received little empirical attention due to endogeneity and measurement issues.2
This paper studies migrants travelling to the US by ship during the first half
of the 20th Century. Migrants were placed together in trips lasting no more than
a few days. Many faced the need to rapidly learn about potential jobs and fi-
nal destinations. The dataset follows a large number of individuals who first met
while travelling to the US and measures their outcomes many years after arrival.
Therefore, this setting provides a unique opportunity to study the value of brief
interactions in high-stakes decision contexts.
The dataset links 350,000 male immigrants to their ships of arrival and includes
rich geographical information on towns of origin and ports of departure.3 For ev-
ery individual, I construct proxies for the quality of his connections upon arrival,
exploiting information on the settled immigrants from his town of origin.4. More
specifically, for each individual, I measure two aspects of his potential connections
upon arrival: (a) the average earnings (in the US) of previous migrants from his
town of origin and (b) the number of previous migrants from his town of origin.
Then, I use these variables to proxy the average quality of an individual’s previ-
ously unknown shipmates.
The empirical strategy relies on the assumption that, conditional on their towns
of origin, individuals departing from the same port and in the same week, were plau-
sibly exogenously assigned to ships. This differential assignment creates variation
in the characteristics of the (previously unknown) shipmates of an individual. The
identification strategy thus compares individuals (exogenously) allocated to travel-
ling in ships that differ in the quality of previously unknown shipmates. A number
of balancing tests supports the notion that, conditional on baseline controls, the
assignment of passengers to ships was uncorrelated with the characteristics of their
2A body of literature has studied the role of indirect and/or weak (e.g. acquaintances rather
than friends) connections. This paper differ from this literature with its focus on the transitory
and fortuitous character of the direct interactions between individuals.
3Previous studies relying on matched historical data have also used male samples (e.g. Ferrie,
1996; Abramitsky, et al., 2012, 2014). One of the main reasons is that surnames changes were
common for females and this makes it difficult to match them across different datasets. In addition
to this, female labor force participation is low in this period (Maurer & Potlogea, 2017).
4A number of studies have shown the importance of settled immigrants in the assimilation
process of new arrived immigrants (Massey et al., 1987, Munshi, 2003; Edin et al., 2003; Lafortune
& Tessada, 2012; Beaman, 2012)
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previously unknown shipmates. I also provide evidence that the data matching pro-
cedure does not induce correlation among shipmates characteristics. In this sense,
I perform a number of tests that suggest that, conditional on baseline controls, the
probability that a passenger is matched to a census record is uncorrelated with any
characteristic of the ship or the individual.
My findings are as follows. Firstly, individuals travelling with higher quality
(i.e. better connected) shipmates, end up being employed in higher earnings occu-
pations. This effect is economically significant and persistent in time. For instance,
a movement from the lowest to highest quintile in terms of the shipmates’ quality
is associated with a 4% increase in US labor earnings. This baseline result is robust
to: (a) using different measures of occupational earnings, (b) including a large set
of additional controls, like, ship-route characteristics, date of arrival and vessel fixed
effects, (c) using variation only from individuals boarding at different stops of the
same trip and (d) using variation only from repeated trips of the same vessel.
My second set of results suggests that the main mechanism consists of shipmates
providing access and/or information about employment opportunities and attractive
final destinations. Firstly, I find that the sectors where migrants end up working
are affected by the sectors of employment of their shipmates’ contacts. Similarly,
their final destinations are also affected by the locations of their shipmates’ contacts.
Secondly, when ships include migrants with different languages, the baseline effects
are driven by shipmates speaking the same language. This suggests that some
form of verbal communication mediated the effect. Thirdly, the baseline effects
are stronger for individuals likely to benefit more from additional connections: (a)
individuals travelling by themselves and (b) individuals with poor connections in
the US. Overall, my findings provide strong evidence that migrants benefit from
their shipmates’ information and/or contacts.5
Contribution This paper provides, to the best of my knowledge, the first causal
evidence on the economic importance of brief social interactions in high-stakes sit-
5My dataset is not well suited to disentangling a pure information effect (e.g. shipmates
providing information on attractive sectors of employment or final destinations) from a direct
access effect (e.g. shipmates providing job referrals or other type of support), and I leave this for
future work.
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uations. Equally important is the finding that the effects are largely contingent on
individual characteristics. In particular, those travelling alone and with fewer con-
nections at destination are more affected than those with a better network at desti-
nation. This suggests the existence of a substitution effect between pre-established
interpersonal connections and circumstantial contacts.
Findings from this paper have implications beyond its particular historical set-
ting. First, it is possible that there are many situations where individuals face
critical decisions that are irreversible or have long term consequences. Examples
include, parental choice of school or students choice of college major. Second, re-
sults are consistent with studies showing that labor market entry conditions have
persistent effects on job assignment and wages (Oreopoulos, et al., 2006; Oyer, 2006;
von Wachter & Bender, 2008). In this paper, I show that short-lasting events that
take place just before job search started can affect earnings in the long run. Third,
this paper contributes to the economic literature on immigrants assimilation process
(Borjas, 1995, 2015, Bleakley & Chin, 2009) by providing evidence that information
and conditions upon arrival can determine newcomers future economic success.
Finally, this paper also provides a methodological contribution. It is well known
that for large datasets, popular record linkage approaches like Fellegi & Sunter (1969)
or Feigenbaum (2016) become unfeasible due computational limitations. I develop a
Machine Learning approach to link US immigrant and passenger lists that improves
the efficiency of previous methods and can serve as a guide to other researchers
matching records across large historical datasets.
Related Literature This paper relates to a number of areas of research. First,
a large body of literature has shown the effects of networks and social connections
in the context of labor markets (Montgomery, 1991; Marmaros & Sacerdote, 2002;
Bayer et al., 2008; Ioannides & Loury, 2004; Bentolilla et al. 2010; Dustmann et
al., 2015, Bramoulle´ et al., 2016; Glitz, 2017).6 Most of this literature has focused
on the importance of job referrals and job search methods to access better quality
jobs.
6There is also a rich theoretical literature in the area of social networks. Recent reviews can
be found in Jackson (2009, 2014), Goyal (2015) and Jackson et.al. (2016).
79
Related to the role of immigrant networks, a number of articles have measured
the importance of connections for newly arrived individuals (Munshi, 2003, 2014;
Edin et al., 2003; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007; Beaman, 2012, Battisti et al., 2017).
This paper differs from these studies in that I focus on the role of links created while
travelling to destination rather than in the role of pre-existing contacts. This also
suggests a link with a growing literature documenting how entry conditions to the
labor market can have long-run effects on earnings (Brunner & Kuhn, 2009; Genda
et al., 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2006). Also, Kramarz & Skans (2014) find that strong
social ties (parents) are an important determinant for the first job of young workers
and that social ties become more important when information on potential openings
are likely to be scarce.
Theoretical models from different fields have assigned an important role to ran-
dom social interactions. For instance, in the seminal work of Jacobs (1969) random
interactions foster innovation and transmission of ideas and in Glaeser (1999), they
influence learning of skills.7 Despite this theoretical work, there are no empirical
studies measuring the importance of random encounters in this field. A notable
exception is Fitjar & Rodriguez-Pose (2016) who surveyed 542 Norwegian firms en-
gaged in innovation partnerships. They find that 10% of partnerships emerged from
random encounters.
A number of previous studies have analyzed the effects of connections established
over long periods (e.g. Sacerdote, 2001; Angrist & Lang, 2004). This paper separates
from that literature in that the (initial) exposure to social interaction is short, 10
days on average. On the contrary, peer-effects studies typically focus on connections
established over long periods.
This paper also relates to the literature on weak ties. Early research, mainly by
sociologists (Granovetter, 1973, 1983) found that a significant number of individuals
find their jobs through connections such as “friends of friends”. This literature
emphasizes the role of weak ties in conveying information not prevalent among
relatives or close friends. A recent number of studies have analyzed the “strength
of weak ties” hypothesis using recent available data (Yakubovich, 2005). Related to
7For a complete review of this literature see Ioannides (2012).
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immigrant outcomes, Goel & Lang (2016) study the role of weak ties in job search
of recent immigrants to Canada and Giulietti et al. (2014) find that the rural-
urban decision is largely affected by weak ties. The type of interactions studied
in this paper diverge from the concept of weak ties, usually defined as a subset of
acquaintances with lower probability to be socially involved with one another.8
Finally, this paper relates to a body of research that study the process of immi-
grants’ assimilation (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1995, 2015; Bleakley & Chin, 2009).
A number of determinants have been explored, including the role of language pro-
ficiency, age of arrival, macroeconomic conditions or the performance of settled
immigrants. Findings from this paper suggest that the first social connections made
by immigrants can affect the later economic success of immigrants.
Plan I describe the historical background and institutional setting in Section 2.2.
I summarize the construction of the matched census-ships dataset in Section 2.3.
The empirical setting and identification strategy is discussed in Section 2.4. Section
2.5, presents the main results of the paper and discuss the economic relevance of
them. In Section 2.6, I provide evidence on additional outcomes and heterogeneous
effects to establish the social interaction explanation as the preferred interpretation
of results. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Historical setting
The period 1850-1924 is often referred to as “The Age of Mass Migration”. Official
statistics indicate that during this period, more than 30 million individuals arrived
in the US (Hatton & Williamson, 1998). This was a period of low administrative
barriers to immigration that ended after the imposition of the 1924 Immigration
Act which sharply reduced immigrant flows (Goldin, 1994).9
8Weak ties are defined in different ways in the literature. For instance, Giulietti et al. (2014),
define an immigrant’s weak ties as those individuals from his same community who are not his
relatives. The theoretical model of Sato & Zenou (2015) associate the idea of “random encounters”
to weak ties, although they acknowledge the difference with respect to previous studies.
9The immigration act of 1892 stated a minimum requirement by banning from entry any
person ”unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge” (Hutchinson,
1981). In practice this excluded individuals with poor health conditions (including insane) or
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The vast majority of immigrants arriving after 1892 entered the US through Ellis
Island in New York Harbor.10 During peak years, Ellis Island registered more than
10,000 arrivals per day. Once arrived, immigrants were inspected and authorized to
enter the country. The sub-sections below explain the typical stages of the immi-
gration process. This starts when individuals buy their tickets and finishes with the
standardized inspection process at Ellis Island.
Before Departure A typical immigrant would buy his ticket from an agent of
the many shipping companies existing at the time.11 The Passenger Act of 1819
required each vessel arriving from abroad to provide a manifest listing all passen-
gers. Although the information covered by manifests improved over time, after
1904 manifests registered the universe of passengers from any class and nationality
(Bandiera, et al., 2016). Given that the cost of any deportation was levied on ship-
ping companies, they faced strong incentives to screen passengers before departing
and check that information was accurate. Therefore, individuals were typically re-
quired to provide travel documents in advance in order to comply with manifest
creation. Additionally, shipping companies carried out their own medical inspection
and disinfection before departure.12 As a result of these requirements, individuals
attended the port some days before departing.13
The Immigrant Journey Once the medical inspection procedure was completed,
passengers were allowed to board the ship for departure. The conditions on the ship
with criminal records as well as those travelling without enough money to support themselves for
few days after arrival. By the end of this period, legislation gradually increased the barriers to
immigration (Reisler, 1976; Scruggs, 1988). For instance, the 1917 Literacy Act increased the head
tax and introduced a literacy test. The 1921 Emergency Immigration Act introduced a system
of quotas mainly directed to reduce immigration from eastern and southern Europe. Another
exception was the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act which banned immigration of Chinese workers.
The increase in restrictions was mainly driven by the increase of critical perceptions an attitudes
towards immigration (Goldin, 1994).
10According to official statistics, more than 75% of total arrivals were through Ellis Island and
this percentage increased considerably for European immigrants (Ferenczi-Willcox, 1929).
11Another common arrangement for travelling was prepaid tickets purchased in advance by
relatives residing in the US. These tickets required to follow the same steps and procedures than
standard tickets.
12Passengers usually received a card certifying the medical inspection and additional information
like names, ship and manifest page/line. Passengers were instructed to attach the card to their
coats and to show it to inspectors upon arrival.
13Some ports had facilities for those passengers waiting for departure. In other cases passengers
had to pay for their own accommodation.
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were poor for the vast majority, who travelled in steerage class. Rooms usually
accommodated large groups and most spaces were shared with other steerage ship-
mates. Although some individuals traveled with relatives or acquaintances from
their home town, a large number of social interactions are likely to have occurred
among individuals who had never met before. The duration of the voyage depended
on the route and port of departure. By 1910, a trip from Liverpool to New York
could take between 6 and 9 days, but departures from Mediterranean ports could
take more than two weeks if the route included intermediate stops. Although there
was some variation in the duration of the trip, the adoption of the steam engine
and other improvements in shipping technology notably reduced the importance of
weather conditions (Hopkins, 1910).14
Some individuals, specifically those with prepaid tickets and strong connections
in the US, had a final destination decided. Indeed, some individuals would have
purchased train tickets in advance or relatives would have been waiting in the NY
port. However, many passengers travelled with poor information and few contacts
on arrival. Lafortune & Tessada (2012) compare the immigrants’ answer regarding
their intended final destination (if any) with the actual states of residence of recently
arrived individuals in the census. They find that only a 45% of answers match
with the actual geographical distribution of recent arrivals. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that shipmates played an important role in either conveying information
on potential destinations and sector of employment or in directly providing job
referrals, accommodation and financial support after arrival.15.
14This contrasts with transatlantic voyages during the late 19th century. For instance, there is a
well documented evidence that during the Irish famine migration (1840-1850), weather conditions
could delay the departure and the arrival of ships by many weeks (Laxton, 1996).
15For instance, Taylor (2010) provides an example of how destination within US were sensitive
to shipmates’ suggestions: “...His mom gave him all the money she had and told him to go to
America. He travelled south on foot until he reached Italy, boarded a ship, and landed in New
York. People whom he’d met on the ship told him to go to the city of Buffalo because many Polish
people lived there...”. In a second example, Grossman (2009) illustrates that shipmates were also
important in providing jobs and accommodation: “... He took a boat from Cork to New York City.
A priest he had met on the ship got him a room to stay in and his job at New York City’s Biltmore
Hotel...”. Anecdotal evidence also document a large number of marriages among partners who met
during the trip. Indeed, the “Records of the Board of Trade and of successor and related bodies”
from the UK, officially registered 133 marriages while travelling to the US.
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Arrival at Ellis Island When a ship arrived at New York Harbor, immigration
officers requested the certified manifests and steerage passengers were conducted
to Ellis Island station.16 Due to the characteristics of inspection facilities, passen-
gers were divided into groups of (approximately) 30 people following their order in
the manifest. Passengers who bought tickets together had close manifest numbers.
Therefore, families and close acquaintances were typically inspected as part of the
same group and queued at the same desk in the Registry Hall. Immigrants had
to pass a quick visual medical screening and then immigration clerks in the Reg-
istry Hall checked that the inspection cards and the manifest information matched.
Finally, passengers answered a series of questions (with the help of official transla-
tors) attempted to detect those with criminal records, extreme political affiliations
(e.g. anarchists) or likely to became a public charge.17 Individuals suspected of not
meeting the minimum entry standards were separated for further investigation, a
procedure that could take several hours or even days. Despite the strict inspection
procedure, official statistics reveal that only 2% of passengers were finally deported
(US Bureau of the Census, 1975). After inspection, individuals were discharged to
enter the US. At this point, many of them faced the decision of where to seek a
new life and/or in which sector to apply for a job. The station had money exchange
facilities and many railway agencies from whom they could buy tickets to any des-
tination, including New York City. This paper studies how contacts established
during the trip could have influenced decisions at this critical stage.
2.3 Ships-Census Matched Dataset
In this section I summarize the construction of the dataset and main variables used
in the study. Some technical details are relegated to Appendix B where I explain in
detail the steps involved in the matching process.
16First class and cabin passengers were usually inspected on board and discharged to enter the
US without going through the main station.
17In practice, the criteria for excluding someone for being likely to became a public charge, was
circumscribed to passengers with several health conditions or those with not enough money to pay
for accommodation and food for a few days after arrival.
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Data Sources The main dataset in this paper combines information from Pas-
senger Lists and historical Censuses. The Passenger Lists contain the universe of
34,000 ship arriving to the New York port during the period 1909-1924.18 The set of
individual variables available in electronic format are: full name, age, gender, race,
marital status and last place of permanent residence. I also observe the date of ar-
rival, port of departure and name of the vessel. I compile additional information on
ships’ characteristics, ports of departure and European cities from multiple online
sources.19 For most of the analysis, I restrict the sample to ships sailing from non-US
ports and located at a distance of 3,000 kilometers or more from the port of New
York.20 Individual census information corresponds to the full count of male immi-
grants from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) for years 1920 and
1930 (Ruggles et al., 2015). Figure 2.1 shows the yearly flow of passengers and the
immigrant stock in Census for different sub-samples of the population. As discussed
in Bandiera et al. (2016), discrepancies between passenger inflows and Census stock
are largely driven by return migration and the large drop in immigration inflows
after 1914 is due to the WWI.
Matching Census and Ships Data I match passengers’ data with census records
using first name(s), surname, year of birth and year of immigration. Passengers are
matched to the closest census year after arrival (i.e. arrivals between 1909 and 1919
are matched to the 1920 census and the remaining to the 1930 census). This dataset
allows me to observe the characteristics of immigrants once they are settled in the
US, but also the details of the voyage to US, including the characteristics of his
shipmates.
18Information from passenger lists is considered accurate and reliable (Weintraub and Point,
2017). The manifests corresponds to the National Archives and Records Administration microfilms
series M237 and T715. Similar data has been used in Bandiera et al. (2016) who discuss in detail
the accuracy and coverage of passenger lists during the period.
19I obtained information available from a number of websites including www.jewishgen.org,
www.stevemorse.org and www.theshiplist.com. I also used information on passenger lists from the
series of Family Archives CDs by Gale Research. Patricia MacFarlane provided generous access
to the Immigrant Ships Transcribers Guild (ISTG) database which contains digitized passenger
manifests and information on immigration during the period of my study.
20This excludes all Caribbean, Mexican and Canadian ports which usually account for voyages
of short duration. It also excludes a large number of small vessels transporting workers and supplies
from and to the Panama Canal zone. Canadian and Mexican citizens are also excluded from the
sample.
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The main challenge when matching passenger lists to Census records is the large
volume of data.21 Popular approaches (e.g. Fellegi & Sunter, 1969; Feigenbaum,
2016) can become unfeasible even after following the standard blocking strategy.22
In Appendix B, I outline a Machine Learning procedure based on Levenshtein Au-
tomata that allows me to match records across large datasets. The approach is
related to Feigenbaum (2014, 2016) but introduces a number of algorithmic im-
provements to increase the speed at which the method identifies individuals with
similar names and/or surnames.23 The matched sample consists of 351,289 individu-
als, 52% of them corresponding to the 1920 census year. The matching rate relative
to the Census is around 12%.24 After excluding individuals sailing from less than
3000 kilometers from New York or missing information on the town of origin or age
outside the range 14-65, the sample is reduced to 206,383 individuals.
Geocoding Ports, Routes and Places of Origin I use an algorithm based on
the Google Places API to obtain the latitude, longitude and (harmonized) name
of departure ports for the universe of ships in the Passenger List data. In total, I
identify around 500 different ports, including those located at Caribbean countries,
Mexico or Canada. Figure 2.2 displays the ports identified outside the area excluded
from the analysis. Using all the ports declared by passengers (regardless of whether
the passenger is matched to the Census or not), I reconstruct the whole route of the
ship. Appendix C provides more details on the geolocalization procedure.
21Matching based on names and surnames requires calculating string similarity measures, which
are computationally demanding. Increasing the sample size exponentially increases the number of
string comparisons and this usually becomes unfeasible unless further restrictions are imposed.
22Blocking restricts the search of potential matches within a smaller set of records, typically
individuals with similar years of birth or arrival. Unfortunately, in my setting blocks are so large
that the problem remains.
23Intuitively, these modifications reduce the number of repeated calculations required to com-
pare among strings. This is (to the best of my knowledge) the first paper in economics implementing
this efficient search approach to match historical data (e.g. Radix Tries Search and Block-Specific
Dictionaries). A recent literature in Computer Science have studied the problem of matching large
string data (e.g. Baeza-Yates & Gonnet, 1996; Schulz & Mihov, 2002). Unfortunately, there is no
existing code or software implementation for these methods and most of them remain as theoretical
contributions.
24The matching rate is comparable to studies tracking immigrants across census years (Ferrie,
1996; Abramitsky et al., 2012, 2014). However, as explained in Appendix B the Machine Learning
approach requires a human trained random sample of matched individuals. When creating this
sample, I use an strict criteria that resulted in a low number of false positive matches. Cross
validation exercises reveal that the matching procedure is highly accurate with a false positive rate
below the 0.1%. As discussed in a recent paper by Bailey et al. (2017), false positive matches in
linked data are more problematic than false negative matches.
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I also geocode information on the “last town of permanent residence” for passen-
gers in the matched sample. The algorithm resembles that used for geocoding ports
but it requires some pre-processing steps in order to correct for common typos and
abbreviations, towns that disappeared over time and places reported in their origi-
nal language.25 The full procedure is described in detail in Appendix C . Overall, I
identify around 11,000 different places of origin. Figure 2.3 displays the location of
places identified in the matched sample. Appendix Figure 2.A1 shows the relative
frequency of the main ports of departure and countries of origin.
Labor Outcomes Since the 1920 and 1930 censuses did not record information
on individual income, I follow previous studies (Abramitsky et al. 2012, 2014;
Maurer & Potlogea, 2017) and use the Occupational Earnings Score which assigns
each individual the percentile rank of his occupation in terms of median earnings
in 1950. Naturally, this measure is invariant to wage differences within occupa-
tions but it captures whether an individual is employed in a job that pays relatively
more. As a robustness check, I use two additional measures. The first one is the
Duncan Socioeconomic Index, which assign a (subjective) prestige rating to each
occupation based on earnings, education and the 1947 National Opinion Research
Center Survey (NORC). The second additional measure is the Nam-Power-Boyd
Index (Nam & Boyd, 2004) which measures the percentage of the labor force em-
ployed in occupations with combined levels of education and earnings below the
incumbent occupation.26 Finally, in order to aid the interpretation of the results,
I construct a measure of occupational earnings by assigning to each individual the
median earnings of his occupation in 1940. Information on sectors of employment
and occupations is created and harmonized by IPUMS based on unstructured text
questionnaires answers.27
25The algorithm generates the following information: latitude and longitude of the place, name
identified by the Google Places Api and the south-west/north-east coordinates of the smallest
rectangle containing the place. A 20% of the records have missing information on the place of
origin and a 15% of the observations are geocoded with a precision above the locality level (e.g.
province).
26All these variables are created by the Minnesota Population Center and are comparable across
individuals and census years (Ruggles et al. 2015).
27Although these variables are not directly comparable with more recent industry or occupation
classifications (e.g. SIC or NAICS for industries or SOC for occupations), the disaggregation is
comparable to 3-digits level and consistent accross census years.
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Summary Statistics Table 2.1 presents some summary statistics of the data.
Panel A reports aggregated information on the number of individuals, ships and
places of origin for different sub-samples and data sources. The first column (full
sample) includes individuals from any origin and age group. The matching rate, de-
fined as the number of matched individuals with respect to the individuals observed
in the Censuses, is 12.4%. Matched individuals are observed in approximately 34,000
different ships, departing from 422 ports and proceeding from 10,900 different places
of origin.28 After restricting the sample to individuals in the age group 14-65 with
non-missing information on the place of origin and to ships departing from ports at
a minimum distance of 3000 km. from New York, approximately 206,000 individuals
from 15,000 ships, 170 ports and 8,200 places of origin remain in the sample.
Panel B reports basic statistics on individual and ship characteristics. Ships
in the regression sample travelled an average distance of 6,500 kilometers (whole
route). This distance would take about 10 days at 15 nautical knots, the average
speed for steamers in that period. In the full passenger list data, an average ship
transported 173 male passengers in the age group 14-65 (excluding those boarding
at less than 3000 km from New York). Ship size is consistent with the findings in
Bandiera et al. (2013) for the same period.29The average number of passengers per
ship observed in the matched sample was about 20. Ships were very diverse in terms
of places of origin: an average ship transported individuals from 15 different towns
of origin (in the matched sample). A large proportion of passengers were single and
travelled without any relative. At destination, most immigrants settled in urban
places and 21% were observed living in New York in the next Census after their
arrival.
28Table 2.1 indicates that 15% of places of origin are geographical units above the locality level
(e.g. province). As a robustness check, in Appendix B I re-estimate the main results excluding
these geographical units
29Bandiera et al. (2013) find that for the period 1892-1924, the average number of passengers
per ship was approximately 500. However, after 1911, the average number of passengers drops
below 200 per ship. After accounting for the gender, age and port restrictions in my sample, the
average number of passengers is in the same range.
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2.4 Empirical Setting
In this section, I explain the empirical strategy to estimate the effects of brief so-
cial interactions, and then justify it with a set of balancing tests. Establishing this
causal effect is not an easy task. In addition to considering the exogenous allocation
of individuals across ships, I need to consider the possibility that shipmates’ charac-
teristics can affect earnings through channels that do not require social interaction.
I postpone the discussion of these confounding effects to Section 2.6, were I provide
additional evidence on the social interaction mechanism.
Defining Brief Social Interactions The first step in the analysis requires defin-
ing the set of individuals who met for the first time during the voyage. For every
individual, I identify this set by excluding any shipmate such that 1) shares the same
town of origin or 2) has a similar surname, defined as a Jaro-Winkler distance below
0.1.30’31 Along the paper, I will refer to them as the set of unrelated shipmates. In
Section 2.5, I perform a set of exercises to rule out the chance that effects are driven
by a weak definition of unrelated shipmates.
Connections on Arrival An important variable that I use below is the quality
of potential contacts that immigrants had in the US. This is a key variable in the
empirical strategy as I will proxy the quality of shipmates based on this dimension.
Following a number of influential papers (e.g. Wegge, 1998; Munshi, 2003; McKenzie
& Rapoport, 2007, 2010) I define the set of potential contacts at destination, as those
individuals who emigrated in the past from the same place of origin. There are two
additional reasons to use the community of origin as the relevant unit to define the
social network at destination. First, there is a strong consensus among historians on
the importance of settled immigrants in triggering chain migration and supporting
new arrivals from the same community (Daniels, 2002). Second, during this period
30The Jaro-Winkler distance (Winkler, 1990) measures the similarity between two words based
on the number and position of common characters.
31In addition to these conditions, I use the smallest rectangular area containing the place of
origin to exclude any shipmate with area overlapping above 50%. This additional condition assures
that no shipmate is considered “unrelated” due to a poor geocoding information (e.g. a shipmate
with the same province of origin but without information on the exact town of origin). In Section
2.5, I show that the main results are robust to more strict conditions (e.g. excluding close towns)
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the outcomes of newcomers are strongly correlated with the characteristics of settled
immigrants from the same community.
To measure the quality of contacts on destination, I focus on two variables:32
1) The average earnings score of settled immigrants from the same town of origin.
2) The number of individuals from the same town who emigrated to the US in the
past.33
The first variable proxies the economic status of potential contacts, based on
the notion that wealthier connections can provide information or referrals on better
jobs. The second variable proxies the size of the network at destination.34
Formally, I define xc(k),t(k) as the earning score for an individual k from town
c(k) and who travelled in period t(k). This notation emphasizes the fact that each
individual in the data is associated to a unique town of origin and emigration period.
The average earnings of potential connections on land for individual j is defined as
Xc(j),t(j) =
∑t−1
r(k)=1 xc(k),r(k)/Nc(j),t(j) with Nc(j),t(j) being the number of individuals
from town c(j) who emigrated before period t(j) and are observed in the census.35
The number of potential contacts upon arrival for individual j, defined as Zc(j),t(j),
can be measured as the size of emigration flows from town c(j) to the US before pe-
riod t(j). Note that Zc(j),t(j) is measured using the whole passenger list but Xc(j),t(j)
and Nc(j),t(j) are calculated using the matched sample only. This underlines the com-
plementarity of the two measures. Table 2.1 Panel B, reports summary statistics
about these variables. Earnings of potential contacts are measured in the scale of
0 to 100 and the average in the sample is 49.7. The average number of potential
contacts of an individual is 9,300.
32As a robustness check, in Section 2.5, I re-estimate the main results using alternative defini-
tions of connections on arrival.
33The earnings of settled immigrants are calculated only for towns observed in the matched
sample as I have no information on earnings of non-matched individuals. The number of emigrants
from each town is calculated using the full flow of passengers observed in the passenger lists since
1900. For a given immigrant, either variable is calculated using only individuals who travelled at
least one month before him.
34Previous studies have measured the migrant network size in different ways. For instance,
Munshi (2003) measures it as the share of immigrants from the home community while Beaman
(2012) uses the number of individuals from the same country living in a given city.
35Note that earnings scores of individuals arrived in different years are usually observed in the
same census year.
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Figure 2.4 illustrates the relevance of previous definitions. Each panel of the fig-
ure displays the coefficients of the following regressions between individual outcomes
and the quintiles of his potential contacts’ characteristics, conditional on ship and
predetermined individual characteristics:
Yi =
5∑
q=1
βqContactsChar
q
i + σs(i) + αIi + i (2.1)
where Yi is an outcome of individual i (measured at the next Census after arrival),
ContactsCharqi is a dummy for the quintile q of some characteristic of the potential
contacts of the individual (e.g. the number of individual’s contacts Zc(i),t(i)). Each
regression controls for ship fixed effects σs(i) and a set of predetermined individual
characteristics Ii. Panel A shows the correlation between individual earnings and
the average earnings (and number) of settled immigrants from the same town of
origin. Panels B to D shows that the location of individuals and the sector of
occupation are strongly correlated with those of previous emigrants from the same
place. Thus, even if newcomers never interact with settled immigrants, we can think
that at the moment of the trip, the previous definitions are predetermined predictors
of immigrants’ economic success.
Identification Strategy In order to identify the effects of brief social interactions,
I rely on the assumption that, conditional on their towns of origin, individuals
departing from the same port and in the same week, were plausibly exogenously
assigned to ships. The plausibility of this assumption is empirically validated later
in this section. The intuition behind the identification strategy can be illustrated
with the following example: Assume that an individual with residence in Benevento
(Italy) has decided to emigrate from the port of Naples (the closest to his town).
Naturally, individuals departing in different years or seasons, may face different
conditions at departure or arrival. Consequently, shipmates’ characteristics can be
correlated with unobserved determinants of the individual’s earnings at destination.
Consider, however, all the ships departing from Naples within a relatively narrow
time horizon (e.g. a week). The identification strategy relies on the assumption that
the individual assignment is uncorrelated with the characteristics of the unrelated
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shipmates boarding the same ship.36
A number of historical facts support this assumption. First, the selection among
passengers of different income took place mainly within ships, as every vessel had
different classes and service upgrades. For instance, wealthy individuals usually
travelled in first or cabin classes. Second, during a short window of time, the fares
for lower class categories (e.g. third class or steerage) were remarkably similar
across shipping lines for a given route.37 The vast majority of immigrants travelled
in steerage class. Third, delays due to paperwork or unexpected changes announced
by the shipping company were common. Finally, passengers bought their tickets
days or weeks in advance, without being able to anticipate the characteristics of
their potential shipmates. Naturally, the exogeneity claim must be validated in the
data, and in this section I discuss a number of empirical exercises that support this
assumption.
A potential concern is that some vessel characteristics (for instance, their external
look or capacity) can influence the individual decision, creating some endogenous
sorting of passengers. In Section 2.5, I show that results are robust to the inclusion
of a large set of ship characteristics and even of vessel fixed effects. Moreover, as
shown below in this section, ship characteristics are strongly balanced with respect
to the average shipmates’ quality.
The exogenous allocation across ships, creates quasi-experimental variation in the
pool of (unrelated) shipmates of each passenger. This implies that similar individuals
can be exposed to a pool of shipmates with different quality of connections on
land. An advantage of this strategy follows from the fact that the characteristics of
contacts upon arrival are predetermined variables at the moment of the trip, thus
not affected by any shock occurring after departure.
36In Section 2.5, I explore two alternative identification strategies based on the variation created
by repeated voyages of the same vessel and by individuals boarding at different ports during the
same trip.
37For instance, Hopkins (1910) reports that in 1909, all the steamers covering the Mediterranean
service of the Cunard Line, North German Lloyd, White Star Line and Italian Royal Mail Lines
had a basic minimum fare of $65 for third class (steerage). Indeed, when including all routes and
services, more than 80% of steamers had a basic minimum fare between $55 and $65. This basic
fare excluded any additional service or railway transportation.
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Estimating Equation The baseline estimating equation is:
Yi = β1X¯i + β2Z¯i + θp(i) × λw(i) + δc(i) × pit(i) + i (2.2)
where Yi is a labor market outcome for immigrant i in the US. Consistently with
the earlier discussion, I control for the interaction between θp(i) (a fixed effect for
the port of departure) and λw(i) (the fixed effect for the week of arrival).
38
The main variables of interest, X¯i and Z¯i, measure the quality of the connec-
tions of i’s shipmates. The first variable is the average earnings score of the po-
tential connections on land among i’s shipmates. The second measure, is the av-
erage number of potential contacts among i’s shipmates. As discussed in Section
2.3, potential connections on land for individual j are defined as the set of emi-
grants from the same town of origin. Formally, if u(i, s) is the subset of passengers
travelling in ship s and unrelated to i, I define X¯i =
∑
j∈u(s,i) Xc(j),t(j)/nu(s,i) with
nu(s,i) being the number of unrelated shipmates for individual i. Similarly, I define
Z¯i =
∑
j∈u(s,i) Zc(j),t(j)/nu(s,i).
39 As defined before in this Section, for a given indi-
vidual j, Xc(j),t(j) is the average earnings in the US among individuals from town
c(j) who emigrated before period t(j) and Zc(j),t(j) is the total emigration flow from
town c(j) to the US before period t(j).
The baseline specification also controls for the interaction between δc(i) (a fixed
effect for the town of origin of immigrant i) and pit(i) (a fixed effect for the semester of
arrival). The inclusion of this interaction serves two purposes. First, it controls for
unobserved time-variant characteristics that could result in individuals from specific
38Note that I do not observe the week of departure, however, conditional on the port of depar-
ture, this is similar to control for the week of departure. Moreover, the route of the ship accounts
for almost all the variation in voyage duration. In Section 2.5, I present evidence that results are
robust to the inclusion of the route fixed effects.
39Some technical aspects involved in the calculation are worth mentioning: (a) Note that both
variables are averaged across unrelated shipmates, thus unaffected by their number; (b) As dis-
cussed in Section 2.2, most social interactions are likely to be among passengers boarding at the
same port. For this reason I only calculate the average characteristics among this set of unrelated
shipmates. In Section 2.5, I modify this definition and use the characteristics of shipmates from
different ports; (c) I only use the characteristics of shipmates in the matched sample. As discussed
by Ammermueller & Pischke (2009) and Sojourner (2013), failing to account for the full set of
relevant peers, can introduce some attenuation bias in the results. Of course, the identification
strategy assumes that the probability that shipmates’ are matched is not systematically correlated
with unobserved characteristics of the individual, after conditioning for the baseline controls. I
address this concern later in this Section.
93
towns boarding certain ships with higher probability. This would be the case, for
instance, if agencies sold tickets for different ships with varying intensity across
regions of the country. Second, given that potential connections on land are defined
at the town of origin level, it absorbs any characteristic of individual’s own contacts.
As discussed in Caeyers & Fafchamps (2017), this strategy eliminates any negative
exclusion bias (Guryan et al., 2009) introduced by the fact that i’s connections are
excluded in the calculation of X¯i and Z¯i.
40 All regressions cluster standard errors
at the week of arrival level. In Appendix Table 2.A2, I show that baseline estimates
are robust to alternative clustering choices.
Balancing Tests and Evidence of Exogenous Sorting This subsection dis-
cusses a number of tests supporting the identifying assumption outlined before. This
is critical to establish a causal interpretation of the effects of shipmates’ character-
istics on future labor outcomes.
The first test consists of studying the correlation between the predetermined vari-
ables of an individual and those of his unrelated shipmates. The exogeneity claim
requires that this correlation must be zero after conditioning on the interaction be-
tween the port of departure and the week of arrival. Therefore, for every individual
in the matched sample, I calculate the average characteristics of his unrelated ship-
mates. In order to avoid the negative mechanical bias of leave-one-out correlations,
I follow Bayer et al. (2008) and sample one individual per ship when performing
these calculations. Column 1 of Table 2.2 reports the unconditional correlations and
Column 2 conditions on Port of Departure X Week of Arrival.41 Results indicate
that the unconditional correlations are high and significant but all of them become
low and insignificant (at 5% level) after controlling for Port of Departure X Week
of Arrival.42
40I define pit(i) at semester level due to the relatively small size of most towns of origin. For
instance, I observe very few week-port cells with more than one individual from the same town
boarding different ships. In Section 2.5, I show that results are robust to controlling for the
interaction between town of origin and the month of arrival.
41A number of predetermined characteristics in the test vary at the town of origin level, for this
reason, I do not control for the town of origin fixed effect, but on a larger geographical level (e.g.
provinces in the case of italy). Note however, that this imposes a more demanding condition for
balance.
42Significance levels are bootstrapped by repeating 500 times the procedure of sampling one
individual per ship.
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The second set of tests is given by standard balance regressions. This consists
of OLS regressions of a number of predetermined passenger and ship characteristics
on the two main variables of interest, X¯i and Z¯i. The results in Figure 2.5, where
I label each row in the left axis by the dependent variable, plot the estimated 95%
confidence intervals of the regression. Panel A plots the confidence intervals for
the average earnings of unrelated shipmates’ contacts on land. Similarly, Panel
B corresponds to the average number of shipmates’ potential connections on land.
To illustrate the importance of the baseline controls, I report the estimates with
and without the Port of Departure X Week controls.43 To ease interpretation, all
variables in the regressions are standardized.
I find that shipmates’ characteristics are (unconditionally) correlated with indi-
vidual and ship characteristics: the estimates are statistically significant for most
dependent variables. The introduction of the baseline controls, however, greatly
decreases the estimates which become extremely small in magnitude. For any left
hand side variable, the coefficients imply that one standard deviation in either the
number or the earnings of unrelated shipmates’ contacts on land, has an effect lower
than 0.05 standard deviations. Indeed, after controlling for Port X Week, only two
of the 32 displayed coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 5% level.44
Overall, I interpret the results of this subsection as supporting the exogeneity
of the variation of shipmates’ characteristics among unrelated individuals departing
from the same port during a given week. Consequently with these findings, In
Section 2.5 I provide additional support for the identification assumption, by showing
that the results are robust to the inclusion of a large set of additional controls.
Census-Ships Data Matching and Non-Random Sampling A potential con-
cern in the study is that the matching process creates a non-random sample of the
ships. A number of additional findings suggest that, conditional on baseline controls,
43Following the discussion in footnote 41, regressions include fixed effects for large administrative
units. Additionally, in order to eliminate any potential downward exclusion bias (Guryan et al.,
2009), I control for the earnings and number of passenger’s own potential connections. Appendix
Figure 2.A3 displays similar balancing tests using the same controls and sample used in the baseline
specification (variables defined at town of origin level are then excluded)
44Since the right hand side variables can be correlated with each other, Appendix Figure 2.A2
displays the F-statistics of the joint significant test of each regression.
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matching is not systematically correlated with individual or ship characteristics.
First, note that the dependent variable in the last row of Figure 2.5 is the (stan-
dardized) share of matched passengers within the ship. Conditional on the Week
X Port controls, the correlation is extremely low in magnitude: One standard de-
viation increase in X¯i or Z¯i, changes the matching rate in less than 0.02 standard
deviations. Figure 2.6 further explores this idea and estimates the balance equation
for quintiles of the shipmates’ contacts characteristics.
Second, I estimate the correlation between the ship matching rate and a set of
individual predetermined characteristics conditional on similar controls than those
in the balance regressions. Figure 2.7 plots this regression. Estimated coefficients
are insignificant for 12 out of 13 variables and low in magnitude in every case. Along
with the balance tests, this evidence suggests that conditional on baseline controls,
the matching algorithm does not correlate with individual outcomes. This is not
surprising as surname characteristics are the main determinants of the matching
rate, and within the Week X Port cell, they are not systematically different.
Finally, I use the full Passenger List data to study whether the probability of
being matched correlates with ships characteristics. I regress a dummy variable
indicating if the passenger was matched to Census on the full set of Ship fixed
effects. Table 2.3 reports the F-statistic for the joint significance test of Ship fixed
effects. Column (1) shows that without further controls, Ship fixed effects have
significant predictive power on the matching rate. However, as shown in Column
(2), after including the Week X Port fixed controls, Ship fixed effects are jointly
insignificant.45
These findings also highlight an advantage of the empirical strategy: Even if
matching is non-random for the whole sample (e.g. because some nationalities are
easier to match), narrowing the variation to the Week X Port of Departure level
eliminates any significant difference in matching rates across ships or individuals.
45A different concern is related to the partial observability of the relevant network structure.
Under (conditional) exogenous sorting of individuals across ships, this would result in coefficients
attenuated to some extent as discussed in Ammermueller & Pishcke (2009) & Sojourner (2013). In
Appendix D, I discuss how the baseline results vary according to the matching rate and the impli-
cations for potential attenuation bias. Additionally, I discuss a number of simulations suggesting
that the attenuation bias is relatively low in this setting.
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2.5 Baseline Results
This section describes and interprets the baseline results of the paper. I also show
that the effects of travelling with better connected shipmates persisted for years after
the arrival. I then discuss a number of robustness tests aimed to provide additional
support for the identification assumption. Finally, I discuss the robustness of results
to alternative specifications and clustering of standard errors.
Baseline Estimates Table 3.1 reports estimates of Equation (2.2) for different
measures of earnings and job quality. Column (1) indicates that both dimensions
of shipmates’ contacts quality have a positive and significant effect on individual
earnings score. Exposure to shipmates with connections employed in jobs one per-
centile higher in the earnings distribution, increases individual earning score in 0.14
points. Similarly, every thousand additional (average) connections among shipmates
increases earnings score by 0.05. Columns (2) to (3) reports the results for the al-
ternative measures of job quality discussed in Section 2.3. Estimates indicate effects
of a similar magnitude.46 Although these variables are correlated with the earn-
ing score, they measure different aspects of job quality. Understanding the size of
effects based on Earnings Score is not straightforward as the earning distribution
is typically left-skewed. In order to ease the interpretation of my findings, I also
report the estimates of Equation (2.2) when the dependent variable is the logarithm
of the earnings derived from the 1940 Census.47 Findings in Column (4) mean that
an upward shift of 10 percentiles along the income distribution of shipmates’ con-
nections, increases individual earnings by 2,7%. Every thousand additional average
connections among unrelated shipmates, increases earnings by 0.7%.48
Equation (2.2) can hide some non-linear relationship between individual earnings
46The Duncan Socioeconomic Index, reflects the social perception of the “prestige” associated
to an occupation. The Nam-Power-Boyd index captures differences in the education-earning com-
position of different occupations. Both variables have the same scale than the earnings score (0 to
100).
47The construction of this variable is described in Section 2.3.
48Appendix Table 2.A1 reports the results for two additional variables based on the 1950 Census.
The dependent variable in Column (2) replicates the last column in Table 3.1 but using 1950
Census. Column (3) assign each individual the median earnings of the percentile associated to his
occupation according to the earnings distribution in 1950. Results are robust to these alternative
earnings measures.
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and shipmates’ connections quality. A potential concern is that results are driven by
few ships with outlier characteristics. Figure 2.8 displays non-parametric evidence
that the effects are increasing in the quintiles of the variables of interest. In the
case of shipmates’ connections earnings, effects are monotonically increasing and
statistically significant for quintiles 3 to 5. Travelling in a ship in the highest quintile,
increases individual earnings score in 1.8 points with respect to the lowest quintile
(an effect of 4% according to the regression with log-earnings in panel B). In the case
of the number of connections, the effects are weakly increasing but only significant for
the highest quintile. Travelling in a ship among the highest quintile of this variable,
increases individual earnings score by 1 point with respect to the lowest quintile (an
increase of 2% based on the regression with log-earnings displayed in panel B). It
is useful to compare these figures with the estimated correlations between earnings
and the characteristics of individual’s own connections in the US (Panel A of Figure
2.4). Although the later is not necessarily causal, it is a useful benchmark for
interpreting the magnitude of the effects. Not surprisingly, the effects of shipmates’
connections on earnings are lower than the correlation with respect to the own
contacts’ characteristics. For instance, relative to the lowest quintile, the effect of
travelling with shipmates in the highest quintile of contacts’ earnings is three to four
times lower than the effects of having connections in the highest quintile of earnings.
Appendix Table 2.A3 explores the interaction between the two measures of qual-
ity of shipmates’ connections. The estimated coefficients correspond to an OLS
regression (analogous to Equation (2.2)) where the explanatory variables are the in-
teractions between two sets of dummies indicating whether the number of shipmates’
connections or their average earnings are above/below the median of its distribution.
Both measures of connections’ quality are relevant. Starting from a situation where
shipmates have low-quality connections in terms of both earnings and number, an
increase in either dimension has a positive impact on earnings. Table 2.A3 also
suggests that the earnings of shipmates’ connections is relatively more important
than the number of shipmates’ connections.
The baseline effects display some heterogeneity at geographical level. Appendix
Figure 2.A4 plots the estimates of Equation (2.2) where the shipmates contacts’
earnings variable is interacted with dummies for the country of origin of the indi-
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vidual. The map shows the relative size of the effects for Europe. Among countries
with more emigrants in the data, effects are stronger for Ireland, Poland and Greece.
Naturally, other factors correlated with the country of origin can drive the heteroge-
neous effect. For instance, the estimated effect for Italians is significant but slightly
below the median for Europe. This could be partially explained by the fact that
Italians from distant regions typically spoke different languages. Unsurprisingly, the
potential benefits of social interactions might depend on the ability to communicate
with those well connected shipmates.
Persistence of the Effects Due to the low number of arrivals between 1914 and
1919, most immigrants in the data are observed many years after arrival (7.5 years on
average). This suggests that effects of social interactions with unrelated shipmates
is highly persistent. Figure 2.9 explores this idea in more detail and displays the
estimates of the baseline equation where the right hand side variables are interacted
with dummies for each year since arrival. Although this disaggregation can confound
other characteristics correlated with the time since arrival, the figure suggest that
effects are not only driven by recent migration. Moreover, estimated effects are
statistically significant even 10 years after arrival.49
Additional Controls In this subsection I show that results are robust to the
inclusion of a large number of additional controls. This evidence is important to
rule out some potential threats to the validity of the identification strategy. Table 2.5
summarizes all these findings. Columns (2) and (3) show that estimates are robust
to the inclusion of a set of individual characteristics (age, race, marital status,
language, and an indicator for the individual travelling with some relative) and
a set of characteristics of the ship and the route (e.g. ship capacity, number of
passengers, distance travelled, number of stops, share of male passengers, etc.).
49There are two main confounders for this heterogeneous effect. First, earlier arrivals are older
when observed in the Census, and additionally, given the high rate of return migration in this
period, likely positively selected. Second, immigrant cohorts can differ in terms of skills and other
unobserved determinants of earnings. Whereas the later can’t be controlled for, I alleviate the first
concern by controlling for the interaction between the right hand side variables and the age of the
individual. An additional source of heterogeneity over time is the 1921 Immigration Act, which
mainly affected immigration from eastern and southern European countries. Appendix Table 2.A4
shows the effects of shipmates’ contacts characteristics interacted with dummies of pre/post 1921
Immigration Act. Results suggest that baseline findings are mainly driven by arrivals before 1921.
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Robustness to these controls is consistent with the assumption that, conditional on
baseline controls, the pool of shipmates is not correlated with individual or ship
characteristics. In a more general way, I want to rule out that individuals select
into ships due to unobservable characteristics of the ship. This would be the case
if for instance, more educated individuals (which potentially correlates with their
connections quality) select into ships with higher capacity or higher speed. Such
situation would confound the effect of better connected shipmates with individual’s
different characteristics. Column (6) shows that effects are similar after controlling
for vessel fixed effects and this finding is inconsistent with such interpretation.
Note that the baseline specification (Equation (2.2)) absorbs any shock at the
Town of Origin X Semester level. Although this is an already narrow time-space
grid, some concerns may arise regarding the relevant time horizon in which local
shocks can affect passengers’ predetermined characteristics.50 Column (4) extends
the baseline specification to a shorter window of time by controlling for the interac-
tion between fixed effects of the town of origin and the month-year of arrival. Since
most towns are relatively small, there are fewer cells with multiple individuals from
the same town boarding different ships within the same month. Despite of the lower
number of observations, results remain statistically significant with coefficients of
similar magnitudes. Column (5) narrows the time horizon to the week level but
uses a larger spatial aggregation grid (administrative units above the locality level,
e.g. provinces in the case of Italy). In this case, results are similar for the earnings
of shipmates’ contacts and non-significant for the number of connections on land,
although standard errors are also larger due to the introduction of a large number
of fixed effects.
As discussed in Section 2.4, it is possible that ships departing from the same
port during the same week, followed a different route. Although the vessel fixed
effect controls for most of this variation, some vessels could have covered different
routes over time. Column (7) shows that baseline results are robust to the inclusion
of fixed effects for each route identified in the data. This rule out that results are
driven by some correlation among shipmates’ characteristics created by individuals
50For instance, it could be the case that a local shock greatly changes the quality of individual’s
own connections within a semester.
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selecting across ships based on the travelled route.51
Finally, Columns (8) and (9) aim to control for a narrow set of individual charac-
teristics and labor market conditions upon arrival. Column (8) includes fixed effects
for the NYSIIS phonetic coding of surnames (Atack and Bateman, 1992) which
accounts for approximately 8000 groups of surnames.52 Column (9) includes fixed
effects for the date of arrival. Despite of a lower number of observations, estimates
are robust to the inclusion of the additional controls. These findings have a number
of implications. First, surnames embeds some important unobserved characteris-
tics of individuals. Thus, findings are consistent with the claim that conditional on
baseline controls, passengers do not select into ships according to individual charac-
teristics that correlate with earnings. Second, surname is the most critical variable
when matching between Passenger Lists and Censuses. Some surnames are more
difficult to match either because they are too frequent, or because they are more
likely to be misspelled when transcribed. Therefore, results in Column (8) are in-
consistent with a non-random matching across ships driving the results. Lastly,
results in Column (9) rule out that some correlation between shipmates’ character-
istics and daily conditions upon arrival explains my findings. This would be the case
if for instance, the arrival of passengers from certain towns triggered some events
like a higher demand for train tickets to some destinations or a lower availability of
temporary accommodation in New York City.
Narrowing the Definition of Unrelated Shipmates One potential concern
when establishing a causal interpretation of Equation (2.2) is the possibility that
shipmates from different places of origin are already connected before travelling.
Although this is an unlikely event for the vast majority of passengers, I restrict
in two ways the pool of shipmates assumed to be unrelated. First, I use the fact
that travelling together (or buying the ticket from the same agent) typically implied
nearby manifest line numbers. In Table 2.6, I report the estimates of the baseline
equation but for every individual, I restrict the set of his unrelated shipmates by
51This is not surprising given that the ports concentrating most of the departures in this period
are usually covered by few routes, and in many cases by a unique route.
52Including surname fixed effects is problematic for two reasons. First, the large variety of
different surnames would absorb most of the variation at individual level. Second, a non-negligible
part of the variation in surnames can be due to transcription errors or typos.
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imposing a minimum distance in their ID numbers (which follows the same order
than manifest line numbers). The first two rows of the table exclude any shipmate
with a difference in ID numbers lower than 10 and 15 respectively. The second
way in which I restrict this set is by excluding passengers with towns of residence
located at less than 100 kilometers from each other. The last row of Table 2.6
displays the baseline results after imposing both sets of restrictions (Minimum ID
number difference and minimum distance). Point estimates are somewhat lower
for the earnings of shipmates’ contacts (but they remain statistically significant
at 1%) and they are similar for the number of shipmates’ connections. Note that
either restriction can introduce some attenuation bias if true unrelated shipmates are
excluded.53 Moreover, due to language constraints and social preferences, interaction
with unrelated individuals can be more likely to occur among those from closer
towns.
Alternative Definition of Connections on Arrival As discussed in Section
2.4, defining potential contacts in the US at the town of origin level is in line with
a number of previous studies. However, in the setting of this paper, it is possible
to think that narrower definitions of connections are also relevant (for instance,
relatives who emigrated in the past). In Appendix Table 2.A5, I re-estimate the
baseline specification using two alternative definitions of potential connections upon
arrival to the US. First, in Column (2) I consider individuals with similar surname
(based on the NYSIIS coding) who previously emigrated from the same province or
large administrative unit. Second, I consider past emigrants from the same town
of origin who share a similar surname (Column (3)). For small places, the second
definition captures to a large extent, relatives who emigrated in the past. In order to
ease the comparison across definitions, I standardize all the right hand side variables.
Column (1) corresponds to the baseline definition.54 Alternative definitions result in
estimated effects of similar magnitude, and in both cases, higher than the baseline
53See footnote 45
54Narrowing the definitions for potential contacts significantly reduce the number of observations
and statistical power since, for instance, very few individuals from same town and with the same
surname migrate in the same semester. For this reason, the specification in Table 2.A5 includes
fixed effects for the group at which contacts are defined (e.g. Town of Origin X Surname) but
interacted with census year instead of semester fixed effects.
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results. Higher estimates can be due to a number of reasons. First, unique surnames
are not included in the pool of unrelated individuals when computing earnings of
shipmates contacts. Second, given a narrower definition, within ship variation in
shipmates’ characteristics is also larger. Finally, connections with settled emigrants
of similar surname can be the main source of information and support upon arrival,
or just better predictors of economic success for immigrants.
Alternative Identification Strategies I explore two different sources of vari-
ation in the characteristics of shipmates. The first strategy exploits the fact that
many vessels travel from the same port repeatedly during the year. Therefore, I
only compare passengers travelling in the same vessel within the same semester..
Column (1) in Appendix Table 2.A6 estimates the following equation:
Yi = β1X¯i + β2Z¯i + ψv(i) × θp(i) × λy(i) + δc(i) × pit(i) + ηr(i) × pit(i) + i (2.3)
where ψv(i) is a vessel fixed effect, ηr(i) is a route fixed effect and the rest of vari-
ables are defined identically to Equation (2.2). Estimates for this specification are
displayed in Column (1). Point estimates are highly significant for the case of earn-
ings of shipmates’ contacts and the magnitude is approximately 40% lower than the
baseline effects. These results provide additional evidence that baseline effects are
not driven by passengers sorting across vessels.
The second alternative variation follows from the fact that some ships stopped
at different ports before arriving in New York. In this case, I exploit the variation
in shipmates’ characteristics created by passengers from different ports. A potential
concern of this specification is that some ports can be very distant from each other
reducing the potential interaction between these shipmates. Moreover, in many
cases, shipmates boarding at different ports spoke different languages.55 Addition-
ally, the sample size is largely reduced because either there were no intermediate
stops or because only few individuals boarded at a different port. Indeed, I exclude
any ship where more than 90% of the passengers boarded in the same port. Column
55This was true not only for ships stopping at different countries. For instance, italians boarding
at different ports typically spoke different languages/dialects and fluent communication among
them was very unlikely.
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(2) estimates the following equation:56
Yi = β1X¯
sp
i + β2Z¯
sp
i + α1X¯
dp
i + α2Z¯
dp
i + ψv(i) + δc(i) × pit(i) + ηr(i) × pit(i) + i
(2.4)
where X¯spi , Z¯
sp
i , X¯
sp
i and Z¯
sp
i are defined similarly to Equation (2.2) but I distin-
guish between the characteristics of passengers boarding in the port (superscript sp)
and that of those boarding at a different port (superscript dp). Estimates from this
equation are displayed in Column (2). Point estimates are higher for the charac-
teristics of same-port shipmates and only significant for the earnings of shipmates’
contacts. Finally, in Column (3) I only consider individuals who boarded the ship at
the first departing port and use the variation created by shipmates boarding at sub-
sequent ports. Remarkably, point estimates for the earnings of shipmates’ contacts
are similar to those in Column (2).57
2.6 Mechanism: Establishing a Social Interaction
Interpretation
The findings in the previous Section, show a causal link between the short run expo-
sure to a pool of better connected individuals and future performance in the labor
market. However, this reduced form result is compatible with a number of mecha-
nisms that do not necessary require social interaction among unrelated shipmates.
In this Section, I provide evidence supporting the social interaction interpretation
as the most plausible one.
I start by showing, that the effect is stronger for passengers with fewer connec-
tions and that results are driven, to a larger extent, by shipmates speaking the same
language (a natural mediator of social interaction). Then, I show that the sector of
employment and place of residence of shipmates’ contacts have predictive power on
56Note that I don’t include the interaction between port of departure and the time dimension in
order to exploit the variation across ports of the same route. Instead, I control for the interaction
between the route and the semester of arrival. This is a less demanding specification compared to
the baseline, but unfortunately, statistical power is too low to include Route X Week fixed effects.
57This also illustrates that my identification strategy is robust to exclusion bias (see Angrist,
2014).
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the occupational and residential outcomes of the individual. Finally, as a reassuring
exercise, I show that conditional on arriving in the same week and from the same
port, the correlation in labor and residential outcomes is stronger among shipmates.
Heterogenous Effects As described in Section 2.3, this was a period of high-
stakes decisions for most immigrants. Consequently, the effects of brief social in-
teraction are expected to be higher for individuals with poor connections and no
access to relevant information. Table 2.7 displays estimations of the baseline re-
gression where each measure of shipmates’ connections is interacted with dummies
indicating how well connected is the individual himself. Column (1) explores the
quality of connections on board, that is, whether the passenger is travelling alone
or with relatives.58 Individuals travelling alone are more benefited by travelling
with higher quality shipmates. Column (2), shows that individuals with poor con-
nections on land59 are more affected by their shipmates’ contacts characteristics.
Finally, Column (3) shows that effects are stronger for individuals travelling alone
and with poor connections on land.
A subset of ships in the sample contains shipmates who spoke different mother
tongue (using Census definition). As verbal communication is an essential compo-
nent of social interaction, I expect that the characteristics of shipmates who speak
the same language are more relevant.60 Table 2.8 displays the estimates of the base-
line equation but separating among the characteristics of unrelated shipmates with
similar and different language. Although the average effects are lower compared
to baseline results, the coefficients associated to shipmates of similar language are
always higher compared to those of different language.61 In the next subsection, I
58In order to avoid confounding the effect with the surname prevalence, I include surname
NYSIIS code fixed effects. This explains why, consistent with Table 3.1, the average effect is
higher compared to the baseline.
59An individual is defined as low connected when the median earnings and the median number
of past emigrants from his town are below the median.
60For instance, Bertrand et al. (2000) use common language to measure links within neighbor-
hoods.
61A large number of ships are dropped from the sample because all matched passengers spoke the
same language, thus, a number of reasons can explain the lower average effects. First, the remaining
ships are larger than the average, with social interactions more difficult to detect or subjected to
higher attenuation bias. Second, departures of “multilingual” ships are more concentrated after
1921, where social interactions were less important as shown in Appendix Table 2.A4. Finally, it
could be the case that remaining ships covered routes and ports where individuals were less prone
to social interaction or less benefited from it.
105
find evidence that shipmates that spoke the same language are also more relevant
in explaining the sector of employment and place of residence of immigrants.
Sector of Employment and Residence Place of Shipmates’ Connections
According to the social interaction hypothesis, shipmates are important in providing
information on potential destinations within US. They can also affect labor decisions
either by granting access to their networks on arrival or by directly providing job
referrals. Consequently, I expect that a number of immigrants migrated toward
places where shipmates’ contacts concentrates. Similarly, a number of immigrants
should have got jobs in sectors where shipmates’ contacts were employed with more
intensity. I explore this idea with a number of tests.
First, I run three OLS regressions where the dependent variables are dummies
indicating whether the individual is employed in primary activities, manufactures,
or services.62 The main explanatory variables are the share of shipmates’ contacts
employed in primary activities and the share employed in manufactures (services is
the ommited category). Regressions also include the set of fixed effects in Equation
(2.2). Table 2.9 displays the results of this exercise. Notably, results reveal that
individuals travelling with shipmates’ contacts employed more intensively in some
sector, are also more likely to be employed in that sector.
Second, given that New York City was the most popular destination for immi-
grants, I study to what extent this desicion depended on the place of residence of
shipmates’ contacts. Figure 2.10 plots the OLS regression of a dummy variable in-
dicating whether the immigrant remained in New York on the share of shipmates’
contacts living in New York (I estimate this non-parametrically for the quintiles of
the explanatory variable and controlling for the same set of fixed effects in baseline
Equation (2.2)). The estimated effect is monotonically increasing and significant for
the two highest quintiles.
Finally, similar conclusions are obtained using with a more granular definition of
sector of employment and place of residence. I show this by estimating the following
62Based on IPUMS detailed industry classification.
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OLS regression(s):
Yij = βSij + γi + φj(i) × θp(i) × λw(i) + φj(i) × δc(i) × pit(i) + i (2.5)
where Yij is an indicator variable that takes one if individual i is employed in sector
j (or lives in place j) and zero otherwise, γi is an individual fixed effect
63 and φj(i)
is a sector of empoyment (or place of residence) fixed effect. Consistently with the
main identification strategy, φj(i) is interacted with the fixed effects in the baseline
Equation (2.2). The main variable of interest is Sij, the share of shipmates’ contacts
employed in sector j (or living in place j).
Table 2.10 displays the estimates of Equation (2.5). In Panel (A), the sector
of employment is defined alternatively at one and two digits based on the IPUMS
detailed classification. In either case, coefficients are highly significant. An increase
of 10 percentage points in the share of shipmates contacts employed in sector j,
increases by 0.8% the probability of working in that sector. In Panel B, I use two
definitions for the place of residence. Column (1) shows the result for the state of
residence and Column (2) for the city of residence.64 Coefficients have a magnitude
comparable to those in Panel A. Finally, Panel (C) displays the estimates of Equation
(2.5) for the Sector of Occupation and the State of Residence with Sij measured
separately for shipmates of same and different language. Similar to previous findings,
estimates are significantly higher for the characteristics of same-language shipmates.
Correlation in Labor and Residential Outcomes among Shipmates Base-
line estimates exploit the variation in predetermined characteristics of shipmates.
In this subsection, I follow a different approach by directly looking at labor and
residential choices of unrelated shipmates. This exercise is complementary to the
previous analysis in two ways. First, it is not affected by measurement issues re-
lated to the definition of networks characteristics (e.g. baseline estimates require
to measure the earnings of settled immigrants). Second, it can account for social
interaction effects, in situations where connections on land are less important for
63Note that each individual enters multiple times in this specification
64In the later case I exclude individuals with missing information on the city of residence or
living in rural locations.
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immigrant decisions.
I extend the empirical approach that Bayer et al. (2008) use to identify social
interaction effects among neighbors. In this case, I compare the correlation in out-
comes among individuals arrived during the same week, conditional on departing
from the same port. As already shown in Section 2.4, predetermined characteris-
tics of shipmates are uncorrelated once we control for the Week X Port interaction.
Thus, it is plausible to assume that unobservable determinants of labor and residen-
tial outcomes are also uncorrelated. Under this assumption, (conditional) correlation
in shipmates’ outcomes can be interpreted as the causal effect of travelling together.
Naturally, the main limitation of this test is that it does not rule out the presence
of common shocks after departure.
More specific, I estimate the following equation using the combination of all
possible (non-repeated) pairs of individuals arrived during the same week:
Yih = βSameShip+ γi + γh + θp(i) × θp(h) × λw(ih) + δd(i) × δd(h) + ih (2.6)
where Yih is a measure of similarity between the outcomes of (unrelated) indi-
viduals i and h. Variables γi, γh are passenger fixed effects. In order to compare
individuals departing from the same port and week, the regression controls for the
interaction between θp(i), θp(h) (port of departure fixed effects) and λw(ih) (week fixed
effect). As suggested above, common shocks experienced during the voyage or upon
arrival can create some correlation in individual outcomes even in the absence of
social interaction. To alleviate this problem, I control for δd(i) × δd(h), the interac-
tion between the fixed effects for the dates of arrival of each passenger in the pair.
Although this does not eliminate ship-specific shocks, it controls for any shock af-
fecting passengers arrived during the same day. For instance, some types of jobs
could have been advertised only during weekends.
Table 2.11 displays the estimates of Equation (2.6) for different outcomes. The
dependent variable in Column (1) takes one if the pair of individuals works in the
same sector and has the same occupation.65 Travelling in the same ship, has an
65Occupations and sectors are defined at the most detailed level available in IPUMS created
variables.
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effect of 0.15 percentage points which corresponds to a 10% increase in the mean of
the dependent variable. In Column (2), the dependent variable measures whether
the pair works in the same sector within the same state. In this case, the effects are
in the magnitude of 26% over the mean of the dependent variable. Columns (3) an
(4) suggest that travelling in the same ship creates some geographical agglomeration.
Column (3) shows that travelling in the same ship, is associated with a 3% reduction
in the distance between the US residence place of (unrelated) individuals. Column
(4) shows that the probability of living in the same city is 0.2 percentage points
higher for unrelated shipmates.
Finally, I estimate the effects of SameShip interacted with a number of pair-
specific characteristics. Consistent with previous findings in this section, Appendix
Table 2.A8 shows that the effects are only driven by pairs of individuals who spoke
the same language. Appendix Table 2.A9 explores the idea that pairs of individ-
uals with strong connections upon arrival, should be less affected by brief social
interactions. Results are consistent with this interpretation.
2.7 Conclusion
Although the role of chance encounters with previously unknown people has been
long recognized by academics, and more recently by companies and managers, em-
pirical evidence on this subject is largely absent. This paper provides causal evidence
that brief social interaction with unknown people has economic relevance, provided
they occur during critical life junctures. In particular, I study the effects of interac-
tions among immigrants who met for the first time while travelling to the US during
the period 1909-1924. Using a dataset of matched immigrants-ship with detailed
geographical information, I have shown that conditional on their town of origin, in-
dividuals travelling with (previously unrelated) better connected shipmates, ended
up being employed in better quality jobs. I identify this effect using the variation
within the same port and week of departure and controlling for the town of origin.
A number of tests show that this variation is plausibly exogenous and thus, results
are credibly driven by differences in shipmates’ characteristics.
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A second set of estimations, provides suggestive evidence that the underlying
mechanism is related to shipmates providing access and/or information on potential
job opportunities or places of destination within the country. At the same time,
heterogeneous baseline results highlight that random social encounters are more
important for individuals with lower access to pre-established networks (i.e. contacts
with immigrants from the same community and had settled in the US).
This paper prompts a number of implications beyond the particular setting of
the study. First, my results indicate that the benefits of brief social interactions are
larger for uninformed individuals or individuals with lower access to stronger forms
of networks, like friends or relatives. Second, my results highlight the influence
that interactions with unknown people can have in situations where individuals
have to make critical decisions and information is scarce. This extends to a large
number of settings, for instance, parental choice among schools or students choice
of college major. A closely related implication is that economic outcomes among
recent waves of refugees to Europe can be affected by the characteristics of those
who they interact in the days surrounding the voyage (which include boat-mates
but also border agents, NGO workers, etc.). More generally, results from this paper
illustrates that brief episodes can have long-lasting effects on future earnings.
In recent years, a growing volume of individual level data has become available
for researchers. In many cases, information is dispersed across multiple sources and
merging across them relies on noisy string variables. Examples vary from historical
full count census to recent automatic web generated data. This paper illustrates
that incorporating tools from Computer Science can be highly valuable for applied
researchers.
Finally, this paper leaves a set of open questions for future research. The extent
to which brief social interactions matter in less critical situations can’t be answered
in the context of this study. Similarly, the setting is not suitable to disentangling
between the pure information effect of brief interactions from the direct effect of
providing access to better connections or financial support. In this sense, it would
be relevant to study settings where individuals meet for a brief period and they
never meet again. Finally, despite of recent trends in management practices, the
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productivity effects of chance encounters within organizations remains largely un-
explored.
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2.8 Figures of the Chapter
Figure 2.1: Passenger List and Census Data
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Figure 2.2: Ports of Departure
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Figure 2.3: Places of Origin in Matched Sample
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Figure 2.4: Individual Outcomes and Settled Immigrants from Same Town
Figure 2.5: Balance of Predetermined Characteristics
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Figure 2.6: Data Matching and Quality of Own Contacts
Figure 2.7: Data Matching and Individual Characteristics
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Figure 2.8: Effect of Shipmates’ Connections on Earnings
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Figure 2.9: Effect on Earnings by Time Since Arrival
Figure 2.10: Probability of Staying in NY as a Function of Shipmates’ Contacts
Residing in NY
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2.9 Tables of the Chapter
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A Full Sample Reg Sample[1]
N Male Individuals Full Passenger List 9,297,026 4,716,934
N Male Immigrants Census 1920-1930 2,836,404 2,469,503
N Matched Individuals 351,289 206,383
N of Ships Matched Sample 34,091 14,910
N of Vessels Matched Sample 5,138 1,152
N Ports Matched Sample 422 166
N Routes Matched Sample 865 454
N Places of Origin Matched Sample[2] 10,909 8,250
Panel B Avg Std Min Max
Min Linear Distance Travelled (thousands of km) [3] 6.5 1.2 3 31
Estimated Days Full Voyage at 15 Knots Speed 9.7 1.9 4.6 46.5
Distance Town to Port of Departure 526.6 913.1 0 19214
Passengers per Ship in Passenger List [4] 173 303.2 1 3749
Passengers per Ship in Matched Sample [4] 20.1 23.2 1 262
Past Emigration from Same Place (thousands) 9.3 22.7 0 168
Earnings of Past Emigrant from Same Place 49.7 11.6 .6 100
Avg N of Potential Contacts of Shipm (thousands) [5] 6.2 9.6 0 168
Avg Earnings of Potential Contacts of Shipmates [5] 49.8 6.4 3.1 100
N of Different Places of Origin in the Ship 14.9 17 1 178
Age at arrival 23 10.4 0 68
Married at arrival .29 .45 0 1
Share Travelling Alone [6] .74 .44 0 1
Share Living in Urban Places at Destination .82 .38 0 1
Share Individuals Staying in New York City .21 .4 0 1
Average N of Ships in Week X Port 2.8 1.8 0 15
[1] The regression sample includes individuals 13-65 years old. For the case of Passenger List information, it only includes
ships departing from ports more than 3000km away from New York port and without missing information on the place
of origin. [2] Places of origin with at least two matched individuals during one semester in the regression sample. [3]
The Minimum Linear Distance of the voyage is estimated as the sum of the straigth distance between subsequential ports
identified within the route, sorted by their proximity to New York port. [4] Only individuals in the regression sample. [5]
Potential contacts are defined as past emigration from the same town or place of origin. [6] Individuals travelling alone are
defined as those without any other passenger in the ship with same place of origin and surname.
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Table 2.2: Correlation of Characteristics within Ship
(1) (2)
Unconditional Conditional on
Correlation Week x Port
Age 0.079*** -0.007
Married 0.088*** 0.003
Single 0.094*** 0.003
Travelling alone 0.075*** 0.001
Mother tongue = English 0.642*** 0.004
Mother tongue = German 0.488*** 0.002
Mother tongue = Spanish 0.462*** -0.011
Quality of machting 0.110*** 0.008
N same town passengers 0.079*** 0.031*
N same town-surname passengers 0.085*** 0.006
N Past emigrants same town-surname 0.008 -0.004
N Past emigrants same surname 0.114*** -0.006
N Past emigrants same town -0.014*** -0.015
Avg earnings of land contacts 0.176*** -0.010
Distance town to port 0.165*** -0.004
Distance town to NY 0.701*** 0.000
The table displays unbiased estimates of the correlation individual and average shipmates’ characteristics , excluding those
residing in the same place or with similar surname. Column (2) controls for Week of arrival X Port of Departure and Adm
Region X Port. Sample of 15-65 males not residing in the US before departure. Bootstrapped significance levels.
Table 2.3: Probability of Matching Passenger List - Census
Dep Var = Passenger Matched with Census
(1) (2)
No Controls Week X Port
F-Stat Joint Significance of Ship FE 5.92 0.60
p-value 0.00 1.00
N Individuals 5008017 4996193
The table reports the joint significance F-statistic for the Ship Fixed Effects, in a regression where the dependent variable
is a dummy for whether the passenger is matched in the census. The sample is the full passenger list for non-american
citizens in the age group 14-65.
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Table 2.4: Effect of Shipmates’ Connections on Earnings and Job Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Earnings Duncan NPB Log Earns
Shipmates Characteristics Score Index Index Occ1940†
Average Contacts Earnings 0.14∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
Number of Contacts 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Mean DepVar 50.89 23.24 44.36 881.88
N individuals 97395 97818 97395 96484
R2 .338 .359 .368 .384
F excl 12.2 9.9 11.4 12.9
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of different measures of earnings and job quality on
the average characteristics of shipmates contacts. † Coefficients multiplied by 100 in this column.
The sample includes all male passengers arrived in the period 1909-1924 matched with census years
1920-1930 and with non-missing information on occupation. In Column (1) the dependent variable is
the occupational earnings score created by IPUMS. In Columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable
is the Duncan Socioeconomic Index and the Nam-Power-Boyd Index. In Column (4) the dependent
variable is the (log) median earnings of the occupation in 1940. In all regressions, the first reported
explanatory variable is the average earnings score of the potential contacts of (unrelated) shipmates.
The second explanatory variable is the average number of potential contacts of (unrelated) ship-
mates. Potential contacts are defined as past emigration from the same town of origin. For every
individual, the pool of unrelated shipmates excludes any passenger with same town of origin or
with similar surname. Surnames are defined as similar when the Jaro-Winkler distance is below 0.1.
All regressions include indicators for Week of Arrival X Port of Departure and Place of Origin X
Semester. Standard errors are clustered at the Week of Arrival level.
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Table 2.6: Investigating Potential Contacts Before Travelling
(1) (2)
Shipmates contacts Shipmates avg Number
avg earnings of contacts
Baseline 0.14*** 0.05**
(0.03) (0.02)
|IDi − IDj| > 10 0.12*** 0.04**
(0.03) (0.02)
|IDi − IDj| > 15 0.12*** 0.04**
(0.03) (0.02)
Dist(Towni, T ownj) > 100km 0.09*** 0.04***
(0.03) (0.02)
Each row in the table reports the coefficients of a different OLS regression of the earnings score on the shipmates
contacts characteristics. Each column variable is a different explanatory variable of the same regression. The second
and third row exclude any shipmate j with ID number difference below 10 and 15 respectively. The last row excludes
any shipmate j with ID number difference below 15 and with town of origin located at less than 100km of individual’s
town of origin. All regressions control for the characteristics of individual own contacts. All regressions include the
baseline controls described in the text and fixed effects fo rthe interaction between port of departure and week, and
the interaction between port of departure, administrative area of residence and year-semester. Robust standard
errors clustered at week of arrival level.
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Table 2.7: Estimated Effects by Individual’s Connections On-Board and On-Land
Depvar = Earnings Score
(1) (2) (3)
Definition of Low Connections: No Contacts Quality of No Contacts
On Board Potential On Board +
(Same Town Contacts Quality of
or Surname) on Land Land Contacts
Shipmates Contacts Earnings 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.34***
x Low Connections (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Shipmates Contacts Earnings 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.12***
x High Connections (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Shipmates N of Contacts 0.07* 0.10** 0.13**
x Low Connections (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Shipmates N of Contacts 0.07** 0.05** 0.05**
x High Connections 0.03 0.02 0.02
Each column shows the coefficients of a different OLS regression of the earnings score on the average earnings of contacts and
on the number of contacts of (unrelated) shipmates’ interacted with a dummy variable indicating the quality of connections
of the individual. In Column (1), an individual is defined as low connected if he is travelling without any person of same
surname from the same place of origin. In Column (2) an individual is defined as low connected if the number of persons
from the same place in the ship is below the median and if the average earnings of past emigrants from same place is below
the median. Column 3 defines an individual as low connected if the number of emigrants and the average earnings of past
emigrants from the same palce of origin is below the median and if there is no other passenger from the same place of origin in
the ship. Surname similarity is defined based on nysiis phonetic coding. All regressions include fixed effects of Week X Port of
Departure, Place of Origin X Semester of Arrival, indicators for the route and a dummy variable indicating if the individual
is high or low connected according to the definition in the column. Column (1) includes fixed effects for each nysiis surname
category. Standard errors clustered at the week of arrival level.
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Table 2.8: Effects by Language of Shipmates
(1) (2)
Earnings Score Log Earns†
Average Earnings of Similar Language 0.05** 0.14***
Shipmates’ Contacts (0.02) (0.04)
Average Earnings of Different Language 0.03 0.06
Shipmates’ Contacts (0.03) (0.06)
Average Number of Similar Language 0.01 0.03
Shipmates’ Contacts (0.01) (0.02)
Average Number of Different Language -0.01 -0.02
Shipmates’ Contacts (0.01) (0.02)
Each column of the Table displays estimates of an OLS regression of a measure of individual earnings on
the average characteristics of (unrelated) shipmates contacts. The main explanatory variables are calculated
separately for shipmates who spoke similar and different mother tongue. In Column (1) the dependent
variable is the occupational earnings score created by IPUMS. In Column (2) the dependent variable is the
(log) median earnings of the occupation in 1940.The sample includes all (male 14-65) matched passengers in
the period 1909-1924 with at least one shipmate speaking a different mother tongue. Mother tongue definition
is constructed based on IPUMS categories. † Coefficients multiplied by 100 in this column. Regressions also
control for baseline controls as defined in the text. The number of observations in the regressions is 62,890.
Standard errors clustered at the week of arrival level.
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Table 2.9: Effects on Sector of Employment
(1) (2) (3)
Primary Manufactures Services
Shipmates Characteristics Sector Sector Sector
Share of Contacts in Primary Sector 0.08∗∗ -0.010 -0.07∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Share of Contacts in Manufactures 0.01 0.07∗ -0.08∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Mean DepVar 0.3 0.4 0.4
N individuals 83459 83459 83459
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of the sector of employment of the individual on the
share of (unrelated) shipmates contacts employed in each sector. The sample includes all male passengers
arrived in the period 1909-1924 matched with census years 1920-1930 and with non-missing information
on occupation. In Column (1) the dependent variable a dummy indicating whether the individual is
employed in agriculture and other primary activites. In Column (2) the dependent variable a dummy
indicating whether the individual is employed in the manufacturing sector. In Column (3) the dependent
variable a dummy indicating whether the individual is employed in services or public sector. Potential
contacts are defined as past emigration from the same town of origin. For every individual, the pool of
unrelated shipmates excludes any passenger with same town of origin or with similar surname. Surnames
are defined as similar when the Jaro-Winkler distance is below 0.1. All regressions control for the share
of individual contacts in each sector, the number of contacts of the individual, the average number of
contacts of his shipmates, the average earnings of the shipmates contacts, the average earnings of his
own contacts and indicators for Week of Arrival X Port of Departure and Place of Origin X Semester.
Standard errors are clustered at the Week of Arrival level.
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Table 2.10: Shipmates Effects on Sectors of Occupation and Place of Residence
Panel A: Sector of Occupation of Individual
(1) (2)
Sector 1 digit Sector 2 digits
Share of Shipmates Contacts Working in 0.079*** 0.076***
the Same Sector (0.014) (0.008)
Panel B: Place of Residence of Individual
(1) (2)
State of City of
Residence Residence
Share of Shipmates Contacts Living in 0.084*** 0.073***
Destination Place (0.009) (0.010)
Panel C: By Language of Shipmates
(1) (2)
Share of Contacts Working/Living in Sector of State of
the Same Sector/State: Occup (1d) Residence
Shipmates of Similar Language 0.078*** 0.086***
(0.012) (0.007)
Shipmates of Different Language 0.015 0.016**
(0.012) (0.008)
Panel A displays the coefficients of an OLS regression of Yij(t), a dummy that takes one if individual i works in
sector j, on XSMij , the share of (unrelated) shipmates contacts working in sector j. Regressions include individual
fixed effects, fixed effects of the interaction between sector of occupation, week and port of departure and fixed effects
of the interaction between sector of occupation, administrative region of origin and year of arrival. Regressions also
control for the share of individual contacts working in sector j. In Column (1) sector of occupation is defined at 1
digit and in Column (2) at 2 digits, in both cases based on the 3 digits classification created by IPUMS. Panel B
displays the coefficients of an OLS regression of Yic(t), a dummy that takes one if individual i lives in place c, on
XSMic , the share of (unrelated) shipmates contacts residing in place c. Regressions include individual fixed effects,
fixed effects of the interaction between the place of residence, week and port of departure and fixed effects of the
interaction between place of residence, administrative region of origin and year of arrival. Regressions also control
for the share of individual contacts living in place c. In Column (1) the place of residence is defined as the state
of residence. In Column (2) the place of residence is based on 85 cities with the highest share of individuals from
the sample, excluding those residing in non-classified cities or small rural areas. In Panel C, the share of shipmates
contacts working in different sectors or living in different states are calculated separately for shipmates with similar
and different mother tongue. Potential contacts are defined as past emigration from the same town of origin. For
every individual, the pool of unrelated shipmates excludes any passenger with same town of origin or with similar
surname. Surnames are defined as similar when the Jaro-Winkler distance is below 0.1. The number of observations
are 712,440 for Panel A Column(1), 5,303,720 for Panel A Column(2), 7,563,689 for Panel B Column(1), 8,971,750
for Panel B Column(2), 464,445 for Panel C Column (1) and 5,110,210 for Panel C Column (2). Standard errors
clustered at the week of arrival level.
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Table 2.11: Correlation in Labor and Spatial Outcomes of Shipmates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Same Work Same Log Dist Live Same
Ind x Occ Ind x State Residence City
Same Ship 0.15∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ -3.15∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.60) (0.09)
% Effect Over the Mean 9.4 11.09 -3.15 2.18
N individuals 134974 134974 193551 137602
N observations 18556160 18556160 37425892 19775703
All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Table displays the OLS regressions of individual-pair level
outcomes on a dummy variable indicating whether the pair travelled in the same ship. The sample consists
of all matched male passengers arrived during the period 1909-1921 grouped into non repeated pairs of
individuals who arrived during the same week. The sample only include pairs of individuals with different
surname (defined as Jaro-Winkler distance above 0.1) and from different places of origin. In Column (1) the
dependent variable is a dummy for whether the pair works in the same occupation and industry. In Column
(2) the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the pair works in the same industry and lives in the
same state . In Column (3) the dependent variable is a measure of the log distance between the county of
residence of each individual in the pair. In Column (4) the dependent variable indicates whether the pair
lives in the same city. Regressions include indicators for each individual in the pair, fixed effects of Week of
Arrival X Port Departure(i) X Port Departure(j) and fixed effect of Date Arrival(i) X Date Arrival(j) where
i and j index individuals in the pair. Standard Errors clustered at week of arrival level.
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2.10 Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures
of the Chapter
Figure 2.A1: Main Ports of Departure and Countries of Origin
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Figure 2.A2: Balance Regressions, Joint Significance
Figure 2.A3: Balance of Predetermined Characteristics
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Figure 2.A4: Heterogenous Effects by Country of Origin of Passengers (Europe)
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Table 2.A1: Alternative Measures of Earnings Based on 1950 Census
(1) (2) (3)
Log Earnings Log Earnings Log Earnings
Shipmates Characteristics Occupation 1940 Occupation 1950 Percentile 1950
Average Contacts Earnings 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Number of Contacts 0.07∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Mean DepVar 881.88 2219.54 2235.79
N individuals 96484 97395 97395
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of different measures of earnings on the average characteristics of
shipmates contacts. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. The sample includes all male passengers arrived in the
period 1909-1924 matched with census years 1920-1930 and with non-missing information on occupation. In Column
(1) the dependent variable is the (log) median earnings of the occupation in 1940. Column (2) is similar to Column (1)
but using 1950 1% census sample. In column (3) the dependent variable is the (log) median earnings of the percentile
ranking of the occupation in 1950. In all regressions, the first reported explanatory variable is the average earnings
score of the potential contacts of (unrelated) shipmates. The second explanatory variable is the average number of
potential contacts of (unrelated) shipmates. Potential contacts are defined as past emigration from the same town of
origin. For every individual, the pool of unrelated shipmates excludes any passenger with same town of origin or with
similar surname. Surnames are defined as similar when the Jaro-Winkler distance is below 0.1. All regressions include
indicators for Week of Arrival X Port of Departure and Place of Origin X Semester. Standard errors are clustered at
the Week of Arrival level.
Table 2.A2: Alternative Clustering of Standard Errors
Clustering Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Week of Month of Ship x Region of Multicluster
Arrival Arrival Port Depart Origin Week-Ship
Avg. Earnings 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.037) (0.028) (0.032) (0.031)
N of contacts 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
N individuals 97391 97391 97391 97391 97391
Each column shows the coefficients of a different regression for alternative levels of clustering in standard errors. The
dependent variable is the earnings score. The reported explanatory variables are the average earnings of (unrelated)
shipmates potential contacts and their average number of contacts (in thousands). Potential contacts are defined
as past emigrants from the same town of origin. All regressions control for the characteristics of individual own
contacts. Baseline controls include interaction for week of arrival and port of departure and the interaction between
administrative region of origin and port of departure.
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Table 2.A3: Effects by Interactions Between Variables of Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Earnings Duncan NPB Log Earns
Shipmates Characteristics Score Index Index Occ1940†
Contacts’ Earnings High X 1.73∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗ 3.91∗∗∗
N Contacts High (0.48) (0.36) (0.43) (0.90)
Contacts’ Earnings High X 1.42∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗
N Contacts Low (0.47) (0.35) (0.43) (0.89)
Contacts’ Earnings Low X 0.70 0.64∗∗ 0.70∗ 1.63∗∗
N Contacts High (0.43) (0.30) (0.38) (0.79)
N individuals 97395 97818 97395 96484
R2 .338 .358 .367 .383
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of different measures of earnings and job quality
on the average characteristics of shipmates contacts. Each column shows the coefficients for the
interaction between two set of dummies. The first set of dummies indicates whether the shipmates
connections earnings are above or below the median of its distribution and the second set of
dummies indicates whether the shipmates number of connections is above or below the median
of its distribution. The omitted category is shipmates below the median of contacts earnings and
contacts number. † Coefficients multiplied by 100 in this column. The sample includes all male
passengers arrived in the period 1909-1924 matched with census years 1920-1930 and with non-
missing information on occupation. In Column (1) the dependent variable is the occupational
earnings score created by IPUMS. In Columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable is the Duncan
Socioeconomic Index and the Nam-Power-Boyd Index. In Column (4) the dependent variable is
the (log) median earnings of the occupation in 1940. All regressions include indicators for Week of
Arrival X Port of Departure and Place of Origin X Semester. Standard errors are clustered at the
Week of Arrival level.
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Table 2.A4: Effects Before and After the 1921 Emergency Quota Act
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Earnings Duncan NPB Log Earns
Shipmates Characteristics Score Index Index Occ1940†
Avg Contacts Earnings x Pre-Quota 0.15∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
Avg Contacts Earnings x Post-Quota 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.12
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12)
Number of Contacts x Pre-Quota 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.08∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Number of Contacts x Post-Quota 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
Mean DepVar
N individuals 97391 97814 97391 96480
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of different measures of earnings and job quality on the average
characteristics of shipmates contacts. The sample includes all male passengers arrived in the period 1909-1924
matched with census years 1920-1930 and with non-missing information on occupation. In Column (1) the dependent
variable is the occupational earnings score created by IPUMS. In Columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable is
the Duncan Socioeconomic Index and the Nam-Power-Boyd Index. In Column (4) the dependent variable is the
(log) median earnings of the occupation in 1940. In all regressions, the reported explanatory variables are the
average earnings score of the potential contacts of (unrelated) shipmates and the average number of them, in both
cases interacted with a dummy indicating whether the individual emigrated before or after the introduction of the
1921 Emergency Quota Act. Potential contacts are defined as past emigration from the same town of origin. For
every individual, the pool of unrelated shipmates excludes any passenger with same town of origin or with similar
surname. Surnames are defined as similar when the Jaro-Winkler distance is below 0.1. All regressions include
indicators for Week of Arrival X Port of Departure and Place of Origin X Semester. † Coefficients multiplied by
100 in this column. Standard errors are clustered at the Week of Arrival level.
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Table 2.A5: Alternative Definitions of Contacts on Land
(1) (2) (3)
Shipmates Baseline Definition Same Admin Region Same Town and
Characteristics (Same Town) and Similar Surname Similar Surname
Avg Contacts 1.25*** 2.77*** 2.78***
Earnings (0.14) (0.32) (0.47)
Number of 0.38** 0.72** 0.87*
Contacts (0.15) (0.35) (0.47)
N observations 130684 35552 17297
Each column shows the coefficients of a different regression of the individual earning score on the average earnings
and number of potential contacts of (unrelated) shipmates’. Explanatory variables are standardized with zero mean
and standard deviation one in every regression. Each column corresponds to a different definition of potential
contacts residing in the US. In Column (1), potential contacts are defined as past emigrants from the same town
of origin. In Column (2), potential contacts are defined as past emigration from same administrative area of origin
and with similar surname. In Column (3), potential contacts are defined as past emigrants from the same town of
origin and with similar surname. Surname similarity is based on nysiis phonetic coding. All regressions control for
fixed effects for Week of Arrival X Port of Departure and fixed effects for the group at which potential contacts are
defined interacted with census year. Standard errors clustered at the week of arrival level.
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Table 2.A6: Alternative Identification Strategies
(2) (3)
(1) Different Stops of Same Ship
Repeated Trips Any Port in Only First Port
of Same Vessel the Route of Departure
Boarding at Same Port:
Average Earnings of 0.08*** 0.11*** -
Shipmates’ Contacts (0.02) (0.04) -
Average Number of 0.03* 0.02 -
Shipmates’ Contacts (0.02) (0.02) -
Boarding at Different Port:
Average Earnings of - 0.07** 0.07*
Shipmates’ Contacts - (0.03) (0.04)
Average Number of - -0.01 0.01
Shipmates’ Contacts - (0.02) (0.02)
N observations 93305 48463 23791
Vessel × Port × Year Arriv X - -
Place of Origin × Semester X X X
Route × Semester X X X
Vessel FE - X X
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of the occupational earnings score on the average characteristics of
shipmates contacts. Each column is a different regression. The sample includes all male passengers arrived in the period
1909-1924 matched with census years 1920-1930 and with non-missing information on occupation. All regressions control
for the characteristics of own contacts, the number of passengers and the days elapsed since the previous trip of the
vessel. Column (1) only includes vessels with at least two trips during the year. The characteristics of the shipmates in
rows are the average earnings of contacts in land and the average number of contacts in land, calculated separately for
shipmates boarding the ship at the same port and at different ports of the same route. Columns (2) and (3) exclude
any ship with more than 90% of total passage boarding in the first port. Column (3) only includes passengers boarding
in the first port of the route. Potential contacts are defined as past emigration from the same town of origin. For every
individual, the pool of unrelated shipmates excludes any passenger with same town of origin or with similar surname.
Surnames are defined as similar when the Jaro-Winkler distance is below 0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the Week
of Arrival level.
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Table 2.A7: Subsample of Places of Origin Geolocalized with High Precision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Earnings Duncan NPB Log Earns
Shipmates Characteristics Score Index Index Occ1940†
Average Contacts Earnings 0.25∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.14)
Number of Contacts 0.04 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.08
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08)
Mean DepVar 52.04 24.09 45.53 714.03
N individuals 70925 71257 70925 70295
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of different measures of earnings and job quality on
the average characteristics of shipmates contacts. The sample includes all male passengers arrived
in the period 1909-1924 matched with census years 1920-1930 and with non-missing information on
occupation. The sample is restricted to those individuals for whom the town of origin is geocoded
with locality or sublocality precision level. In Column (1) the dependent variable is the occupational
earnings score created by IPUMS. In Columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable is the Duncan
Socioeconomic Index and the Nam-Power-Boyd Index. In Column (4) the dependent variable is the
(log) median earnings of the occupation in 1940. In all regressions, the first reported explanatory
variable is the average earnings score of the potential contacts of (unrelated) shipmates. The second
explanatory variable is the average number of potential contacts of (unrelated) shipmates. Potential
contacts are defined as past emigration from the same town of origin. For every individual, the pool
of unrelated shipmates excludes any passenger with same town of origin or with similar surname.
Surnames are defined as similar when the Jaro-Winkler distance is below 0.1. All regressions include
indicators for Week of Arrival X Port of Departure and Place of Origin X Semester. † Coefficients
multiplied by 100 in this column. Standard errors are clustered at the Week of Arrival level.
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Table 2.A8: Correlation in Outcomes by Spoken Language
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Same Work Same Log Dist Live Same
Ind x Occ Ind x State Residence City
SameShip x Same Lang 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ -6.63∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.77) (0.10)
SameShip x Diff Lang 0.03 -0.05 2.13∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.70) (0.12)
N individuals 134974 134974 193551 137602
N observations 18556160 18556160 37425892 19775703
All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Table displays the OLS regressions of individual-pair level
outcomes on a dummy variable indicating whether the pair travelled in the same ship, interacted with a
dummy indicating if the pair speaks the same mother tongue (based on census categories). The sample
consists of all matched male passengers arrived during the period 1909-1924, grouped into non repeated
pairs of individuals who arrived during the same week. The sample only include pairs of individuals with
different surname (defined as Jaro-Winkler distance above 0.1) and from different places of origin. In Column
(1) the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the pair works in the same occupation and industry. In
Column (2) the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the pair works in the same industry and lives in
the same state. In Column (3) the dependent variable is a measure of the log distance between the county
of residence of each individual in the pair. In Column (4) the dependent variable indicates whether the pair
lives in the same city. Regressions include indicators for each individual in the pair, fixed effects of Week of
Arrival X Port Departure(i) X Port Departure(j) where i and j index individuals in the pair and fixed effects
for Date Arrival (i) X Date Arrival (j). Standard Errors clustered at week of arrival level.
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Table 2.A9: Correlation in Outcomes by Contacts On-Land
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Same Work Same Log Dist Live Same
Ind x Occ Ind x State Residence City
SameShip X 0.12∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ -2.34∗∗∗ 0.16∗
HighCont-HighCont (0.04) (0.03) (0.59) (0.10)
SameShip X 0.16∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ -3.82∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗
HighCont-LowCont (0.06) (0.04) (0.79) (0.11)
SameShip X 0.29∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ -7.09∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
LowCont-LowCont (0.07) (0.06) (1.02) (0.13)
N individuals 134974 134974 193551 137602
N observations 18556160 18556160 37425892 19775703
All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Table displays the OLS regressions of individual-pair level
outcomes on a dummy variable indicating whether the pair travelled in the same ship, interacted with a
set of dummies indicating if both individuals have a high number of contacts on land, only one individual
has high contacts on land or both have high number of potential contacts on land. Contacts on land are
defined as the number of past emigrants from the same town of origin. The sample consists of all matched
male passengers arrived during the period 1909-1921, grouped into non repeated pairs of individuals
who arrived during the same week. The sample only includes pairs of individuals with different surname
(defined as Jaro-Winkler distance above 0.1) and from different places of origin. In Column (1) the
dependent variable is a dummy for whether the pair works in the same occupation and industry. In
Column (2) the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the pair works in the same industry and
lives in the same state. In Column (3) the dependent variable is a measure of the log distance between
the county of residence of each individual in the pair. In Column (4) the dependent variable indicates
whether the pair lives in the same city. Regressions include indicators for each individual in the pair and
fixed effects of Week of Arrival X Port Departure(i) X Port Departure(j) where i and j index individuals
in the pair. Standard Errors clustered at week of arrival level.
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2.11 Appendix B: Matching Passenger Lists and
Census using Machine Learning
In this section I provide further details on the matching procedure used to merge
Passenger Lists with Census Data. I start by describing the potential problem
faced by researchers dealing with large historical records. Then, I explain the steps
involved in the matching algorithm and the techniques used to increase its speed.
The Dimensionality Problem An important challenge when matching across
large datasets follows from the need of relying on fuzzy and noisy variables like
names and surnames. Economists have used a number of approaches to address
this problem, for instance, Fellegi & Sunter (1969), Christien & Churches (2005),
Goeken (2011) and more recent Feigenbaum, (2016). However, in many cases, these
approaches become unfeasible when data is large.66 Not surprising, many studies
relying on historical data have tried to overcome this problem by either using small
random sub-samples or by imposing restrictive assumptions during the matching
process.
Although recent advances in computer science have improved the search and
matching techniques (see for instance, Schulz & Mihov, 2002), they remain unfamil-
iar and probably inaccessible to most applied Economists. The lack of easy imple-
mentations and the high entry costs to this literature has contributed to their low
adoption. In this Appendix, I address the problem of matching across large histori-
cal datasets by improving on existing Machine Learning approaches (Feigenmabum,
2016). I introduce some simple modifications, popular among Computer Scientists,
which significantly increase the speed and reduce the computational requirements
of the matching process.
Two problems contribute to make matching unfeasible. First, the number of
calculations required to compare records increases exponentially with the sample
size. Intuitively, if there are N individuals in each dataset, the matching process
66I tried replicating the approaches described by Christien & Churches (2005) and Feigenbaum
(2016) using a 20% random sample of the data. Both procedures resulted unfeasible for a desktop
PC with intel-i7 processor and 24GB ram.
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involves comparing the name similarity of each pair of individuals which result in
NN calculations. Second, measuring similarity between string variables, involves
computationally intensive algorithms. For instance, the most extended measure to
compare two strings is the Levenshtein Distance (Levenshtein, 1966). It is defined
as the minimum number of character insertions, deletions or substitutions required
to transform the first string into the second one. Some statistical packages include
commands to calculate Levenshtein distances but they are typically slow due to the
complexity of the algorithm (usually based on Wagner & Fischer, 1974).
Blocking In some cases, researchers alleviate the first problem by narrowing the
subset of potential matches before comparing names. In my setting, this blocking
strategy, consists in defining for every individual i in the passenger list, a set of
Census individuals such that: 1) They arrived in the US during the same year than
i and 2) The distance in reported year of birth with respect to i is below 2. Then,
for each passenger, I search for census individuals with similar names and surnames,
only within the relevant block. In some cases, blocking solves the dimensionality
problem and matching performs reasonably well.
Unfortunately, in many cases like in my setting, blocks are too large and the
number of pair comparisons remain unfeasible. Some restrictive assumptions (like
blocking on phonetic coding, or on the first two characters of the surname) are
not recommended, particularly when dealing with non-English surnames, as they
significantly reduce the accuracy of the matching.67
Matching Procedure The whole procedure follows a number of steps described
below. Some steps are similar to those in Feigenbaum (2016), but some modifications
are introduced to increase the feasibility and accuracy of the method. For efficiency
reasons, the direction of the match is performed from the Passenger List to the
Census data.
1. Preliminar Cleaning: I start by using a dictionary of US places (states,
67An important advantage of the algorithm used in this paper is that the Levenshtein distance,
although computationally more intensive than the Jaro-Winkler distance, captures to a larger
extent different sources of string differences, (e.g. not only typos but also phonetic transcriptions,
etc.)
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cities and acronyms), to detect passengers that are either US citizens, or have
residence in the US. These individuals are excluded from the matching. Then,
I use a dictionary of names acronyms and abbreviations (e.g. Jno. for John)
and replace them in Passenger Lists and Census.68.
2. Unmatchable Cases: I drop multiple observations with same name, sur-
name, year of arrival and year of birth. These individuals cannot be distin-
guished from each other in the Census data, and therefore matching them is
not possible.
3. Set of Candidates: For every passenger arriving during year ya with year of
birth yb, find a set of “potential matches” in the census with year of immigra-
tion ya and year of birth yb±2 and with a Levenshtein distance in given name
and surname below a threshold d.69 This is the key step in the procedure and
usually unfeasible if performed without any additional restriction. I explain
later in this Section, two modifications that allow to identify candidates with
similar names and surnames significantly faster compared to existing algo-
rithms available in some statistical packages. Lastly, I drop any passenger for
whom the set of candidates includes multiple census individuals that match
exactly in name, surname and year of birth.
4. Human Trained Sample: The previous step defines a set of potential
matches for each passenger. I randomly sample 2000 sets, and for each one, I
decide whether there exists a candidate who is a “true match” for the refer-
ence passenger. As noted by Feigenbaum (2016), human criteria to detect true
matches is highly reliable and accurate compared to automatized heuristic pro-
cedures. In a recent paper Bailey et al.(2017) find that supervised procedures,
based on human trained samples, result in higher matching quality compared
to other methods like Ferrie (1996). The training step is performed using all
information available to the researcher, this includes the distance in names,
surnames and year of birth but also additional information on the whole set
of candidates and even the whole sample. Note that it is possible that no can-
68This dictionary is constructed based on information from genealogy sites
69Census data can be affected by rounding bias in the year of birth. For this reason, I also
include the closest round year of birth.
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didate is declared a true match. This would happen in two situations. First,
if no candidate looks similar enough to the reference passenger (e.g. surnames
are too different to be considered a typo or phonetic translation). Second, be-
cause more than one passenger looks similar to the reference passenger. When
deciding whether a candidate is a true match, I also consider the number of
candidates in the block, how similar is the second best candidate, how popular
is the name or surname, and any type of information that can be relevant. In
this step, the researcher sets the level of accuracy of the match as the following
steps are aimed to “imitate” the heuristic behavior of the researcher.70
5. Prediction of True Matches: Based on the human trained sample, I use a
Machine Learning approach to predict the true matches for the whole sample.
Feigenbaum (2016) proposes a double-threshold probit procedure and Goeken
et al. (2011) describe a Support Vector Machine approach71. In my case, I
use a Random Forest Classifier (Breiman, 2001) due to its well known out-
of-sample prediction properties. Additionally, the inclusion of a large set of
variables describing the whole set of candidates combined with the ability of
the method to detect highly non-linear patterns, notably reduces the number
of multiple predictions (i.e. two candidates are matched with the same passen-
ger).72 Indeed, cross-validation exercises reveals that the method results in a
negligible number of false positives matches.73 Bailey et al. (2017) shows that
the bias introduced by false positive links are more harmful than the biased
resulting in smaller matched samples and suggest that the quality of inference
can be improved by increasing the precision of match (at the cost of reducing
the number of matches). Table 2.B1 at the end of this section describes the
main variables used as inputs in the Random Forest Classifier.
6. Refining Predictions: The fact that each Census candidate can belong to
70Other linking approaches that use human trained samples are Goeken et al. (2011) and
Cristien & Churches (2005).
71This is similar to the procedure used by IPUMS to create census linked samples.
72For the few cases where multiple matches are predicted, I only consider the highest probability
match. Alternatively, the difference in the matching probability between the best and the second
best matching can be considered, but I find no significant differences in my case.
73The Scikit Phyton package includes an straightforward implementation of the Random Forest
Classifier
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the set of potential candidates of multiple passengers implies that for a small
number of cases, the same Census individual is matched with two different
passengers. In those cases, I use the matching probability of the Random
Forest model to assign as a true match the pair with highest probability. Then
I run the Random Forest Classifier again excluding from the set of Census
candidates those already matched to a passenger.74
As mentioned above, Step 3 is unfeasible even after blocking on year of birth
and year of arrival. Some improvement in the algorithm that searchs among similar
names and surnames is required to make any progress. The modifications I propose
are the following: 1) Reduce the number of comparisons by using indexed dictionar-
ies of names and surnames specific for every block. 2) Use a Levehnstein automata
approach for searching among “similar names”. A Levehnstein automata is a func-
tion that identify all the words within a list that are below a certain string distance.
The automata significantly reduces the speed of calculations by transforming the
dictionaries of names and surnames into a data structure called ”radix trie” which
decomposes words into a tree of common suffixes. Intuitively, the speed gain comes
from the fact that when two words are detected to be above a certain string distance,
every word sharing the same “branch” of the second word, will be at least at the
same distance, and many searches are skipped.
Indexed Dictionaries A simple way of increasing search speed is by eliminating
repeated calculations. This is achieved by creating a set of dictionaries for names and
surnames, specific to every year of immigration and year of birth block. For instance,
the target dictionary of surnames for a passenger arrived in 1911 with year of birth
1891, will contain the set of (non-repeated) surnames in Census data corresponding
to all individuals arrived in 1911 with years of birth 1889 to 1893. Each surname
is associated to a numerical id number. Similarly, names and surnames in the
Passenger List are stored in dictionaries specific to the year of immigration and
year of birth. Denote W PS (yb, ya) to the dictionary of surnames constructed with
individuals in the passenger list arrived in year ya and born in year yb. In a similar
74All the results in the paper are robust to dropping individuals who were originally matched
to multiple passengers.
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way, denote WCS (yb, ya) to the dictionary of surnames based on census individuals
arrived in year ya and born in year yb± 2. Instead of comparing among individuals,
dictionary search is reduced to find for every entry in W PS (yb, ya), a set of entries in
WCS (yb, ya) below a maximum Levenshtein distance defined by the researcher.
Levenshtein Automata and Radix Tries Search across dictionaries is more
efficient than comparing individuals records, however, calculating string distance
measures is slow. If dictionaries are too large, search remains unfeasible. I start by
decomposing each dictionary into a Radix Trie, a structure that store words as a
combination of suffixes (nodes) and paths connecting them.75 Figure 2.B1 below,
shows an example of it for a dictionary of 8 surnames. Note that each word is
associated to a parent branch and child nodes can emerge after a word terminates.
After transforming dictionaries into Radix Tries, I program a Levenshtein Au-
tomata that searches within the Trie and that for each entry in W PS (yb, ya), retrieves
a set of “similar” surnames from W PS (yb, ya) (similarly for given names dictionaries).
This Levenshtein Automata is thousands of times faster than any sequential word
comparison. The reason is the lower number of required computations. Intuitively,
as words are organized into branches, once the Automata detects a word not sat-
isfying the similarity criteria, it stops searching into subsequent nodes. Remaining
words in the branch, won’t satisfy the criteria as well.76
In order to further increase the speed, I add two additional elements. First, search
is adaptative: for short words I start with a lower tolerance (maximum distance of
2) and only increase this threshold if few similar words are found. For longer words,
the Automata starts to search with a tolerance of 3. The reason is that setting
a high tolerance bound for short words is inefficient as it would retrieve most of
the target words of similar length. Second, I store results as numerical matrices,
where each cell contains the id number that indexes the word and the first column
correspond to the Passenger List dictionary entries.77
75Radix tries are a common way in Computer Science to storage large volumes of string data.
Beyond the search speed increase, they are also useful to storage information in a sequential way.
76See author’s website for a simple example of an implementation of a Levenshtein Automata
based on Radix Tries based on Python.
77I further restrict the number of “similar words” to the closest 300 entries identified by the
Automata. This number is non-biding for the vast majority of names, but restricts the matrix
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Figure 2.B1: Radix Trie
The final step to find the “set of potential candidates”, is as follows: for every
individual in the Passenger List, find the Census individuals with given names and
surnames identified in the numerical matrices mentioned above. Since this step en-
tirely relies on numerical variables, the process is fast even for large volumes of data.
Figure 2.B2 below illustrates the efficiency gain of the improved algorithm. The fig-
ure compares the time required to find potential candidates for different number of
individual records using a target database with 100,000 individuals.78 The standard
method uses the stata command strdist to calculate Levenshtein distances and se-
quentially searches for candidates with names and surnames at a maximum distance
of 3. The efficient algorithm incorporates Radix Tries Search and Dictionaries as
explained in the text. The difference is significant, for instance, the standard al-
gorithm takes more than 8 hours to perform 5,000 candidates searches while the
improved algorithm does the same job in 16 minutes.
dimension for a small number of short names that match with any word of similar length. The
criteria to sort entries is based on the Jaro-Winkler distance (a variation of the Levenshtein distance
that accounts for the length of the string and the relative position of the unmatched characters,
(Lynch and Winkler, 1994)). This is convenient because it has a denser scale compared with
Levenshtein distance. Furthermore, Feigenbaum (2016) uses a Jaro-Winkler treshold of 0.2 to
restrict the pool of potential matches
78This size corresponds to the average size of a Year of Immigration X Year of Birth block,
although the number of searches is substantially lower than the one performed to construct the
dataset.The calculations were performed with an i7-7th generation Intel processor and 24 GB of
ram memory.
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Figure 2.B2: Comparing Search Algorithms
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Table 2.B1: Variables used for Random Forest Matching
Jaro Winkler Distance in first names
Pair Jaro Winkler Distance in surnames
specific Jaro Winkler Distance of names and surnames combined
variables Any match in the first name (relevant when multiple first names)
First names match in Soudex code
Surnames match in Soudex code
Difference in age
Round year of birth in Census
Round year of birth in Passenger List
Exact first name-surname match
Exact first name-surname-yearbirth match
First letter of first name matchs
First letter of surname matchs
Last letter of first name matches
Last letter of surname matches
Midle name initial matches (when multiple names)
First name case Census(e.g. multiple names, middle initial, etc.)
First name case Passenger List (e.g. multiple names, middle initial, etc.)
Number of potential candidates (and square)
Block and N of first name matches within block of candidates
aggregated N of surname matches within block of candidates
variables Average first name (Jaro Winkler) distance to all candidates in block
Average surname (Jaro Winkler) distance to all candidates in block
Jaro Winkler distance in first name to next candidate in block
Jaro Winkler distance in surname to next candidate in block
N of exact name-surname matches within block of candidates
Frequency of surname in Census
Frequency of first name in Census
Frequency of surname in Passenger List
Frequency of first name in Passenger List
Frequency of first name-surname combination
N of individuals in census year of birth cell
Note: The table does not list interactions between the variables included in the model.
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2.12 Appendix C: Geocoding geographical infor-
mation
This section describes the algorithm used to geocode the geographical units used in
the main analysis.
Places of Origin The data contains information on the “last town of permanent
residence”. I first identify those individuals reported as US residents and exclude
them from the matching process. For the matched sample, I pre-process the data
by correcting for common typos and abbreviations in city or country names (e.g.
Liverpool abbreviated as lpool). Then, I run a geocoding algorithm that uses the
Google Places Api to identify the following information: Latitude and Longitude
of the place, Name identified by Google Places and the Shouth-West/North-East
coordinates of the smallest rectangle that contains the place. This rectangle is used
in the main analysis to further restrict the set of shipmates assumed to be unrelated
before the voyage.
The algorithm runs in several steps. It first starts by running an automatized
search of the place of origin reported in the Passenger List (after cleaning). I only
keep the cases where Google Places retrieves a unique place and it refer to a locality
(city, village, etc.). For the remaining cases, I use a dictionary of country abbrevi-
ations and acronyms to split the sample by country of origin. Then, I search with
Google Places using biasing parameters corresponding to the country. In a second
step, I set the language parameter consistently with the country79. Finally, I man-
ually search for the remaining cases where more than one observation is observed
in the data. In many cases, the manual process consists in homogenizing names
spelled with typos and re-running the Google Places search. In other cases, it con-
sists in checking genealogy sites, and simple Google search for towns’ name changes
or translations.
In a number of cases (around 18% of the sample), the exact town can’t be
identified either because the individual report a broader administrative unit (e.g.
79This is useful for some eastern European cities, transcribed in their native language
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the Italian province or region instead of the town), or only a larger administrative
unit transcription is recognized by the algorithm, or the exact town does not exist
anymore.80 These cases are codified under the larger administrative region and the
corresponding rectangle accounts for this. Finally, a number of observations can
only be associated to disappeared historical regions (e.g. Kingdom of Galicia in the
actual border between Poland and Ukraine). For these cases, I manually assign a
coded name and the rectangle that covers the area of the historical region.
For towns identified with high precision, I use a reverse geocoding algorithm to
find the larger administrative region containing it. Broadly, this corresponds to the
Google Place Api administrative area level 3 category. Of course, due to changes in
political divisions during the 20th century, measurement error can be significant for
this codification.
Ports and Routes Following similar steps than those used to geocode the town
of origin, I obtain the latitude and longitude of every port of departure in the whole
sample (including not matched observations). When two ports belong to the same
city or they are located at less than 10 kilometers, I group them into the same unit
(e.g. Liverpool and Birkenhead). Some observations include not only the port of
departure but a whole list of ports covered during the voyage. In those cases, I only
consider the first port reported by the individual as the departure port. Notably,
the procedure geolocalizes the port of departure for more than 99% of the passenger
records in the period 1909-1924.
Using all the ports of departure in the ship identified at the passenger level, I
reconstruct the whole route of the vessel and calculate the total distance of the trip.
I assume that stops are sorted by their distance to New York port and the travel
distance is calculated as the sum of the minimum linear distance connecting the
stops. In the case of ships that stop at Caribbean ports, when constructing Route
Fixed Effects, I group them into the same category. There are three reasons for this
grouping. First, the distance between Caribbean ports is small and total distance,
other trip characteristics, and Caribbean ports’ conditions are quite similar if we
80The advantage of using towns of origin instead of regions or provinces, is that fewer towns
changed their names during the 20th Century.
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ignore this variation. Second, routes are identified based on the port of embarkation
of all the passengers within the ship. Given that relatively few passengers board
the ship in these small ports, differences in the estimated route can be due to
measurement error. Finally, the main analysis do not use individuals departing
from these ports.
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2.13 Appendix D: Baseline Effects by Ship’s Match-
ing Rate and Potential Attenuation Bias
Figure 2.D1 reports the baseline effects by quintiles of the ship’s matching rate.81
Effects are weakly increasing in the matching rate for both measures of shipmates’
connections. This suggests that some attenuation bias could be expected due to the
partial observability of the set of unrelated shipmates’. However, the fact that effects
are not uniquely driven by the highest quintile also indicates that attenuation bias
is not extremely large. This is not surprising given that many passengers within the
ship shared either the same town or the same region of origin. Thus, since matching
is orthogonal to individual characteristics (conditional on baseline controls), the
sampling variation is lower relative to a case where shipmates’ characteristics vary
at individual level (i.e. within towns of origin). For instance, in the extreme case
where individuals are matched proportionally to the share of their towns of origin
within ship, there is no attenuation bias if the matched sample is large enough to
include at least one individual per town of origin in the ship.
In order to explore this idea more explicitly, I perform a series of exercises based
on simulated data. Using a distribution of ships and passengers that replicates the
one observed in the full Passenger List, I generate the individual earnings as Yi(c) =
α+X¯i(−c)+Xi(c)+i, where Xi(c) is a simulated town of origin-specific component and
X¯i(−c) is the average town of origin component across all the unrelated shipmates’
contacts (in other words, it replicates the construction of the average earnings of
unrelated shipmates’ contacts as used in the previous sections.) The term  is an
idiosyncratic individual component. The variance of Xi(c) and i are calibrated based
on the distribution of their analogues observed in the matched sample data. Then,
I create a random sample of passengers for each ship and recalculate the variable
X¯i(−c) using only the sampled passengers. Finally, I calculate the attenuation bias
for different sampling percentages using OLS estimations of the earnings equation.
The main difficulty when estimating the distribution of towns of origin within
the ship (before sampling), is that this variable is harmonized only for the matched
81To avoid some confounding effects, the quintiles are calculated conditional on the Port of
Departure and the Year of Arrival.
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Figure 2.D1: Estimated Effects on Individual’s Earnings Score by Ship’s Matching
Rate
sample. The distribution of towns plays an important role in the attenuation bias as
all the shipmates’ characteristics ultimately depend on their town of origin. Hence, I
simulate the distribution of passengers among towns of origin using three alternative
assumptions: Uniform, Poisson and Binomial distributions. The parameters of each
distribution is calibrated to replicate the number of average towns per ship in the
matched sample data. 82
Figure 2.D2 shows the results of the simulations discussed above. The exercise
reveals that for all distributional assumptions, the attenuation bias is relatively
low. For instance, even for matching rates of 10%, the attenuation bias varies
from 15% to 25%. The low attenuation bias is mainly driven by the fact that
the number of different towns within the ship is not extremely large. Although
these simulations rely on a number of arbitrary assumptions (e.g. homogenous
82More specific, I start by simulating the distribution of towns with a low value for the distri-
butional parameter. The distributional parameter is expressed as a percentage of the size of the
ship (e.g. a uniform distribution with parameter of 0.5 implies that, on average, there is a town
every two passengers within the ship). Then, I create a random sub-sample of passengers for each
ship where the sampling rate is equal to the average matching rate in the data (approximately
12%). Finally, I calculate the average number of different towns per ship in the simulated random
sub-sample. If this value is below the average number of different towns per ship in the matched
data, I increase the distributional parameter and repeat the process until these values match.
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matching rate across ships), the findings from this section suggest that baseline
results shouldn’t be seriously downward biased due the partial observability of the
pool of shipmates.
Figure 2.D2: Simulated Attenuation Bias
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Chapter 3
The Local Effect of Executions on
Serious Crime
3.1 Introduction
The death penalty is arguably the most controversial criminal justice policy in the
US. Its divisiveness in the US political debate is demonstrated by the differences
across states in its application, by the back-and-forth Supreme Court decisions on
its constitutionality, and by the number of pressure groups devoted to advocate
against (and sometimes for) it. Proponents claim that it generates respect for law
and order and that it constitutes justifiable retribution for heinous crimes. On the
opposite side it is argued that it cheapens the value of life and that its uneven use
contributes to perpetuate social injustices.
The core issue from an academic perspective is whether the death penalty reduces
serious crime, most intuitively through a deterrence mechanism.1 Unfortunately
empirical evidence studying the link between the death penalty and serious crime
remains highly flawed, most importantly because of its inability to identify causal
effects (Donohue and Wolfers 2005, 2009, NRC 2012, Charles and Durlauf 2013,
Nagin 2013). Studies using state-year panel datasets are for instance hampered by
1While deterrence is the most commonly discussed mechanism, NRC (2012) note that there
are others, such as the social censure that is signaled by such an extreme form of punishment. On
the opposite side, it has been argued that the death penalty has a brutalisation effect that leads
to an increase in crime (Bailey 1998, Shepherd 2005)
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the likely correlation between unobserved determinants of crime (including other
features of the sanctions regime) and a state-year use of the death penalty. The
instrumental variables sometimes used to account for this endogeneity have not
been credible (Donohue and Wolfers, 2009).
In this paper we use a county-date panel dataset to provide causal evidence on
the local effect of executions on crime. For every execution we identify both its
exact date and the county where the crime motivating the execution was originally
committed (the ‘original-crime county’). We then investigate the existence of a local
effect, that is an effect in the original-crime county and during the days surrounding
the execution. Our focus is on serious but not necessarily capital-offense violent
crime, as we believe that highly salient penalties could have effects that spill over
into criminal behaviour not specifically covered by such penalties.2
We start the paper with a simple behavioural model, which we use to understand
the rationale for a short-term effect of executions on crime. In our model, the
comparison between the cost and benefit of crime is moderated by a psychological
variable which we label ‘awareness’ of the cost of crime (Loewenstein, 1996). Highly
salient criminal punishments raise awareness, but can be forgotten as time passes
(Mullainathan, 2002). The first prediction of the model is that executions reduce
crime, although this effect is only temporary. The second prediction is that the
additional effect of an execution decreases in the number of recent executions.
We test the first prediction by regressing serious crime on a local execution
dummy, which takes value one for the original-crime county and a short time win-
dow around the execution date. The high granularity of the dataset permits the
introduction of a rich set of controls (i.e. date and county-month fixed effects),
which enhances the credibility of the estimates. Executions are scheduled long in
advance, and typically take place in prisons located far away from the original-crime
county. Because of this, reverse causality is implausible in our setting. Furthermore,
2Our measure of serious crime combines homicides, rapes and assaults with weapons. However,
we also show the baseline results separately for each category of crime, including homicides. There
are several ways to understand these potential spillovers. In a purely Bayesian framework with
partially uninformed criminals and correlated sanctions, learning about an execution could lead
any violent offender to update on the likely punishment for his behaviour. In the behavioural model
that we outline in Section 3.2, highly salient punishments could raise general awareness about the
cost of crime even for non-capital offense criminals.
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omitted variables such as the sanctions regime remain arguably constant during very
short windows of time. The identifying assumption, which we regard as plausible,
is that executions do not occur in dates of abnormal levels of crime (in the original-
crime county, relative to other counties).
The main finding of the paper is that serious crime is .1 units lower (around
20% of the sample mean) during the local execution window. This finding is robust
to using either a one-day or a three-day window, and it is qualitatively similar
when studying separately homicides, rapes and assaults with weapon. The baseline
finding is also robust to controlling for state and date interactions, to using non-
linear models such as the Poisson model, and to alternative sample choices. We
complement the baseline specification with an event analysis to study the dynamics
of the crime reduction around the execution date. The examination of the estimated
leads and lags suggests that serious crime remains largely unchanged in the days
leading up to an execution, decreases in the day before and for two additional days,
and then returns to its pre-existing level.
We test the second prediction of the model by interacting the local execution
variable with the number of past executions in the original-crime county and dur-
ing the previous five years. The estimated interaction is positive and statistically
significant, confirming that the crime reduction effect of an additional execution is
lower in counties that are highly prone to the application of the death penalty.
A limitation of the literature studying the effects of the death penalty is the
inability to directly measure its impact on criminals’ perceptions about the execu-
tion risk. While we do not have access to perception measures in this paper, our
empirical analysis takes seriously the notion that criminals must be made aware
of the existence of an execution, if such an event is going to affect their behavior.
This notion provokes the focus on the original-crime county, as it is residents of
this county that should be more likely to receive information (or to be affected by
information) about an execution. We also test this notion directly by interacting
the local execution variable with a measure of the media attention associated with
that execution. We find that the baseline effect is stronger for executions that are
associated with a lot of media interest, thus providing evidence on the mechanism
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through which execution events affect criminal behaviour.
While awareness about an execution is predicted to increase most in the location
of the original crime, nearby locations may also be partially affected. We study
this in the last heterogeneity exercise of the paper, where we allow the effect of an
execution to differ non-parametrically depending on the distance between a county
and the original-crime county. The plotted estimates are consistent with the notion
that publicity about an execution is highest in the county most associated with it,
and then dissipates as one moves away from such epicentre.
Despite the voluminous literature on the death penalty, our findings arguably
represent the first causal evidence that executions have an effect on crime. The
focus on short-term effects implies however that we are reluctant to draw unwise
policy conclusions of the type ‘each execution prevents x units of crime’ (Ehrlich
1975, Dezhbakhsh et al. 2003). The amount of crime prevented could certainly be
larger than what we identify here. It may be, for instance, that some criminals do
not respond to each additional execution but would do so if capital punishment dis-
appeared completely from the statute book. This would be consistent with our first
heterogeneity exercise, which indicates the presence of a non-linear relation between
executions and crime. On the other hand, the total amount of crime prevented
could be lower than our estimates suggest. The focus on the short-term implies
that we cannot comprehensively study whether the effects that we identify lead to
a permanent reduction, or instead to a temporal displacement of criminal activity.3
As Chalfin and McCrary (2017) argue, both possibilities would constitute evidence
of responsiveness. However, from a policy perspective distinguishing between them
is obviously important.
Our objective in this paper is relatively modest. Prior to arguing that the death
penalty prevents enough crime to pass any type of cost-benefit analysis, we believe
it is important to credibly show that executions affect crime at all. We therefore
interpret our findings as providing a necessary first step in the academic evaluation
of the crime effects of the death penalty. The importance and controversy of this
3We fail to find any evidence of displacement to the week after the execution. However, the
lack of statistical power implies that we need to be cautious about this negative finding. The same
lack of statistical power makes us reluctant to examine effects beyond a single week.
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question implies that we would not want it to be the last step.
Related Literature The most influential study on the effect of the death penalty
is probably Ehrlich (1975), who claimed that each execution saved on average eight
lives. This study was comprehensively criticised by a National Research Council
report (1978). A later group of studies used state-year panel datasets and often
claimed to find very large deterrence effects (Dezbakhsh et al. 2003, Mocan and
Gittings 2003, Zimmerman 2003, Ekelund et al. 2006, Kovandzic et al. 2009).
These papers have in turn been subject to a wide array of persuasive criticisms (Na-
tional Research Council, 2012). In addition to the endogeneity concerns mentioned
above, several issues have been raised. Firstly, the fact that the number of execu-
tions per state-year is highly skewed implies that estimates are disproportionately
caused by a small number of outlying observations (Berk, 2005). More generally,
within-state year-to-year variation in executions is low relative to variation in crime,
and this makes it difficult to disentangle the effect of executions from other factors
affecting the crime rate (Donohue and Wolfers, 2005). Secondly, insufficient atten-
tion has been devoted to understanding conceptually how criminals should alter
their perceptions about the sanctions regime in response to executions. In addition,
there has been no consensus or clear criteria as to what the best empirical measure
for execution risk is. This is particularly worrying as estimates have been highly
sensitive to the measure chosen. Lastly, existing literature has typically assumed a
common effect, while there are reasons to expect effects to vary widely across states.
Our empirical design alleviates or circumvents the limitations above. Our simple
theoretical model is explicit about the assumptions underlying a potential short-term
reaction of criminals to news about an execution. Secondly, the use of disaggregated
data implies that the independent variable has to be binary, thereby reducing the
scope for arbitrary choices in its formation. The use of a binary independent vari-
able also reduces concerns about outlying observations.4 Thirdly, the focus on the
days surrounding executions and the original-crime counties makes inference easier.
Awareness about an execution is likely to be higher on these counties and dates,
4The number of executions in our sample is 493. Naturally, they represent a very small pro-
portion of county-date observations.
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so we maximise the statistical power of the study when focusing on them. Lastly,
we conduct a set of heterogeneity exercises, thereby allowing for the effects to differ
across executions and counties.
Our paper is most related to a small set of studies that estimate short-term
effects of executions (Phillips 1982, Grogger 1990, Hjalmarsson 2009). The focus on
the short-term represents definite progress in terms of identification. However, these
studies are also single-jurisdiction time-series analyses, and as a result lack a control
group that can capture time effects. The restriction to a single jurisdiction both
limits the number of executions examined and therefore the power of the study, and
forces the researchers to select states where the frequent use of the death penalty
implies that the effect of an additional execution should be lower.5
3.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section we outline a simple framework to rationalise why executions could
have a (transitory) effect on crime. At the core of the model is the notion that
psychological forces that can change significantly over short time periods can affect
behaviour. The effect of these forces is distinct from the Bayesian updating on the
expected consequences following conviction that is at the heart of the cost benefit
analysis of crime (Becker, 1968). Our model instead builds upon ideas in psychology,
criminology and behavioural economics.6
We assume that criminal acts yield instant utility u and the expected cost of
5In addition to the panel studies discussed above, there is a body of work using time series
econometric methods to link capital punishment and crime (Stolzenberg and D’Alessio 2004, Land
et al. 2009, Cochran et al. 1994, Bailey 1998). The major limitation of these studies is that they
are not well placed to identify causal effects (Charles and Durlauf, 2013).
6For instance, the drift theory of crime states that criminals often develop the ability to tem-
porally neutralize the internal cost of not complying with social norms (Matza, 1964). In a related
explanation, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argue that criminal acts are often non-controlled, im-
pulsive, opportunistic and short-sighted. They then relate poor parental inputs and crime through
the development of a low self-control capacity. Building upon the notion that moral codes are
not objective or universal, Gibbs (1989) claims that public punishment actions communicate the
signal that ‘society condemns some acts’. In economics, Loewestein (1996, 2000) assumes that
tastes and attention can be affected in the short run by emotions and drives. These visceral factors
typically change fast and are predictably correlated with external circumstances. Laibson (2001)
proposes a model where trivial variations in situational cues can elicit temporary but powerful
changes in marginal utility. Card and Dahl (2011) empirically show that unexpected emotional
cues can trigger violent actions by changing the reference point of a ‘gain-loss’ utility function.
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crime is c. Note that c is time-invariant and therefore not affected by informational
updating on the consequences of crime.7 Instead we follow Loewenstein (1996) in
assuming that the comparison between benefits and costs of actions is distorted by
a psychological state st that we label ‘awareness’ of criminal consequences. Specif-
ically, the individual commits a crime whenever u > stc. While we refer to st as
‘awareness’, it can be alternatively interpreted as the visceral factors of Loewenstein
(1996), the perceived social norms of Matza (1964) or the level of self-control in
Thaler and Shefrin (1981). The important assumption for our purposes is that st is
affected by information on events such as executions, especially when these relate
to individuals or locations that feel proximate to the decision-maker.
Define xj = 1 as the occurrence of an event (such as a proximate execution)
in period j. xj = 0 if the event did not occur. Under full persistence, st = 1 if
at least one event occurred in the past, and zero otherwise. We instead posit that
the state variable awareness st = s(Xt,Wt) is a function of the history of events
Xt = (x1, ..., xt) and of a corresponding system of weights Wt = (w1t, w2t, ..., wtt).
We assume a random recalling process where events increase awareness but their
effect is forgotten over time (Mullainathan, 2002). In particular, awareness is a
linear combination of past events, st =
∑t
j=0wjtxj/
∑t
j=0 xj, where the weight wjt
can be interpreted as the persistence of event xj in st. This implies that at time t
event xj is remembered with probability wjt, which we assume is given by:
wjt = m+ pRj,(t−1) (3.1)
where the term m is a baseline probability of recalling an event and Rj,(t−1) = 1 if the
event j was remembered in the previous period. We assume that α ≡ m/(1−p)p < 1.
The expected recalling probabilities are obtained by backward solving (3.1) for
E(wjt|xj) using the facts that E(Rj,(t−1)|xj) = wjt−1 and that wjj = 1 (i.e. the
individual always remembers what just happened). Therefore,
7If that was the case, executions could affect these perceived consequences and therefore have
medium or even long-term effects. This is of course unless criminals form their beliefs using signals
from a short span of time.
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E(wjt|xj) = pα + (1− α)pt−j
This equation implies that recalling probabilities decay exponentially after an event
if no new events occur. Denote x˜t as the number of accumulated events before period
t. The expected level of awareness is given by the following expression:
E(st|Xt) = pα + (1− α)
x˜t
t∑
j=0
xjp
t−j
From this expression we can easily derive our first result:
Result 1: In a setting with imperfect (random) recall probabilities, a new
event reduces crime temporarily.
To prove this result, we calculate ∆t = E(st|Xt−1, xt = 1) − E(st|Xt−1, xt = 0) for
a given sequence of events Xt−1. We find that:
∆t =
1− α
x˜t(x˜t + 1)
t∑
j=0
(1− pt−j)xj (3.2)
The assumption that α < 1 implies that ∆t > 0. Because the individual commits a
crime whenever u < stc, this implies that crime is (weakly) reduced when there is
a new event. The fact that E(wjt|xj) decreases over time implies that this negative
effect fades over time.
Result 2: In a setting with imperfect (random) recall probabilities, the effect
of a new event decreases with the number of accumulated past events.
It is straightforward to show in equation (3.2) that ∂
2∆t
∂xj∂x˜t
< 0. Intuitively, the
marginal effect of a new execution is lower in counties with lots of executions.
3.3 Data
We use several data sources to construct an unbalanced date and county panel
dataset. The main variables are the level of crime and the presence of an execution
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caused by a crime in that county. Table 3.1 displays a set of descriptive statistics.
Figure 3.1 displays the set of counties in the sample, and highlights the counties
with at least one associated execution during the period that that county appears
in the panel.
The information on criminal activity is extracted from the National Incident-
Based Reporting System (NIBRS). The NIBRS is a voluntary program where par-
ticipating law enforcement agencies report detailed information to the FBI, on a
monthly basis. Our sample contains every county and month reported to the NI-
BRS during the 1997-2015 period. Note however that the number of counties covered
has been increasing over time. Around 30% of the US population was covered in
2013, up from close to zero in 1997.8 The number of county-date observations in
the main estimating sample is 8,462,202.
We use information at the incident level, taking into account that an incident
can be associated with multiple offences (e.g. an armed assault being inputted as
an assault and an illegal carrying of weapons). Our dependent variable ’serious
crimes’ is the sum of homicides (murders and non-negligent manslaughters), rapes
(forcible rapes and sex assaults) and aggravated assaults accompanied by the use of
a fire weapon.9 In Panel B of Table 3.1 we find that the average of serious crimes per
county-day is .14. This low number results both the relative rareness of these crimes
and the fact that many counties covered by the NIBRS are quite small. Rapes and
assault with weapons are similarly prevalent, with homicides being less common.
The data on executions is extracted from the website https:deathpenaltyinfo.org.
For every execution we identify the county where the capital offense was originally
committed (i.e. the ’original-crime county’) and use this to compute our main
independent variables of interest. In total, we find 493 executions for which the
original-crime county is covered by the NIBRS during that particular month (see
Panel A of Table 3.1). These executions occur in 143 different counties, with an
average of 3.45 executions per county. Figure 3.A1 in the Appendix shows the
number of executions per year for the period and counties in our sample. Figure
8Our empirical strategy, which controls for the interaction of county, month and year, is de-
signed to account for within-county changes in coverage over time.
9Aggravated assaults are those regarded as unlawful attacks for the purpose of inflicting severe
or aggravated bodily injuries.
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3.A2 in the Appendix displays the distribution of executions and serious crimes by
day of the week.
Lastly, we use ’death penalty’ search results from Google Trends to measure the
media attention received by each execution. This data is available only from 2004
onwards. Google Trends does not report the total number of searches, but instead an
index of the relative intensity of searches. We compute our measure in the following
way. We first compute gst, which is the index for state s (relative to all states in the
US) in date t. We then use US-aggregate information to calculate zmt, which is the
index for date t in the month m to which t belongs.
Our measure of death-penalty related media attention in a state-date combina-
tion is Mst = gst × zmt. The measure captures the relative interest in death-penalty
related topics within a state and date. Note that by construction this measure is
normalised by the amount of media attention present within a particular month. It
is therefore orthogonal to the large increase in the use and coverage of the internet
over our sample period.
3.4 Event Study Analysis
In this section we study the evolution of serious crime in the days preceding and
following an execution, in the county where (many years earlier) the crime leading to
that execution was originally committed. Our main independent variable of interest
is the dummy Executionjit, which takes value one (for a county i date t combination)
on the day j relative to the date of an execution motivated by a crime in that county.
The estimating equation is:
crimeit =
+6∑
j=−6
βjExecutionjit + γt + (αi × pim(t) × λy(t)) + it
where crimeit is the number of crimes, γt represents a set of date indicators and
(αi×pim(t)×λy(t)) is a set of interactions between county, month and year indicators.
The date indicators absorb any US-wide shocks to crime occurring on a particular
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date.10 Including the interacted county, year and month indicators controls for
any county-specific shocks within the relatively narrow time window of a month.
Standard errors are clustered at the state and year level, a choice that we regard as
conservative.
The identifying assumption implicit in the estimation of (3.3) is that executions
are not scheduled to take place on days of idiosyncratically high or low crime in the
original-crime county, relative to other counties on the same date and to that same
county on that same month. We regard this assumption as plausible. Executions are
scheduled well in advance and they take place in a single maximum-security prison
per state. The prison is typically not located in the county where the original crime
occurred.11
Figure 3.2 displays the estimated effects βˆ−6 . . . βˆ+6, using the number of serious
crimes (homicides, rapes and assaults with weapon) as dependent variable. We find
that crime remains largely stable prior to the eve of an execution (the dip at j = −4
is not statistically significant). A statistically significant decrease on the eve of the
execution persists approximately for two additional days, and then crime returns
to its pre-existing level.12 Figure 3.A3 in the Appendix shows that the estimates
are essentially unchanged when controlling for the interaction of date and state
indicators.
We interpret the evidence in Figure 3.2 as indicating that executions have a
negative effect on crime. This negative effect is consistent with news about the
execution affecting would-be criminals’ awareness of the potential consequences of
crime. Figure 3.2 further indicates that this effect is very short lived, lasting around
three days. In light of this evidence and in order to increase statistical power, our
baseline regressions use dummy variables capturing time windows around the execu-
10In one of the robustness tests, we find that the results are essentially unchanged when inter-
acting the date indicators with state indicators.
11The Death Penalty Information Center maintains a list of upcoming executions
(https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/upcoming-executions). Executions are scheduled up to five years
in advance. For a list of the prisons where executions take place in each state, see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Execution chamber.
12The finding that serious crime starts to decrease already the day before the execution is
consistent with Hong and Kleck (2018) finding that newspaper and television stories start to
report on executions the day before they take place.
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tion date.13 We estimate our main results using a one-day time window (comprising
exclusively of the execution date), as well as a three-day window (which additionally
includes the day before and the day after the execution). We show below that the
results do not depend on the choice of window.
3.5 Main Results
In this section we display the main results of the paper. We estimate variations of
the equation:
crimeit = βExecutionWindowit + γt + (αi × pim(t) × λy(t)) + it
where ExecutionWindowit is a dummy variable taking value one in a time window
(either one or three-day) around an execution, in the county where the original
crime was committed. The other variables are defined as above. We present first
the baseline results and then a set of additional tests exploring their robustness.
Baseline Estimates Table 3.2 displays the results of estimating (3.3), separately
for the serious crime variable and for each of its three components. We find first that
the number of serious crimes is approximately .10 units lower in the window around
the execution date. Note that this is a very large effect: the mean of the variable
serious crimes in the sample is only slightly higher, at .14. A better reference point
is perhaps the mean in the subset of counties associated with at least one execution
throughout our sample period. As Panel B of Table 3.1 shows this is .48. Evaluated
against this benchmark, the estimate represents a decrease of approximately 20% in
serious crime.
We find qualitatively similar results when evaluating separately the effects on
homicides, rapes and assaults with weapons. Evaluated against the mean of the
dependent variable, the effects are strongest for homicides. The .012 coefficient
13The baseline regressions implicitly assume that dates close to the execution date but outside
the chosen time window are not associated with higher or lower levels of crime (relative to that
same county in that same month). In light of the evidence in Figure 3.2, this assumption appears
to be justified.
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of the one-day window represents approximately half of the mean of the homicide
rate in the counties associated with at least one execution. The relative rarity
of homicides implies however that the estimate is not statistically significant for
the three-day window. For rapes and assaults with weapons the estimated effects
represent between 15% and 25% of the means of the respective dependent variables
in the counties associated with at least one execution.
Robustness In Table 3.3 we evaluate the robustness of the main findings to mod-
ifying the set of controls, the estimating equation, the clustering strategy and the
estimating sample. An extensive robustness exercise is particularly important in
our context, given the well-documented finding that death-penalty estimates can be
extremely fragile to specification choices (Donohue and Wolfers, 2009).
We first add interactions between date and state indicators to the baseline re-
gression (3.3). In doing this, the identification assumption is that executions are not
scheduled in days of idiosyncratically high or low crime in the original-crime county,
relative to other counties in the same state. Because executions do not typically
take place in the original-crime county, we regard this assumption as particularly
plausible. The estimates are largely unchanged.
Relative to non-linear methods with a large number of fixed effects, OLS has the
advantage of being more robust and easy to interpret (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In
the fifth row of Table 3.3 we estimate however a Poisson model, which may be more
appropriate given the count nature of the dependent variable (Hjalmarsson, 2009).
The coefficients are strongly statistically significant and similar in magnitude to
those in the baseline regression. The estimated coefficients indicate that executions
are associated with a 16%-20% decrease in serious crime, in the original-crime county.
In the fourth row, we find that the coefficients are strongly significant, albeit much
smaller in magnitude, when the number of serious crimes (plus one) is entered in
logs.14
In the baseline regression, the standard errors allow for correlation within the
same state and year. In the fourth row of Table 3.3, we allow the date to be an
14The log model is likely misspecified in our context, given the high proportion of zeros in the
serious crime variable.
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additional dimension of error correlation (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2011). The
two-way clustered standard errors are essentially identical to the baseline one-way
standard errors.
In the last three rows of Table 3.3, we examine the robustness of the estimates
to changes in the estimation sample. We first exclude counties from the state of
Texas, which can be regarded as an outlier in its enthusiastic application of the
death penalty.
Secondly, we limit the sample to including only counties from states where
at least one execution took place during the sample period. Note that the non-
execution states only contribute in the baseline regression to the estimation of the
date fixed effects. It could be argued, however, that excluding these non-execution
states generates a better counterfactual to the original-crime counties during the
execution window.
In the last row of Table 3.3 we account for the fact that the coverage of the NIBRS
has increased significantly throughout the sample period. Our baseline empirical
strategy (where we control for the interaction of county, year and month indicators)
is designed to absorb secular trends and even relatively short-term variations in
crime. Nevertheless, we repeat the estimations with a (balanced) panel of counties
that are present throughout the period 2002-2015.
Overall, we find that the baseline estimates are not sensitive to these reasonable
alterations of the estimation sample.
3.6 Heterogeneity
The theoretical framework in Section 3.2 provides a number of testable additional
predictions. Firstly, it suggests that the awareness impact of an additional execu-
tion should be higher in counties where executions are relatively rare. Secondly, the
model is based upon the notion that it is news about execution that increases aware-
ness of the negative consequences of crime. This suggests that executions that are
widely covered by the media should impact criminal decision-making more strongly
than those that receive less attention. It further indicates that, while the strongest
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effects should be concentrated on the original-crime county, neighbouring counties
may also be partially affected, as there may be informational spillovers towards these
counties.
Death Penalty Propensity We first study whether the increase in awareness
decreases in the number of past executions of the county. Our measure is the num-
ber of past executions in the five year window previous to (the month before) an
execution, in the original-crime county that the execution is associated with. Note
that by defining the variable in this way, we ensure that it does not mechanically in-
crease over the sample period. We interact this measure with the main independent
variable of interest, the time window around an execution. An additional compli-
cating factor is the strong positive correlation between the number of executions in
a county and its population, a correlation that one would expect. The complica-
tion arises because the population of a county is also related to its level of crime.
Therefore, in this heterogeneity exercise we also control for the interaction with the
county’s (log of) population.
Panel A of Table 3.4 displays the results. The positive coefficient of the in-
teraction with the county’s death penalty propensity indicates that the effect of
executions on serious crime is lower in counties with a higher number of past exe-
cutions, as predicted by our conceptual framework.This finding provides a potential
reconciliation of our paper with Hjalmarsson (2009), who finds no effect of execution
on homicides in a sample from the state of Texas. Given that Texas carries out a
disproportionately high number of executions every year, our findings predict that
the effect of each additional execution should be relatively low.
Media Attention In our second heterogeneity exercise, we differentiate between
executions receiving different levels of media attention. Our initial measure of me-
dia attention is based on Google Trends search results and explained in detail in
Section 3.3 above. We use this measure to split the main independent variable into
two different variables, depending on whether the execution windows coincide with
(within state and date) above median media attention regarding death penalty is-
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sues.15 Because our measure of media attention varies within a county/month and
also within a date, we need to explicitly control for it in the regression.
We find in Panel B that it is only executions associated with above median media
attention that are associated with decreases in crime. For these execution windows,
the effect is in fact much larger than the baseline effect. For instance, for the one
day window the effect is -.175. The above median and the below median dummies
are statistically different from each other at the 7% level.
Neighbouring Counties Lastly, we examine in Panel C whether counties that
neighbour the original-crime county also experience a decrease in crime during the
execution window. To study this, we use an additional variable: a dummy taking
value one during an execution window and for counties sharing a border with the
original-crime county. Naturally, the regression maintains the main independent
variable of interest.
The resulting estimate for the one-day window indicates that the number of
serious crimes is approximately .025 units lower on the day of an execution, in the
counties neighbouring the original-crime county. Note that this effect is economically
meaningful and statistically significant. Reassuringly, it is also much smaller than
the original-crime county estimate, which remains largely unchanged.16
Panel C of Table 3.4 suggests that the awareness regarding an execution (and its
impact on crime) may ripple away from its epicentre at the original-crime county.
To study the functional form of this relation, we calculate the distance between (the
centre of) a county and (the centre of) the original-crime county. We then create a
set of distance dummies and combine these with the original time windows around
executions. The corresponding estimates from introducing these in equation (3.3),
for the one-day window, are displayed in Figure 3.3. At zero kilometres we display
the baseline effect for the original-crime county.
We find that surrounding counties with a (centre to centre) distance of less than
15Because the information from Google Trends is only available from 2004 onwards, these re-
gressions exclude all years before that. This reduces the number of executions to 311. Out of these,
189 are classified as coinciding with high media attention.
16It is one fourth of the original-crime estimate, although as we can see in Panel B of Table 3.1
the average number of serious crimes is also smaller, at .21 rather than .48.
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50 kilometres experience a .04 decrease in the number of serious crimes, during the
execution day. The effect is .02 decrease for counties between 50 and 100 kilometres
away, smaller at higher distances, and statistically insignificant beyond 2,000km.
Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that awareness about an execu-
tion (and its effect on behaviour) is strongest for would-be criminals that are closer
to the location of the original crime.
3.7 Conclusion
Although the death penalty is a controversial criminal justice policy in the US,
credible causal evidence about its effect is scarce. In this study, we focus in the
county-day level variation as a plausibly source of identification. We show that
executions cause a local and temporary reduction in serious violent crime (homi-
cides, rapes and assaults with weapon). We interpret this result using the simple
behavioural model explained in Section 3.2. The empirical findings of Sections 3.4,
3.5 and 3.6 are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework. Namely,
that the effect is decreasing in the number of recent executions in the county, and
higher for executions associated with a lot of media attention. We interpret our
findings as providing a necessary first step in the academic evaluation of the crime
effects of the death penalty. Our focus on short-term effects implies however that we
are reluctant to draw unwise policy conclusions regarding the effectiveness of death
penalty to prevent crime. Indeed, the magnitude of our results are much lower that
previous studies claiming significant deterrence effects this policy. However, as dis-
cussed in Section 3.1, we find reasons to think that compared to a counterfactual
scenario with no executions, the total amount of crime prevented could certainly be
larger or smaller than what we identify.
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3.8 Figures of the Chapter
Figure 3.1: Sample of Crimes and Executions
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Figure 3.2: Event Study: Evolution of Serious Crime in Days Around Execution
Day
Figure 3.3: Effects by Distance to Original-Crime County
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3.9 Tables of the Chapter
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Executions
Only Execution or
N in N of Neighboring Counties
Sample Counties Avg N Std Min Max
Executions 493 143 3.45 7.86 1 70
Executions in 1,496 350 4.27 8.04 1 70
Neighboring County
Panel B: Crimes
Execution Neighboring
All Counties in Sample Counties Counties
Total Avg Std Avg Std Avg Std
Serious Crimes 1,173,252 0.14 0.66 0.48 1.27 0.21 0.69
Homicides 50,257 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.11
Rapes 586,928 0.07 0.35 0.21 0.64 0.10 0.43
Assaults Weapons 540,346 0.06 0.43 0.25 0.84 0.10 0.41
The table displays descriptive statistics for executions and crimes for the sample period. The sample consists of
8,462,202 day-county observations during the period 1997-2015.
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Table 3.2: Baseline Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Serious Homicides Rapes Assaults
Dependent Variable Crime Weapons
1 Day Execution Window -.101*** -.012** -.053*** -.036*
(.026) (.006) (.021) (.019)
3 Days Execution Window -.085*** -.006 -.045*** -.033***
(.016) (.004) (.012) (.011)
Mean Dependent Variable .139 .006 .069 .064
In Execution Counties .481 .024 .209 .248
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of crime on the combinations of a time window surrounding
an execution and the county where the crime motivating that execution was originally committed. The 1 Day
Execution Window comprises of the execution date. The 3 Days Execution Window includes also the day before
and the day after the execution. Every coefficient results from a different regression. All regressions control for
Date indicators and County X Month X Year indicators. The standard errors are clustered at the State X Year
level. The dependent variable in column (1) is the sum of the dependent variables in columns (2), (3) and (4).
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Table 3.3: Robustness
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable = Serious Crimes 1 Day 3 Days
Window Window
Baseline -.101*** -.085***
(.026) (.016)
Adding State X Date Indicators -.094*** -.078***
(.026) (.016)
Poisson Regression -.202*** -.157***
(.064) (.038)
Dep. Variable in Logs -.041*** -.032***
(.012) (.007)
Multi-Way Clustering -.101*** -.078***
(.026) (.016)
Sample Excludes Texas -.12*** -.094***
(.045) (.026)
Sample Includes only States with Executions -.094*** -.078***
(.026) (.016)
Balanced Panel 2002-2015 -.095*** -.076***
(.028) (.019)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of the number of serious crimes on the interaction between a
time window surrounding an execution and the county where the crime motivating that execution was originally
committed. Every Panel/Column combination displays a different regression. In Column (1) the time window
comprises of the execution date. In Column (2) the time window includes also the day before and the day after the
execution. In Panel A the independent variable is interacted with the propensity to carry out the death penalty
in that county, measured as the (log of the) accumulated number of executions in the county. The regression
also controls for the interactions with the (log of the) number of days since the last execution, and the (log of
the) county’s population. In Panel B an additional independent variable is added to the regression, capturing the
interaction between a time window surrounding an execution and the counties neighbouring the county where the
crime motivating the execution was originally committed. In Panel C, the main independent variable is interacted
with a weekly indicator of media attention, measured using the Google Trends result at the state level for death
penalty topics. All regressions control for Date indicators and County X Month X Year indicators. The standard
errors are clustered at the State X Year level.
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Table 3.4: Heterogeneity
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable = Serious Crimes 1 Day 3 Days
Window Window
Panel A: Death Penalty Propensity
Execution Window .362 .405***
(.288) (.171)
Execution Window X Death Penalty Propensity .075* .045***
(.039) (.019)
Execution Window X County Population -.043* -.043***
(.026) (.015)
Panel B: Media Attention
Execution Window X High Media Attention -.175*** -.125***
(.048) (.034)
Execution Window X Low Media Attention .008 -.062
(.074) (.048)
High Media Attention -.001 -.001
(.001) (.001)
Panel C: Effect on Neighbouring Counties
Execution Window -.102*** -.085***
(.026) (.016)
Execution Window (Neighbouring County) -.024** -.027***
(.012) (.008)
This table displays estimates of OLS regressions of the number of serious crimes on the interaction between a
time window surrounding an execution and the county where the crime motivating that execution was originally
committed. Every Panel/Column combination displays a different regression. In Column (1) the time window
comprises of the execution date. In Column (2) the time window includes also the day before and the day after the
execution. In Panel A the independent variable is interacted with the propensity to carry out the death penalty
in that county, measured as the (log of the) accumulated number of executions in the county. The regression
also controls for the interactions with the (log of the) number of days since the last execution, and the (log of
the) county’s population. In Panel B an additional independent variable is added to the regression, capturing the
interaction between a time window surrounding an execution and the counties neighbouring the county where the
crime motivating the execution was originally committed. In Panel C, the main independent variable is interacted
with a weekly indicator of media attention, measured using the Google Trends result at the state level for death
penalty topics. All regressions control for Date indicators and County X Month X Year indicators. The standard
errors are clustered at the State X Year level.
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3.10 Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures
of the Chapter
Figure 3.A1: Executions by Year
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Figure 3.A2: Distribution of Executions and Crime by Day of the Week
Figure 3.A3: Event Study: Evolution of Serious Crime in Days Around Execution
Day. Controlling for State X Day Indicators
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Conclusion
This thesis used three different natural experiments to study, in three specific
settings, the economic importance of mechanisms usually regarded as “soft factors”
within organisations and markets.
The first chapter contributes to the literature by providing one of the first causal
evidence on how the ability to communicate face-to-face (in addition to electronic
communication) can increase organisational performance. The study focus on a
large organisation where workers must complete a task that requires communicat-
ing electronically with their teammates. The teams have to answer emergency calls
and based on the extracted information they allocate police officers to attend the
incident place. A computerized queuing system that allocates calls to workers in a
way that is orthogonal to the incidents creates a natural experiment where team-
mates often share the same room. Co-location of teammates is associated with a
significant reduction in the allocation and response time of the police. An additional
contribution of the chapter is to show that the benefits from face-to-face communi-
cation are largely contingent to the characteristics of the tasks, teams and working
environment. In this sense, the increase in productivity is larger when the task is
more urgent, the team is more homogenous and the workload is higher. Additionally,
the chapter develops a theoretical framework that allows understanding the costs
associated to face-to-face communication. An advantage of the empirical setting is
that it allows measuring and comparing the benefits and the (operational) costs of
face-to-face interaction. Results indicate that benefits are significantly larger than
(operational) costs.
The second chapter exploits a natural experiment during the “age of mass mi-
gration” where thousand of immigrants travelled (mainly from Europe) to the US
sharing the voyage with other individuals from different backgrounds and socioe-
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conomic status. The study focus on the social interactions among individuals who
met for the first time in the ship during the few days of the voyage. Using a novel
dataset linking more than 300,000 immigrants to their ships of arrival, I study how
the characteristics of the (previously unknown) shipmates affect labour and residen-
tial outcomes. I focus on two predetermined characteristics of the shipmates that
proxy for the quality of their connections at destination. Namely, the average earn-
ings and the total number of past emigrants from the same place of origin to the US.
Both variables aim to measure how well connected is a shipmate. Results indicate
that individuals travelling with better connected shipmates get higher quality jobs
in the US. The chapter discusses several results suggesting that shipmates provide
information or access to job opportunities. An important finding of the chapter is
that the effects are stronger for those individuals with poor connections. The results
of the study highlight the importance of brief social interactions and their persistent
effects on labour outcomes.
The third chapter shows a causal link between executions and a local reduction
in serious violent crime (homicides, rapes and assaults with weapon) in the days
surrounding the event. The identification strategy exploits the high frequency of
crime data (county x day) and the fact that executions are set many months in
advance and at the state level. Focusing on the county where the capital crime
occurred and using daily variation makes the identification of the effects credible
and transparent. The chapter offers a theoretical explanation for the causal pattern
observed in the data. The simple behavioural model is based on the idea that
information updates about death penalty can (temporarily) increase the perceived
costs of crime. The model has additional implications that are consistent with other
findings of the chapter. In this sense, results indicate that executions have lower
effects in places with high propensity to death penalty and when executions received
lower media attention.
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